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Abstract

In 1997, the Province of Ontario formed the City of Toronto, amalgamating one regional
and six small municipalities into a single city government. This action altered the formal
institutions of local governance, replacing what was once regional with a City Council
meant to represent “city-wide” issues, and without providing a clear model for local or
smaller-than-city decision-making. The purpose of this dissertation is to conceptualize
the meaning of “local governance” within the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of
wards (as represented by councillors), community councils, business improvement areas
and neighbourhood associations, each of which claim geographical boundaries as
justification for the representation of locally-based populations, and claim to be open to
participation to some degree. This research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has
unrecognized consequences, in particular, the effect on historically marginalized
residents. This dissertation offers a theoretical conceptualization of “local governance”
grounded in legal pluralism and legal geography that presents the city as a set of uneven
and overlapping local legal spaces operating on multiple scales. Using a mixed methods
approach that includes doctrinal review, case studies, and semi-structured interviews, the
dissertation finds that wards dominate the law and practice of local decision-making, and
do not represent an inclusive local governance model in Toronto. BIAs and
neighbourhood associations are unevenly distributed across and the city, exist mainly in
the socio-economically privileged areas and have grown in number and broadened their
mandates since Toronto’s 1997 amalgamation. Toronto’s community councils, which
were initially conceived by the province as a means to provide “local” access to
municipal decision-making, have failed to achieve their legislative potential. The
dissertation concludes that reimagined community councils, grounded within a normative
understanding of the urban commons, serve as a means to create a more inclusive and
participatory local governance model in Toronto.
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Introduction
In 2013, Toronto City Council decided to alter a recently-approved seven-stop Light Rail
Transit (LRT) project in Scarborough, a suburban area that comprises about a quarter of
the city’s land mass, to a three-stop subway.1 The LRT was meant to provide rapid transit
access to some of the poorest residents of Toronto, who at present endure long commutes
using a complex network of buses and an outdated rail line. The rationale for the shift in
the plan, as asserted by the then-Mayor Rob Ford, was that Scarborough residents
deserve equal consideration in city-wide decision-making.2 In his view, spatial and
distributional justice demanded a rapid transit plan equivalent to those of other areas
within Toronto. In the five years that followed, the subway dwindled to a single stop,
exacerbating the “transit injustice” that has plagued Scarborough for years,3 and the price
escalated from one to three billion dollars.4 The Scarborough subway decision alerts us to
the need for transit plans that address the needs of Toronto’s poorest residents.5 However,
it also raises another crucial issue at this point in Toronto’s municipal history: should
local residents have a say in “city-wide” decisions? In the case of the subway, what role
should Scarborough residents have had – especially the most vulnerable – in determining
the policy actions that affect their day-to-day lives?
The central question that this dissertation seeks to answer is what “local governance”
means in the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of various governance bodies, each
with their own set of geographic boundaries and assertions of representation. In Toronto,
these overlapping bodies are wards (as represented by councillors), community councils,
business improvement areas and neighbourhood associations, each of which claims

1

City Manager, Report to City Council: Scarborough Rapid Transit Options (12 July 2013), online:
<https://perma.cc/9E5M-YZ3L>.
2
Bob Hepburn, “Scarborough deserves respect, fairness,” Toronto Star (30 June 2016), online:
<https://perma.cc/Z3F9-PB8L>.
3
Roger Keil, Melissa Ollevier and Erica Tsang, “Why is there no Environmental Justice in Canada” in
Julian Agyeman, Peter Cole, Randolph Haluza-DeLay, Pat O'Riley (eds), Speaking for Ourselves:
Environmental Justice in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) at 78.
4
City Clerk, City Council Decision: Next Steps on the Scarborough Subway Extension, City of Toronto
(28 March 2017), online: <https://perma.cc/W6N6-K5T6>.
5
Rahul Gupta, “Scarborough group demands province study LRT plan,” Inside Toronto (25 April 2017),
online: <https://perma.cc/U9MG-NQGA>.
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geographical boundaries as justification for the representation of locally-based
populations, plays a role in local governance, and claims to be open to participation to
some degree. Fundamentally, this research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has
unrecognized consequences and how these consequences affect marginalized people.
“Representation” refers to the meaningful involvement of all demographics of the
populations who reside within the applicable boundaries. “Marginalized people” are
economically disadvantaged populations, although I recognize that gender and racial
factors interpenetrate economic disadvantage. While the conceptual meaning of “local
governance” is explored later in this dissertation, I start with a working definition of the
term as a geographically identifiable community that makes a governance claim based on
particular boundaries. Given that all of these governance bodies articulate their mandate
in terms of a claim to “local governance,” I centre the theoretical examination of the
meaning of this term and its implications.
I. Why local governance?
According to Saskia Sassen, the global city is a singular, territorially-specific entity
alongside others that competes internationally for the ideal nexus of profitability and
livability.6 At the same time, large cities are the sum of their local geographies, identified
by boundary lines that demarcate neighbourhoods and communities.7 City decisionmaking is often thought of in the context of City Council, a body comprised of a mayor
and councillors that determines the municipality’s policies and by-laws. In reality, given
the breadth of matters within their jurisdiction, large cities must delegate to committees,
commissions and other bodies responsibility to consider certain matters, sometimes as
final decision-makers. Outside of formal government and its “top down” powers of
delegation, grassroots or “bottom up” publics form at the community or neighbourhood
level within cities, nudging and urging transformation.
My interest in this topic began while I was working in a senior policy role at the City of
Toronto between 2009 and 2015. My areas of expertise were “city-wide” matters like
6
7

Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Pine Forge Press, 2012).
Gerald E. Frug, “The Geography of Community” (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1047.
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intergovernmental relations, housing, and infrastructure, which had clear routes of
reporting into City Council. By contrast, I observed that “local” issues were comparably
undefined and messy to my legally trained brain. I learned that the city’s electoral
districts, called wards, divided Toronto into 44 geographic spaces each with an elected
councillor. But, it was also evident that councillors varied extensively in their day-to-day
involvement in negotiating ward-based matters. At that time, I observed that, despite their
name, the city’s four community councils did not have a role in issues like housing, child
care, community centres or transit, regardless of the local interest in such initiatives;
these issues, instead, fell within the mandates of the “city-wide” standing communities.
Public engagement changed a lot too, during my time at City Hall, including the
disbanding of almost all of the city’s advisory committees and a loss of staff mandate to
pursue “Civics 101,” an educational initiative to increase knowledge about municipal
government. This wild west of messy local spaces, governance, and engagement was
fascinating to me, and I eagerly wanted to understand how “local governance” was
actualized in the city.
Even before its genesis as a city in 1834, Toronto divided its geography based on
“wards,” a construct borrowed from England, whereby an elected councillor represents
the residents of each ward. Wards remained the connective tissue of the city’s governance
throughout its many annexations and amalgamations, the most recent in 1998 when the
Province of Ontario brought together seven municipalities to form the current City of
Toronto. Until 2006, the Province of Ontario had the authority to draw municipal
boundaries. The city’s current wards are a legacy of this provincial power: Toronto’s 44
wards were struck in 2000 based on the federal and provincial electoral districts and then
divided by two.8
In 1998, the forced provincial amalgamation of one upper-tier and six lower-tier
municipalities resulted in a lawsuit, a referendum, and unparalleled civic activism.9 The
8

At the time of writing, Toronto’s 44 wards – now with very different populations – are being redrawn for
the first time since 2000, a process detailed in Chapter 5.
9
Mary Louise McAllister, Governing Ourselves?: The Politics of Canadian Communities (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2004) at 38.
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resident opposition centered on the impact that the new “mega city” would have on
public access to City Hall. The Province of Ontario included a last-minute change in the
City of Toronto Act, 1997 that required the new City of Toronto to consider the inclusion
of “neighbourhood committees” and “community councils” in its governance model. 10
Caught between a fear of a decentralized model that would ultimately privilege the
former municipalities and the political pressure to include governance bodies lying
somewhere between the ward and City Council, the new City of Toronto created
community councils with very little autonomy, no community representation, and a
narrow set of issues defined as “local” delegated for their review.
Since their inception, there has been little change in the mandates and composition of
Toronto’s four community councils. Under the City of Toronto Act, 2006 (COTA), City
Council has wide authority to determine who may serve on a community council and
their corresponding authorities.11 The councillors within community council boundaries
are the sole members. Community councils may make final decisions on specified “local”
matters like on-street permit parking and traffic calming, but not matters affecting more
than one community council, nor matters that have been determined to have “city-wide”
significance. A seldom-used provision of the City’s procedural bylaw also gives
community councils the power to consider “neighbourhood issues.” In conceptualizing
community councils, neither staff nor City Council has explained the rationale for the
“local” versus “city-wide” binary, nor how to reconcile arguments that an issue could, in
fact, be both.
This dissertation also examines the role of the two other bodies that play an important
role in local decision-making. Business Improvement Areas (BIAs) have existed in
Toronto since 1970 and are regulated through the city’s procedural bylaw. By contrast,
neighbourhood associations are ad hoc organizations that are unregulated by and have no
formal ties to the City of Toronto and correlate with higher than average socio-economic
10

City of Toronto Act, 1997 (No. 2), S.O. 1997, c. 26 (this legislation was introduced to create the new
amalgamated City of Toronto. Other than provisions to the contrary in this Act, the City of Toronto
remained subject to the authorities prescribed under the Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.45, as amended
and, later, repealed).
11
City of Toronto Act, 2006. S.O. 2006, Ch. 11 [hereinafter “COTA”].
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demographics. Both BIAs and neighbourhood associations justify their advocacy and
service roles by asserting that they represent local populations within specific boundaries.
Both BIAs and neighbourhood associations engage in active lobbying and can play a
highly influential role in the decisions that take place at the ward or community council
level.
Wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations each play a role in
local governance. But, what does their overlap mean in understanding the term “local
governance” and what are the effects on inclusive representation across Toronto? These
are the questions that this dissertation seeks to answer.

II. Mapping Toronto: Competing Tales of Prosperity and Inequality
Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes that “maps distort reality in order to establish
orientation.”12 Likewise, the maps used to describe Toronto orient our attention and
establish a lens of analysis. In one city map, we see a growing, prosperous, diverse urban
space. This account of Canada’s largest city, with a population of 2.6 million people at
the last census count,13 is replete with distinctions such as eighth safest14 and fifth most
livable city in the world;15 tenth most financially competitive city;16 and in fifth place for
its labour and economic “attractiveness” in North America.17 In 2016, Toronto was
chosen to join the Resilient Cities Network, an initiative of the Rockefeller Centre which
provides funding for the hiring of a “Chief Resiliency Officer” to tackle the effects of
globalization, urbanization and climate change, as well as networking opportunities with
other “global cities.”18 This version of Toronto is the “economic engine” of the region,

12

Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading – Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law”
(1987) 14 J.L. & Soc’y 281 at 458.
13
City of Toronto, 2011 Census: Population and Dwelling Counts (last retrieved: 11 May 2017), online:
<https://perma.cc/AN6N-PN4Z> at 1.
14
Economist Intelligence Unit, The Safe Cities Index (2005), online: <https://perma.cc/W785-YS72>.
15
Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Liveability Ranking (2016), online: <https://perma.cc/47C9NLUN>.
16
Z/Yen Group Limited, GFCI 19 Introduction (2016).
17
Toronto Region Board of Trade, Toronto as a Global City: Scorecard on Prosperity (2015), online:
<https://perma.cc/2U8C-JANK>.
18
Rockefeller Foundation, 100 Resilient Cities, Overview (2016), online: <https://perma.cc/X4EG-ZZ4V>.
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province, and country, with 10% of the country’s GDP drawing from the activity within
its boundaries.19
This orientation reinforces Toronto’s emerging status as a “global city,” one of a small
set of interconnected urban centres that dictate the flow of capital and attract
investment.20 Likewise, Richard Florida’s theory of the creative class describes an
economically-thriving, progressive urban centre like Toronto’s, where young, mobile
workers flit across the globe, starting companies, painting hipster graffiti and ultimately
strengthening the economic prosperity of those cities fortunate enough to attract them.21
“The creative centres tend to be the winners of our age,” he writes. “Not only do they
have high concentrations of creative economic outcomes in the form of innovative and
high-tech industry growth. They also show strong signs of overall regional vitality such
as increases in regional employment and population.”22
This account of Toronto sees its sizeable newcomer population as evidence of the success
of Toronto’s motto, “Diversity our Strength.” The BBC dubbed Toronto the “most
multicultural city in the world,”23 with over two hundred racialized communities and 140
languages spoken.24 This map portrays Toronto as a welcoming, growing, and thriving
city, where people come to make their home and a better life for themselves.
This vibrant characterization obscures Toronto’s growing spatial injustice, visible when
the lens of analysis zooms in on localized areas of the city. Under this more focused
view, low-income and visible minority residents inhabit different parts of the city than
affluent or middle-class white Torontonians. Scholars Alan Walks and David Hulchanski
have written extensively about the rising levels of income inequality over the last three

19

Toronto Region Board of Trade, Toronto as a Global City: Scorecard on Prosperity (2015), online:
<https://perma.cc/2U8C-JANK>.
20
Saskia Sassen, “The Global City: Introducing a Concept (2005) XI:2 Brown Journal of World Affairs 27
at 39.
21
Richard Florida, “Cities and the Creative Class” (2003) 2:1 Cities and Commentary 3.
22
Ibid. at 8.
23
D. Flack, “Toronto named most diverse city in the world,” blogTo (15 May 2016),
online: <https://perma.cc/KH7X-WH43>.
24
Ibid.
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decades and the degree to which this inequality is spatialized.25 Hulchanski identified
three geographically distinct cities in his 2010 report: one where incomes have increased
by 20% since 1970; a second where incomes have increased or decreased by less than
20%; and a third where incomes decreased by more than 20%.26
Toronto’s spatial poverty is overlaid with racial inequality. As Roger Keil, Melissa
Ollevier and Erica Tsang write, “Toronto’s view of itself as the most diverse city on the
planet usually comes with the bravado of claiming normative superiority in questions of
diversity, too.”27 The reality is a “paper thin veneer” of multiculturalism, when in fact,
poverty and inequality are socio-spatially located.28 As a cautionary tale, they write,
“Much of the literature on ghettos comes from the United States, where racial
segregation, particularly of the black and Hispanic population, is a major concern.
Although stark segregation like that in the United States does not (yet) exist, there are
indications of increasing inequalities in Canadian cities, especially Toronto.”29 Keil,
Ollevier and Tsang include housing amongst the most egregious environmental concerns
in the city, with substandard housing in poor, racialized areas of the city laden with
rodent infestations and hazardous odors.30 The least economically affluent areas are also
“transit deserts,” meaning that they suffer from the poorest levels of transit service.31
Since 2009, when Keil, Ollevier and Tsang wrote their piece, the geographic disparities
of low-income and racialized communities have become even more acute. According to
the Toronto Foundation’s 2016 Vital Signs report, income inequality is increasing by
double the speed in Toronto as compared with the rest of the country.32 This report notes
25

See e.g. Alan Walks, Income Inequality and Polarization in Canada’s Cities: An Examination and New
Form of Measurement (Toronto: Cities Centre, 2013), online: <https://perma.cc/9J35-3VZJ>; and David
Hulchanski, The Three Cities Within Toronto: Income Polarization among Toronto’s Neighbourhoods,
1970–2005. (Toronto: University of Toronto Cities Centre, 2010).
26
Ibid. at 7.
27
Keil, Ollevier & Tsang, supra note 3 at 66.
28
Ibid. at 66, referencing Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer, “Spaces of Difference: Reflections
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that Toronto is the “child poverty capital of Canada” with over 28% of children living in
poverty.33 Overall, more than 22% of Toronto’s residents live in poverty, similar to
Boston and Los Angeles, and second only to London, UK.34 In Toronto, poverty is
racialized. The 2011 National Household Survey notes that poorer areas tend to have
more visible minorities and immigrants.35 White, non-immigrant children have the lowest
poverty rates.36 The United Way recently concluded that, “Left unaddressed, Toronto is
at risk of becoming the income inequality capital of Canada.”37 Perhaps as a reflection,
the number of immigrants moving to Toronto dropped by 19% from 2011 to 2013.38
This present study focuses on the zoomed in characterization of Toronto to analyze how
the local governance model overlaps with and affects the city’s spatial inequality.

III. Theoretical Considerations
This dissertation brings together the scholarship of legal pluralists, in particular Santos,39
with the work of property and local government scholars Gerald Frug,40 Sheila Foster
and Christian Iaione,41 legal geographer Nicholas Blomley42 and interdisciplinary scholar
Mariana Valverde,43 to conceptualize “local governance.” I advance a conceptualization
of “local governance” drawn from notions of legal pluralism and legal geography that
offers new insights into the spatiality of Toronto’s local boundaries and bodies, and their
33
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impact on the city’s most marginalized populations. This conceptualization holds that,
first, “local governance” is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple
normative orders known as “local legal spaces,” which cannot be considered selfenclosed, autonomous units; and second, that state iterations of local governance bodies
create political, social, and spatial realities, through multiple overlapping institutions;
incorporate other norms, orders, rules and practices; and include and exclude certain
people and communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. This
project advances both legal pluralism and legal geography project by recognizing
localized areas of the city as multiscalar and interlegal in themselves, with a local
governance model that is inclusive of a plurality of formal and informal bodies and
geographies.
This conception moves beyond the contours of legal scholarship to explore the
implications of this study for notions of power. Valverde, Blomley, and Santos belong to
the loosely defined and still-unfolding legal geographies project and consider how maps
and geography can shed light on the dynamics of legal and political power. They and
others within the legal geography project also explore the complexities of “interlegality,”
meaning how norms and laws interact within particular spaces and over time, and how
power is asserted and competing parties claim jurisdiction. As detailed in Chapter 3,
Toronto’s local governance model embodies the overarching aim of these and other
scholars to make sense of overlapping, discontinuous, and in some cases contradictory
boundaries and institutions.
Drawing on this conceptualization, I advance a normative argument that inclusive,
participatory “local governance” should be conceived within the theoretical framework of
the urban commons. In so doing, I apply Foster and Iaione’s model of the urban
commons that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, the city is a
territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is
reinforced in law.44 Foster and Iaione draw on Elinor Ostrom’s famous study, captured in
her book Governing the Commons, which meticulously challenged the assumption that
44
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common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and
inefficiency.45 Foster and Iaione adapt Ostrom’s thesis to the urban form and, in
particular, to the question of how public-private organizations can effectively play a role
in governing specific city areas. They argue that to do so, they must incorporate “bottomup” governance practices by engaging the public. My dissertation draws on Foster and
Iaione’s work to argue that the urban commons represents a helpful normative framework
that values inclusive participation in the specific practices of laws and institutions created
by local governments.
However, Foster and Iaione rightly note that in considering the city as an urban
commons, and in conceptualizing governance institutions, the question of inclusivity is
crucial, even though they do not directly contend with this question in their work. As
such, my normative theoretical contribution incorporates the work of Gregory Alexander,
Eduardo Peñalver and Gerald Frug, also property law theorists, who delve squarely into
the impact of boundaries on the representation of historically disadvantaged people in
city spaces. These and other authors, including Richard Thompson Ford, have observed
that creating neighbourhood boundaries and enabling local power also lead to “insiders”
and “outsider” and disproportionately impacts racialized, low-income people, and others
who have been historically disadvantaged. Through the notion of the urban commons, I
apply the conceptualization of “local governance” to advance a normative understanding
of the roles and mandates of Toronto’s local governance institutions. In doing so,
Valverde, Blomley and Santos’ works complement notions of the urban commons in
providing a framework for Toronto’s complex, messy local governance model for the
analysis that follows in the dissertation.
IV. Case studies: Exploring “Local Governance” in “City-wide” Decisions
Under COTA, City Council is empowered “to represent the public and to consider the
well-being and interests of the City.”46 Under the theoretical framework advanced in this
dissertation, “city-wide” issues have disparate, specific and localized effects, meaning
45
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that local impacts are created by decisions taken at the “city-wide” level. This dissertation
introduces two case studies to evaluate the theoretical framework advanced in Chapter 1,
including how wards, community councils, business improvement areas and
neighbourhood associations are involved in decision-making on “city-wide” issues, and
the effect of their roles on inclusive participation.
In Chapter 4, this dissertation explores two casino decisions taken by City Council in an
eighteen-month period with vastly different results. In the 2012-13 casino debate, four
casino options were identified as possible locations for a new casino in the City of
Toronto, all soundly rejected by City Council on the basis of “local” concerns such as
traffic, planning and the localized effects of addiction and health. In 2015, the expansion
of the Woodbine Racetrack to a casino in Rexdale, one of the city’s poorest areas, was
approved. These decisions offer insights into how place-based notions of “local
governance” are exercised unevenly across the city, examining how advocates in the
downtown debate were able to modify governance practices to shift the scale of decisionmaking, while “local” issues in suburban Rexdale focused exclusively on economic
considerations, with the casino characterized as a rare opportunity for job creation with
little attention to civic engagement, incorporation of community knowledges or
consideration of the social effects of casinos. The studies query whether “local
governance” served as a privileged, but ultimately unequal, assertion in contested
jurisdictional claims and whether the spatiality of casino development demands attention
to the empowerment of local communities amidst a landscape of socio-economic
inequality.47
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Chapter 5 sets out the ward boundary review initiated in 2013. This case study took place
over two terms of Council and concerned the drawing of new ward boundaries
throughout Toronto. The ward boundary review was the first since the introduction of the
City of Toronto Act, 2006, which gave the City of Toronto expansive authority to
consider the design of its governance model, including the drawing of electoral districts.
Like other governments, Toronto is bound by jurisprudence that mandates that wards be
drawn, in part, to protect the boundaries of “communities of interest.”48 This case study
directly examines the contested meanings of “communities of interest” asserted by
councillors, BIAs, neighbourhood associations and others, and how these meanings
overlay with the geographically-based placement of wards and other local governance
bodies. This case study directly examines the bodies empowered in the review, and the
interplay between wards and other “local governance” bodies, including BIAs and
neighbourhood associations.
The analysis presented in both case studies tests the conceptualization of “local
governance” introduced in Chapter 1. The case studies also animate the central normative
question in this dissertation, explored in Chapter 6: how can the framework of the urban
commons advance an inclusive, participatory “local governance” model in Toronto?
V. Structure of the Argument
Chapter 1 articulates the theoretical framework that forms the backbone of this
dissertation. I review the major debates in legal pluralism and legal geography related to
the concept of “local governance.” Drawing on the work of Blomley, Valverde, and
Santos, I theorize a meaning of “local governance” that builds on what I call “local legal
spaces,” meaning the competing spatial claims to smaller-than-city areas of the city. I
offer a conceptualization of “local governance” that recognizes the pluralistic and
interlegal nature of “local legal spaces,” yet is framed by the state in political and spatial
terms without necessarily incorporating other norms, orders, rules and practices, and may
ultimately include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of
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boundaries and participation rules. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. First, it advances
the legal geography project by focusing on smaller-than-city spaces as pluralistic,
comprised of multiple scales, and with significant implications for distributional justice.
Second, it argues in favour of a normative conception of an inclusive and participatory
local governance model based on Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s notion of the
“urban commons.”
Chapter 2 sets out the methodological approach used to understand the meaning of “local
governance” within the City of Toronto. This dissertation uses a mixed methodological
approach, combining doctrinal analysis with qualitative empirical methods of case
studies, interviews, and ethnographic observation. In this chapter I set out the methods
used to obtain data on wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations,
and detail the criteria used to select the case studies, together with the role of doctrine,
semi-structured interviews, data analysis, and ethnography to gather the data necessary to
draw the conclusions reached in this dissertation. My theoretical framework and
normative argument are interested in how “local governance” is constructed by official
actors and within official city governance institutions, and, as such, I explain why the use
of case studies to examine the localized effects of “city-wide” issues is critical to
conceptualizing “local governance.”
Chapter 3 sets out the City of Toronto’s existing model of local governance. The aim is to
explain the “law in the books” in the city’s smaller-than-city governance and focuses
specifically on wards and community councils, as well as the city’s neighbourhood
associations and business improvement areas (BIAs).49 First, I set out the interplay
between provincial requirements and the city’s bylaws as they relate to governance. This
chapter explains the historical significance of the ward and the centrality of the ward
councillor in local decision-making. Next, this chapter introduces community councils as
“ghosts” of the former municipalities with largely unused powers to redefine and reframe
local governance. Third, I show that neighbourhood associations and BIAs assert a role in
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local governance both by advancing representation based on particular geographical
boundaries, and through their privileged access to ward councillors and formal municipal
governance bodies. The chapter details the histories, locations, and mandates of these
organizations, setting out the differences and similarities in their relationship to the city.
Drawing on quantitative and interview data describing the role of these bodies in local
governance and their interaction with other actors, I argue that neighbourhood
associations positively correlate with higher levels of homeownership and economic
advantage, however, have significantly modified their structures and mandates to move
beyond planning as the focus of attention.
To further understand the meaning of “local governance,” Chapters 4 and 5 set out the
case studies used in the dissertation: the 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions, and the ward
boundary review. The case studies were “city-wide” issues, meaning that they were
identified under city policy as having city-wide significance and therefore requiring
deliberation and decision-making by City Council and the Executive Committee. The
objective of the thorough case study review is to examine more closely whether and how
wards, community councils, neighbourhood associations, and BIAs are involved in
deciding these “city-wide” issues through the assertion of a local role. The chapter sets
out the meaning of “local governance” that emerged from each of the case studies, as
well as the degree to which this governance was inclusive and participatory.
Chapter 6 draws together the data presented throughout the dissertation to reimagine
Toronto’s local governance model through the lens of an urban commons. The
dissertation concludes that ward councillors are the chief representatives in decisionmaking regarding the local impacts of city-wide issues; BIAs and NAs can play an
important role in representing local issues at the ward level, but their presence varies
spatially across the city; and community councils can use their authority under the
procedural bylaw to mediate city-wide matters with community groups and gather
expansive information on the local implications of city-wide issues, but these powers are
seldom employed. The result, I argue, is a local governance model that operates unevenly
across Toronto’s landscape of spatial inequality. The chapter applies the conceptual
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meaning of “local governance” presented in Chapter 1 to the City of Toronto’s local
governance model, querying what a reframing within the urban commons would mean
for the city’s approach to local decision-making. The chapter concludes with an
ambitious agenda in the making of “local governance” in Toronto that conceptualizes
community councils by incorporating urban commons principles.
VI. The Normative Aspiration
Outside of its theoretical contributions, this research is timely and important from a
normative perspective. First, scholars from numerous disciplines and decision-makers
across governments continue to grapple with questions as to optimal approaches to
decision-making, representation, and participation at the municipal level.50 From a
theoretical perspective, scholars have presented compelling analyses as to why Jane
Jacobs’ advocacy of neighbourhood-based decision-making can lead to inequalities in
resident participation and resource sharing across cities in the United States, but fewer
studies have taken place within the Canadian context.51 Also, many studies have focused
on city planning rather than a broader set of issues that conceptualizes the meaning of
“local governance.” This research sheds light on how Toronto’s overlapping local
institutions contribute to understandings of local governance, both conceptually and
geographically, and the impacts of this overlapping model on participation. This research
hopes to advance an understanding of how the current model of local governance affects
residents and to reconsider approaches to participation and representation.
Second, this research aims to be specifically meaningful for policy-makers in the City of
Toronto who may soon reconsider the role and scope of its local governance model.
Toronto is now the sixth largest jurisdiction in the country with a population larger that
many Canadian provinces. The policy areas within the City of Toronto's authority are
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tremendously broad. In a typical City Council meeting, issues under consideration range
from street sign names to long-term regional transit planning and funding. Despite the
city’s size and the complexity of the issues under review, City Council continues to make
almost all decisions, with little delegation to other bodies. Regarding local governance,
ward councillors representing approximately 60,000 residents exercise a tremendous
amount of power, with little role for the city’s four community councils. At the same
time, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have ballooned in number and broadened in
mandate since amalgamation, seeking a broader role on matters of relevance to their
neighbourhoods. As detailed in Chapter 5, Toronto is grappling with the re-design of its
ward boundaries, where questions of jurisdiction, geographic boundaries, and who is
included - and thus excluded – within the city’s mapped areas have been raised.
Following the ward boundary review, the City of Toronto will turn its attention to the
boundaries of community councils and, perhaps, their role and composition. This
dissertation aims to contribute to this ongoing dialogue by asking how the City of
Toronto can conceive of a local governance model that better represents its diverse
residents.
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Chapter 1 – A Theoretical Map-Making of “Local Governance”
This dissertation conceptualizes the meaning of “local governance” by asking how local
spaces within the city of Toronto are created, imagined and governed by law. This
chapter sets the theoretical framework for the dissertation, which focuses on “local
governance” as comprising overlapping geographies and competing claims to
representation, and examines how the overlap impacts meaningful, inclusive
participation. I offer a conceptualization of local governance that is grounded within legal
pluralism and legal geography, and that is meant to serve both explanatory and diagnostic
purposes. By “explanatory,” I mean the principles or statements used to explain facts or
phenomena, to be tested later based on the methodological approach outlined in Chapter
2. By “diagnostic,” I mean the identification of causes and contributions to particular
outcomes. I introduce a roadmap of the various literatures that come together to explain
the meaning of local governance within the context of legal pluralism and legal
geography.
A key area of exploration – the one that will be the chief focus of this dissertation –
expands on what has been termed “vertical tensions” within legal geography, meaning
the many scales that operate with a given jurisdiction.52 Drawing on the work of Gerald
Frug, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Mariana Valverde, the theoretical framework of
the dissertation queries vertical tensions within the “local legal spaces” of the city, asking
how scale operates within this smaller-than-city scale. In my project, I limit the question
to which formal and informal actors and institutions claim to represent those within
localized areas of the city, examining their legal structures, the geographies that they
advance, and the implications for the meaningful participation of residents across the city.
Following this conceptualization of “local governance,” chiefly meant to theorize how
local legal spaces overlap and impact inclusive participation in local governance, this
chapter argues that the “urban commons” as advanced by Sheila Foster and Christian
Iaione may serve as a useful normative framework for an inclusive, participatory local
52
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governance model. The aim of the dissertation broadly – and of this chapter specifically –
is to defend a conceptualization of local governance that is subsequently evaluated in the
case studies that follow.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, this chapter sets out the legal geography
framework that serves as the basis for the conceptualization of local governance,
including the meaning and relevance of interlegality, legal pluralism, and local legal
spaces. Second, as the core element of this chapter, I bring together these literatures to
offer and defend a two-part conceptualization of local governance according to which,
first, local governance is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative
orders such that local spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous units; and,
second, that state iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial
realities, through multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms, orders, rules
and practices; and include and exclude certain people and communities through the
setting of boundaries and participation rules. The chapter concludes by arguing that
Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s meaning of the urban commons may be used to
normatively evaluate how local bodies make overlapping and contradictory claims about
their legal jurisdiction over segments of the city; and, second, that the impact of local
governance may be assessed based on the degree to which it provides meaningful and
inclusive participation of historically marginalized people.
I. Legal geography: interlegality and the significance of space
There has been a growing shift in the treatment of space in legal theory. Before the
1990s, legal theorists saw space as a background upon which legal norms could be
considered, but not a factor that needed closer integration and analysis.53 Much of the
scholarship later identified or attributed to the legal geography project didn’t expressly
intend to broaden a legal geography project; instead existing scholarship was considered
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to be “speaking” legal geography all along.54 For example, Gerald Frug, who wrote about
“localism” and “regionalism,” is an example of a legal scholar who questioned the
relationship of law and geography prior to the conceptualization of “legal geography.”55
Santos’s innovative use of cartography to illustrate his conclusion that “laws are maps;
written laws are cartographic maps; customary, informal laws are mental maps” critically
married law and space long before the legal geography project was coined.56 While the
connections did not explicitly recognize or draw on geography scholarship as a tool to
better understand legal dynamics at play, space itself was recognized as an active and
important subject of analysis rather than a benign and irrelevant backdrop. In this
dissertation, I assert that the legal geography project’s recognition of the interrelationship
of law and space is crucial to understand the meaning of local governance as embodying
both geographic spaces and legal rules.
Scholars began drifting to a more common and identifiable understanding of the
connections between law and geography, owing in part to the critical legal studies
movement.57 Those interested in the intersections between law and geography suddenly
found each other, beginning to form intellectual linkages reflected in consequential
bridging work.58 These connections ultimately resulted in work that had the following
recognizable attributes in common.59 First, all sought to reexamine the “legal in terms of
the spatial and the spatial in terms of the legal” to see whether former ideas or
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conclusions were challenged or altered in light of new gaps revealed.60 In so doing, the
spatial imagination could be broadly envisaged to include geographically demarcated
boundaries as well as institutions of governance. Second, all works examined how social
space is produced, maintained and transformed through the use of legal terminology such
as “property” and “rights.” Third, the works sought to understand how the “legal” and the
“spatial” were aspects of each other and were fundamental parts of another “more
holistically conceived social-material reality.”61 One of the aims of this dissertation is to
examine how legal rules that demarcate boundaries create, transform and sanction what is
deemed to be “local legal space,” influencing the conceptualization of “local
governance.” As in the legal geography project, the theoretical framework proposed here
considers the “spatial” and the “legal” to be interconnected notions in the framing of
“local governance.”
Legal geography is concerned with the production and political importance of law and
space.62 Legal geography engages in spatial policy analysis to understand how legal
frameworks influence and change landscapes and social processes.63 This
interdisciplinary intellectual project – also referred to as “braided lines of inquiry”64 seeks to understand how spaces within the public sphere are negotiated and understood.65
The foundation of this theoretical movement, often called critical legal geography, was
grounded in David Harvey’s 1973 work on territorial social justice.66 It initially began as
a specialized branch of political geography and sought to understand the underlying
social processes that shape the legal and physical landscape.67 It has since moved on to
capture social regulation and jurisprudence as it relates to geography, recognizing that
law is “literally constitutive of the nation state, the community, the firm, the market and
60
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the family” and that “social relation … is also shaped by and understood in terms of
space and place.”68 Now, legal geography aims to both draw on and contribute to broader
social and humanities studies and, perhaps, to develop a distinct theoretical and
methodological framework that can be translated into a broader range of contexts.69 This
means that the project must move beyond recognizing where the “legal” takes place
within the “spatial,” and instead to engage in examinations of “lived geographies,” in
which the understandings and practices of legal forms and their geographies are
examined as mutually constitutive.70 This project seeks to contribute to this broader
debate by theorizing the meaning of local governance within a legal geography
framework, first by advancing how smaller-than-city spaces have multiple scales
represented by a plurality of legal forms that operate unevenly across the city.
Examining space and law in tandem illuminates questions of power by seeing how they
intersect, inform and identify such power: “[T]he connections between the legal and the
spatial in the world may, in some situations, be so tight as to be identical. Is the state a
legal or spatial entity? Is eviction a legal or spatial state of affairs? Is deportation a legal
or spatial (corporeal) experience? What is revealed by regarding them through one lens
but not the other? What is obscured? What might hinge on what is being obscured
remaining so? Ultimately, perhaps, the relation of law and space is an instance of the
relationship between meaning and world.”71 Likewise, in this dissertation, identifying
local governance means an illumination of how space and law enable belonging and, in
particular, whether the formal processes of local enable meaningful, inclusive
participation. Put another way, how do the formal and informal bodies that define and
create local governance affect the representation of those located within smaller-than-city
boundaries of the city?
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The theoretical framework offered by this dissertation is both diagnostic and normative.
It seeks to explain how the overlap of formal and informal bodies define and create “local
legal spaces,” which assert competing geographic boundaries and claims to
representation that form the basis of local governance. The dissertation aims to contribute
to the legal geography project by identifying how the work of Blomley, Valverde, Santos
and others informs what may be understood as “local legal spaces.” Drawing in particular
on Blomley’s work on interlegality and Santos’ notions of scale, this dissertation
examines the local legal spaces that assert multiple and competing geographic and
representative claims, theorizing how “local governance” may be conceptualized as
multi-scalar, influenced by a plurality of formal and informal rules and norms, and which
includes and excludes particular populations. Following this conceptualization, the
chapter outlines how a normative understanding of “local governance” grounded in an
urban commons framework may guide how the City of Toronto could enable a more
inclusive, participatory city through the design of their legal processes and institutions
enacted in a local governance model. This study explicitly adopts a legal pluralist lens,
expanding on the scope and applicability of “interlegality” within the legal geography
project. I next explore this pluralist lens.
“Legal pluralism”
The version of legal pluralism that I invoke distinguishes between “state law,” which I
take to mean law that is formally enacted by a governmental power, and “social orders”
which are rules and norms created by non-state actors.72 The chief struggle in identifying
the rules and norms created by non-state actors is avoiding oversimplification. As Sally
Engel Merry writes,
Where do we stop speaking of law and find ourselves simply describing social
life? Is it useful to call these forms of ordering law? In writing about legal
pluralism, I find that once legal centralism has been vanquished, calling all
forms of ordering that are not state law by the term law confounds the analysis.
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The literature in this field has not yet clearly demarcated a boundary between
normative orders that can and cannot be called law.73
This dissertation recognizes that “state” and “non-state” are rudimentary distinctions that
are not, in practice, simple to distinguish.74 This dissertation enters this debate by seeking
to understand how local, as a legal space, encompasses and is molded by state and nonstate rules and norms. In this way, I assert a claim that state law is a dominant force that
can and does direct non-state actors.75 I also see descriptive merit in conceptualizing local
governance as a nameable legal object with attached rules to advance conclusions as to
what is “law” within Toronto’s governance model, even as I agree that such labels are
socially constructed, not a priori facts.76 I believe that such labels can help in identifying
rights and responsibilities, and create more opportunities for the exercise of political
power.
To Moore, law consists of some combination of social norms, rules, customs, and
practices, as well as “hard” legal rules created and sanctioned by the state.77 In what she
calls the “semiautonomous social field,” which describes the multiple systems of ordering
in ordering in complex societies, Moore suggests that social norms, rules, customs and
practices can be created internally, yet are vulnerable to the rules and decisions
emanating from the larger world within which they are surrounded.78 Moore sets out a
version of legal pluralism that allows for semiautonomous social fields with different
strengths and powers, and which are more or less bound by the rules of the larger world.
Although Moore does not refer to this “larger world” as state-based with powers to
compel, other scholars have framed it in this respect.79 Peter Fitzpatrick suggests that
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state law is comprised of a plurality of social forms, which he calls “integral plurality.”80
He uses this term to build on Moore’s notions of how social fields and the larger world
continuously engage in interaction. Fitzpatrick names state law as affecting and
influencing other social forms in a “contradictory process of mutual support and
opposition.”81 Unlike Moore, who sees the larger world as framing social forms,
Fitzpatrick believes that state law is influenced and altered by other social forms,
including organizations, the workplace and family, and that these social forms are also
influenced and altered by state law. Influencing factors may also include spaces that exist
in practice or memory.82
Moore’s identification of the semiautonomous social field is a helpful broad framework
in this present study for its clarification that many social orderings have their own rules
and customs, yet are framed and affected by external rules, as a way of understanding
overlapping local governance bodies generally speaking, especially when coupled with
Fitzpatrick’s view of state law and social orders as continuously affecting and altering
one another.83 I assert that “local governance” is comprised of an overlapping set of
formal and informal, and state and non-state laws, that each comprises a semiautonomous
social field. Legal pluralism allows me to look beyond formal law, as chiefly described in
provincial laws and municipal codes, to understand how local is governed and the many
levels of norm creation.84 Moore’s language of semiautonomous social spheres captures
the interconnected nature of local governance bodies as not just reducible to law/non-law
and private/public binaries, but as an overlapping set of norms, orders, rules and practices
that govern Toronto’s local spaces. I assert that there is both a theoretical and descriptive
importance to understanding what is law/non-law in order to identify and understand the
exercise of power in localized spaces in the city.

80

Peter Fitzpatrick, "Law and Societies." (1984) 22:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 115, online:
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol22/iss1/5>.
81
Ibid at 116.
82
Franz von Benda-Beckmann & Keebat von Benda-Beckmann, “Places that come and go: A legal
anthropological perspective on the temporalities of space in plural legal orders” in I. Braverman, N.
Blomley, D. Delaney & A. Kedar, eds. The Expanding Spaces of Law: A Timely Legal Geography
(Stanford University Press, 2014) at 41.
83
For a lively debate of legal pluralism, see https://sydney.edu.au/law/slr/slr30_3/Tamanaha.pdf.
84
Zumbansen, supra note 74 at 326.

24

My pluralistic account of law is further informed by the work of Boaventura de Sousa
Santos, who draws on transnationalism to add a political dimension to legal space. Santos
challenges the view that the state should be understood in its Hegelian form as a “well
ordered political life,” meaning a neutralized, bureaucratized set of rules, on the basis that
it fails to incorporate the power of political challenge.85 Instead, Santos believes that legal
orders, which include the many rules within the state,86 do not merely coexist in the same
political space, but are interpenetrated and superimposed legal spaces.87 Santos notes the
three phases of legal pluralism: the colonial and post-colonial period (which includes the
work of Moore and Fitzpatrick), legal pluralism within modern capitalist societies and,
third, a postmodern view of the law.88 The differences are based in part on the scale that
is being studied, from “local, infrastrate legal orders coexisting within the same national
time space” to, now, “suprastate global legal orders coexisting in the world system with
both state and infrastate legal orders.”89 To Santos, thinking of suprastate global legal
orders expands both the idea of law and the idea of politics, and allows for “a
revitalization of democratic content within a broader legal configuration.”90 Thus, it is not
just that entities or institutions co-exist and influence one another, entities impact notions
of politics, democracy and belonging which in turn affect actions and then again impact
these and other entities and institutions. According to Franz and Keebat von BendaBeckmann, “places are defined by reference to the persons occupying them,” showing the
degree to which legal spaces are informed by non-state phenomena.91
Scholars, including Santos, have highlighted that legal pluralism should also extend its
analysis beyond identifying state law and social spheres and the resulting interlegalities,
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but to understanding power dynamics as well.92 As von Benda-Beckmann and Spiertz
state, “Law thus embodies power positions and power relationships.”93 As Santos writes
in his examination of the political transformation that resulted from grassroots
participatory budgeting in Brazil: “[Participatory budgeting] involves both state official
law and non-state (or quasi-non-state), unofficial (or quasi-unofficial) law played out in
forms of confrontational or complementary legal pluralities and interlegalities.”94 I
suggest that legal pluralists’ emphasis on identifying interlegalities achieves a crucial first
step in understanding power relations: seeing and understanding the state and non-state
law and their scales in operation. The notion of “interlegality,” and its relevance to local
legal spaces, is explored next.
Interlegality
Interlegality alerts us to the existence of formal legal codes that may govern our
encounter, in addition to informal understandings of the law. As we saw from legal
pluralism and especially the work of Santos, interlegality connects us back to legal
pluralism through the intersection and interstices of different normative orders. Blomley
likens the relationship between and among governments to a “Russian doll-like
conception of spatial order, in which some levels are higher or lower, or bigger or
smaller; and in which one scale nests within another, in an ordered hierarchy.”95 This
conception is not new. Santos, in charting his use of maps to illustrate law, stated: “The
legal developments reveal the existence of three different legal spaces and their
correspondent forms of law: local, national and world legality. It is rather unsatisfactory
to distinguish these legal orders by their respective objects of regulation because often
they seem to regulate the same kind of social action.”96
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Interlegality has been applied to urban law, where provincial governments have legal
jurisdiction over municipalities, and federal policies are said to be separate from cities.
Blomley states, “The complexities of politics, for example, are fit into and explained by
scalar categories (is homelessness a local, regional or national issue?), running the risk of
unduly narrowing the conversation. The city is treated as inevitably situated in the ‘local’
categorical box, with all that this smuggles in. That which is designated ‘local’, for
example, is assumed to have certain distinctive characteristics, set apart from other
scales.”97 To Blomley, local is “here,” described later as its own scale rather than a
miniaturized version of another level of government.98
This narrowing is acute when examining urban issues, as city governments – and
especially the country’s largest urban areas – frequently take leadership roles that cross
jurisdictional lines, such as their involvement in enacting policies to address
homelessness, immigration and settlement, and the development of transit strategies.
Thus, rather than conceiving of “levels” or “orders” of government “operating
simultaneously on different scales and from different interpretive standpoints,”99 one may
look for the interactions of legal spaces with geography to see what emerges. Valverde
asks the fundamental question, “what would happen if, for example, those who have
breached the criminal code were governed as if the criminal law were local? What if
climate change were imagined as a municipal or regional issue? What if cities seceded
from the state? Why can cities not have foreign policy, or national states engage in land
use planning?”100
While this dissertation does not take up the connection between transnational norms and
city space, Santos’ postmodern view of the law as grounded within legal pluralism offers
an additional dimension relevant to this dissertation: it expands an analysis of the coexistence and interaction of state law and legal orders to include representation and
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participation.101 His insistence on drawing attention to representation and participation
within the context of scale makes his approach especially fruitful in articulating a
theoretical framework for local governance. To Santos, current approaches to
representation and participation focus on “top down,” meaning state coordinated, rather
than “bottom up” efforts to engage citizenry as “stakeholders” in political processes.102
He writes, “By default or design, those doing the imagining are the elites or the members
of the middle class with the economic or culture capital to count as ‘stakeholders’.”103
Missing from the picture are the grassroots organizations and community leaders who
“mobilize resistance to neoliberal legality,” even though these hidden voices are shifting
and shaping the law.104 Similarly, this research seeks to understand how state law shapes
narratives of engagement and participation and to understand which voices are included
and excluded within usual engagement practices. Invoking a legal pluralist lens allows us
to better understand how power is invoked in legal spaces, as described next.
Legal spaces
Legal geography has been the subject of ongoing internal debate about its limitations,
potential, and future possibilities. For example, Delaney notes, “there is an increasing
sense that this project has gotten stuck in its bridging phase and that inherited conceptual
dualisms are impeding further progress.”105 These “conceptual dualisms” are the lenses of
geography and law, each of which may have their own language and analysis for making
sense of the world. In this dissertation, I build on existing conversations on legal
geography’s focus on legal spaces to understand how such spaces can inform the
meaning of local governance. In the conceptualization advanced next, I argue that the
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legal spaces that inform local governance must acknowledge the multiplicity of scales in
operation in smaller-than-city spaces. An analysis of scale is not only relevant when
looking at the overlap of international, national, state and local; scale can also reveal
important implications for distributive justice.106
Like legal pluralists, legal geographers have recognized that law is not just present in
formal, bureaucratic structures, but also in everyday situations.107 What legal geography
adds to the conversation is a more thorough emphasis on “legal spaces” as the foci of
analysis and, in this present study, what is meant by a “local legal space.”
Legal geography helps to deepen what is meant by the term “legal spaces,” which I use as
a foundation or focal point to understand how such spaces are governed. To von BendaBeckmann and von Benda-Beckmann, space is a “constituent element of social life and
organization” that helps conceptualize social interactions and relationships, even with the
understanding that notions of space are ultimately social constructions.108 In this
dissertation, legal spaces refer to notions of space that have been given formal legal
meaning, as well as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices
within these same spaces. While individual understandings of space can differ, spaces are
replete with a complex range of interconnecting institutions and entities that have been
given social meaning, which in turn affect individual understandings of space.109 Notions
of space can be cemented into law, assert validity or even supremacy, and connect
numerous legal and non-legal spaces through rules and norms, even though other
conceptions of space may exist, too. Many dynamics operate in tandem – some in formal
law, some not.
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Adding to the complexity is the notion of formal law as a rich layering of codes, bylaws,
policies, laws, regulations and other rules. They may operate at the municipal, provincial
or federal level, or within carved-out subsets of these government orders. State laws also
create physical boundaries and, in this way, they are spatial in nature.110 I assert that the
way in which laws are described by governments tells us a part of the story in
understanding the legal space in operation, but such descriptions are not determinative
and can even mislead.111 Instead, it is imperative that a layered, creative approach is used
to understand the legal dynamics at play in the creation and enforcement of jurisdictional
boundaries. As Blomley notes, “To trace such interstitial connections requires an
imaginative and conceptual leap, a necessary condition for which is to think around scale,
while recognizing its powerful hold.”112
Legal spaces also include historical iterations of boundaries and bodies. One of the
noteworthy areas of analysis taking place in legal geography is a purposeful inclusion of
time. Time helps to advance the idea that legal space is not a separate, fixed notion;
instead, it is as understood by Doreen Massey: “dynamic and heterogeneous – not the
dead, inert matter which time runs over the top of, but the constantly evolving, politically
important dimension of multiplicity itself.”113 Mariana Valverde affirms Massey’s focus
on time as an important category of analysis, lamenting that “there is a tendency to
privilege space and isolate it from time and to reduce time to empirical history.”114 She
invokes the notion of a “chronotype” from the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, to conceptualize
one way that space and time can be understood without reducing them to “separate
dimensions to be considered one after the other.”115 Bakhtin invoked the Agora and
Roman family as chronotypes to understand space-time, whereby “time, as it were,
thickens, takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged
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and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history.”116 Space and time cannot be
discrete, separated concepts; they are instead part of one another. Valverde points to the
chronotype as a vehicle that has and can reframe the tendency to either exclude time or
study it within a compartmentalized way.
My theorization of local governance incorporates this aspect of Massey and Valverde’s
work by arguing that the legal spaces include historical events, boundaries, laws, and
norms that were previously enacted in the law, and continue to exist even where their
legal frameworks like wards or municipalities no longer remain. I suggest that legal
spaces may continue to include historical versions of legal realities, even where they are
no longer acknowledged in formal law. These legal “ghosts” remain a part of local legal
spaces and are therefore relevant to the meaning of local governance. As an empirical
matter, in examining the local legal spaces of Toronto, time is a not just relevant, but a
crucial element of analysis. The boundaries of the City of Toronto, a single-tier
municipality since 1999, were previously comprised of seven municipalities: the
Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto (”Metro Toronto”) and six smaller municipalities –
Toronto, York, North York, East York, Scarborough, and Etobicoke.117 The provincial
decision to amalgamate means that what was once regional (Metro Toronto) is now citywide (the post-1999 City of Toronto), and what was a city is now “local.” What is
“regional” is also subject to many different geographic configurations, including the
Greater Toronto Area (GTA),118 the Greater Toronto Hamilton Area (GTHA),119
Metrolinx, a regional transportation agency set up to improve the coordination and
integration of all modes of transportation in the GTHA municipalities,120 and the Greater
Golden Horseshoe,121 each of which is used provincially to advance particular legislative
initiatives.
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A focus on legal spaces also alerts us the notion of scale by examining the cascade of
spatial boundaries of smaller-than-city decision-making and the resulting implications for
an inclusive, participatory governance model. Here, I advance Santos’ scholarship related
to scale to ask how much one focuses in or out on spaces and therefore offers a more or
less detailed perspective, and applies this lens of scale to decision-making.122 Santos
offers an analogy between maps and law by distinguishing between “large scale” and
“small scale.” A large-scale map shows less land but far more detail (“a miniaturized
version of reality”) and small-scale more land, showing relative positions, but ultimately
less detail.123 Scale differs in its presentation of detail or relative positions, and may
“zoom in” on particular phenomena. Scale is relevant in how law is crafted, as “laws use
different criteria to determine the meaningful details and the relevant features of the
activity to be regulated.”124 Scholars have capably observed how a “zooming in” to micro
scales of the city ultimately leads to the exclusion of the most vulnerable.125 This
dissertation examines how competing notions of local governance “zoom in” to city
spaces and the degree to which the scale of decision-making impacts inclusivity.
While Blomley and Santos focus their studies of interlegality on the normative orders at
the local, provincial or state, national and international scales, this dissertation explores
interlegality within the local scale only, meaning the many governance bodies and their
boundaries within smaller-than-city spaces, as outlined below. Building on the meaning
of legal spaces, the next section orients local legal spaces as the “zoomed in” spaces that
are the subject matter of this dissertation.
“Local legal spaces”
This section defends local legal spaces as an important site of inquiry. Blomley remarks
that, “Jurisdictions are conceived as technical devices, sorting mechanisms that can be
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used to allocate people and objects to particular categories.”126 One of these “sorting
devices” is the localized boundaries within city spaces. One way of thinking about the
law of local government centres on the power of municipal governments operating under
the authority of provincial or federal law.127 Under this view, scholars grapple with the
manner in which boundaries should be drawn, and the nature and type of bodies best able
to govern at the local level.
This scholarship has also included a focus on the boundaries and decision-making
authority of smaller-than-city spaces like the “neighbourhood” and “community.”
Deborah G. Martin writes that the neighbourhood is constructed “based on common
ideals of what we expect an urban neighborhood to be.”128 In her view, the
neighbourhood is the locale upon which human, political and economic activity is centred
and where “everyday life is situated.”129 Pragmatically, the neighbourhood may be the
place where the needs and circumstances of individual residents and families most clearly
come together.130 “Community” has been defined as a particular spatial setting where
social interactions occur and regarding the kinds of social interactions that occur.131
These studies help to locate the city and the legal spaces within them as important objects
of study.
In Canada, there is a small, but growing legal scholarship related to the legal spaces of
cities.132 The centrality of law in relation to the city is highlighted by Hoi Kong, who
writes, “Whether one conceives of a city broadly as a community of interest, or more
specifically, as a municipality, laws shape cities, and the relevant issues of law are
126
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distinct from those of political theory.”133 Indeed, the law serves a critical role in
empowering people and communities within an urban space to engage and act. Sassen
describes large cities as “a new frontier zone.”134 She says: “Access to the city is no
longer simply a matter of having or not having power. Urban spaces have become hybrid
bases from which to act” through robust governance structures.135 Such governance
structures are critical to action: “If we really want to understand how democratic
institutions support effectiveness and accountability in government, we must be clear
about which governance entities have the legal authority to deliver services.”136 The law
also helps to define the micro spaces and bodies within the complex city that play a role
in local and city-wide decision-making.
This study builds on this scholarship by conceptualizing local governance as concerning
the boundaries and decision-making that takes place in “local legal spaces” that operate at
the smaller-than-city level. I seek to add precision to the plural claims and orderings of
these spaces across Toronto, arguing that local governance in Toronto includes multiple,
competing bodies at the smaller-than-city level, notably wards, community councils,
business improvement areas (BIAs) and neighbourhood associations. Wards or “electoral
districts” are created for administrative and representative purposes;137 community
councils are public, deliberative bodies with a mandated set of responsibilities over a
particular set of issues and represent a particular geographic area with a smaller-than-city
space;138 BIAs are privately run organizations operating under city approval which aim to
supplement public services within geographically defined boundaries through a
compulsory tax on local property owners and/or businesses;139 and neighbourhood
associations are “a civic organization oriented towards maintaining or improving the
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quality of life in a geographically defined residential area.”140 Each of these bodies has its
own set of boundaries that may or may not overlap in whole or in part, and claims to
represent some or all interests within its boundaries.
To summarize, the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation builds upon the
existing scholarship by expanding upon notions of legal pluralism and interlegality as
articulated by Blomley, Santos and Valverde to conceptualize how “local legal spaces”
are governed in Toronto. I argue that local legal spaces are affected by bodies that assert
their own geographies, belongings and histories, whether formally through the state,
informally through non-state bodies, or as a result of historical iterations of legal realities,
even where they are no longer acknowledged in formal law. The conceptual framework
advances that local governance can be recognized as an interlegal legal space within
multiple semiautonomous social spheres rather than a single self-enclosed autonomous
unit; and that state iterations of local governance create political, social, and spatial
realities through multiple overlapping institutions, are impacted by other norms, orders,
rules and practices, and include and exclude certain people and communities through the
setting of boundaries and participation rules. This framework contributes to the legal
geography project by arguing that these smaller-than-city legal spaces are multi-scaled
and affected by historical iterations of boundaries and bodies that continue to have
contemporary meaning, and have important implications for inclusive governance.
This theorization contributes to legal geography by focusing Blomley’s notion of
interlegality on the local sphere itself is an interlegal space, governed by multiple laws,
norms and rules, and itself a product of the shifts in mandates and power of plural bodies
operating both within and outside the formal governance model. This conceptualization
includes Valverde’s notion of temporal relevance by viewing past iterations of law and
boundaries as not simply empirical data or linear storytelling, but as “local legal ghosts”
that continue to have relevance in the meaning of “local governance,” and by
incorporating Santos’ idea of multi-scalar spaces, as well as the implications of power
based on how the formal governance model understands and privileges particular scales.
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The dissertation aims to contribute to distributive justice in the city by articulating an
inclusive local governance model that serves a broader range of residents.141
Following the conceptualization of local governance, which I elaborate in the next
section, I then argue that the notion of the urban commons offers an inclusive,
participatory framework to normatively evaluate local governance.

II. Conceptualizing local governance
In practice, as is explored in the chapters that follow, local governance is a contested
legal concept used interchangeably with terms like “community” and “neighbourhood,”
and without precision in much of the research on urban boundaries and governance. As
noted in the survey of theoretical literature above, local governance carries distinct and
critical theoretical questions, specifically: how smaller-than-city boundaries are legally
constructed and constituted; which bodies are empowered to make decisions; and to what
extent the relevant institutions are organized formally or informally.
I propose a conceptualization of local governance that consists of the following two
components, drawn from the analysis set out earlier in this chapter and further explained
below:
1.

A pluralist conception of local governance recognizes the interlegality of multiple

normative orders such that local spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed autonomous
units; and
2.

State iterations of local governance bodies:
a) create political, social, and spatial realities through multiple overlapping
institutions;
b) incorporate non-state norms, orders, rules and practices; and
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c) include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of
boundaries and participation rules.

1. A pluralist conception of local governance
Legal pluralism outlines the combination of social norms, rules, customs and practices
that operate alongside formal legal rules created by the state. Moore and Fitzpatrick
understand state law and social norms as affecting and altering one another. Legal
pluralism frames local governance beyond state law as follows.
First, a legal pluralist orientation helps us to see the many bodies operating within
smaller-than-city spaces. This descriptive component of the meaning of local governance
suggests that the legal spaces of local consist of an overlapping set of norms, orders, rules
and practices.142 Within this space are a set of semiautonomous entities or institutions that
co-exist and influence one another. I suggest that the first step in understanding local
governance is to acknowledge its inclusion of multiple interconnected spheres beyond
state law and including the norms, orders, rules and practices that may also operate within
smaller-than-city spaces. The underlying premise articulated in this first part of
understanding local governance is that the entities and institutions within a local space
are shaped and re-shaped by one another, transforming the entities or institutions over
time.
Highlighting legal pluralism as a first step in local affirms what von Benda-Beckmann
and Spiertz affirm as “power relationships,” meaning the importance of the specific
context in articulating relationships.143 Conceptualizing local governance through the lens
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of legal pluralism helps to see that many entities and institutions overlap within a
localized space. It also affirms that the specific context – which bodies, what history,
what articulations of power – are central to defining and understanding local.
The next component of local governance is to understand the specific norms, orders, rules
and practices that penetrate an interlegal, semiautonomous order. This means grappling
with whether and how boundaries and institutions may encapsulate communities in any
meaningful way as an embodiment of local,144 or whether such boundaries and
institutions are simply political devices that ultimately have no real meaning.145 I suggest
that by identifying the laws in existence and to whom they belong is a critical component
of local governance.

2. State iterations of local governance
Drawing in particular on Santos’ notion of scale, Blomley’s work on interlegality, and
incorporating aspects of Valverde’s observations of time, this second part of the
conceptualization focuses on the multiple competing legal spaces of local governance. In
this dissertation, legal spaces refer to notions of space that have been given formal legal
meaning, as well as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices
within these same spaces. This part of the conceptualization of local governance clarifies
what state law has done to cement an understanding of local governance and how other
entities and institutions have been included in this legal framework, if at all. This
diagnostic step allows us to understand what has been included in – and what has been
left out of –state law’s conceptualization of local.

a) State iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial
realities through overlapping governance and institutions
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Understanding local governance means examining the relevant state and non-state
iterations. These state and non-state claimants each assert political, social, and spatial
realities. In her brilliant response to the Localism Act, 2011, legislation introduced in the
United Kingdom that aimed to define what was meant by local,146 Antonia Layard writes
that the legal construction of “local” in the UK context may have jarred with other
conceptualizations of the term and the place.147 “Yet once legally implemented with
defined boundaries,” she rightly observes, “a locality or neighbourhood takes on a new
administrative, political and sometimes socially constructed reality.”148 In Toronto’s
context, numerous iterations of the city’s local boundaries have been created through law
and policy and over time, with corresponding institutions and governance models
introduced as well. Amalgamation disrupted what was considered to be “local,” “citywide” and “regional” even within the same physically bounded area, challenging the
rules and norms that structured power and relationships. To Layard, law’s work in these
institutions and governance has taken on a “constructed reality.”149 Put more simply, law
cements an understanding of local governance even where other – and often competing –
conceptualizations of the term exist.
Based on existing literature, as detailed below, city governments may draw formalized
boundaries and bodies based on three rationales: the desirability of civic engagement and
participation; the importance of local autonomy or “subsidiarity;” and the utilitarian need
for further delegation at the municipal level.150 These boundaries and bodies that emerge
as a result of these decisions are the formal local legal spaces, or the “constructed
realities,” of which Layard speaks.
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On the first rationale, as argued by Enid Slack and Richard Bird, local bodies allow large
single-tier cities to have greater public access and accountability to residents.151 Scaling
access to municipal government to a smaller level than city council allows residents to
have their issues heard and feel that they have some agency over their interests.152 This
argument may be particularly compelling for very large urban centres on the basis that a
more populous and geographically widespread city necessitates localized governance
bodies in addition to a single city council to adequately consider the range of needs or
interests within a particular set of boundaries. In this context, bodies like wards and
community councils, canvassed in Chapter 3, enable closer contact with elected officials.
This rationale may also matter more in the case of amalgamated cities, where the
previous municipalities had histories, boundaries, and cultures that were meaningful to
residents. Such cities might wish to maintain some degree of continuity and therefore
continue some form of organizational structure to maintain these connections.
This dissertation argues that mere listening is insufficient. Participation must be linked to
decision-making power. In a Toronto-based study, Deborah Cowen and Vanessa Parlette
concluded that municipal action that is entirely separated from consultation, skills
building and leadership opportunities for a broad range of residents, but especially those
most commonly excluded from decision-making power, ultimately fails to address the
larger systemic causes of poverty that are outside of the power of municipal
governments.153
Localized bodies may be seen to fulfill the democratic ideal of representation that is
closer to the community. In the 1950s, Jane Jacobs passionately advocated the
importance of neighbourhoods in the built form and the decision-making of urban
areas.154 In her view, local decision-making was more legitimately democratic and
connected to the interests and desires of those within neighbourhoods. The fundamental
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question was the degree to which residents should have a role to play in the policies that
affect them. In their study on whether neighborhood associations encourage more
political participation, Jeffrey Berry, Kent Portney and Ken Thomson argue that the “key
to making America more participatory may be making political participation more
meaningful in the context of the communities people live in.”155 They suggest that
collective challenges are best understood in a more narrow geographical space and
ultimately lead to decisions that are better for society as a whole. Erwin Chemerinsky and
Sam Kleiner tout the benefits of local councils, including that they are uniquely
positioned to allow historically marginalized residents to engage in the political life of the
city.156 Elena Fagotto and Archon Fung conclude that such bodies permit “deliberative
democracy” based on increased neighbourhood capacity for collective action and
neighbourhood development.157
Some scholars believe that localized power protects smaller-than-city areas from
provincial/state and federal policies which aim to offload responsibility to municipalities
without corresponding funding. According to Richard Briffault, local governments
should be given more autonomy and power.158 Briffault suggests that many claims to
localized autonomy draw on the Greek polis, Aristotle and Rousseau to invoke “a mythic,
golden era in the history of democracy when political communities were small enough to
give each citizen an effective voice and the citizenry exercised a collective role in politics
and as a contemporary exhortation to vest power in today's cities.”159 To Briffault,
“Localist ideology masks local power and hides the privatization of local public life
behind the rhetoric of efficiency, participation, community and local self-
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determination.”160 He believes that the “nostalgia” for parochial political autonomy leads
to increased delegation to the local level without an appreciation for the many matters
which cannot be solved by such small political units. Moreover, it exacerbates the “us”
and “them” exclusion of particular populations, especially the most economically
marginalized, by ghettoizing landscapes as “inner city” and poor. The result is that upperlevel governments – in Canada, the provincial and federal governments – may offload to
smaller, localized units as a way of deflecting their responsibility. Briffault suggests that,
instead, participatory initiatives must be combined with state support and funding for
local action.161
Put another way, the rationale for creating state-based conceptions of local is the logic
that such bodies are best able to ensure fair and participatory governance within the city.
Many scholars assert specific proposals for such state-based conceptions. To Will
Kymlicka, negotiation must ultimately lead to a set of rules or policies that articulate the
boundaries and rules of particular environments. Kymlicka urges that “political
boundaries be drawn to ensure that the community has sufficient powers to define and to
protect itself.”162 Gerald Frug advocates for the adoption of “charettes,” particularly in
planning, which are lengthy negotiation sessions that bring together diverse interests like
developers, neighbourhood residents, bankers and city officials to provide concrete
feedback on development projects and to educate people on the costs of zoning
policies.163 Frug argues that these and other community creating strategies should be
firmly embedded in the fabric of local government law, that community is something that
can be asserted, not merely facilitated, and that there is an obligation on local
governments to do so. The obligation that Frug speaks of is based on the normative view
that municipal governments have an obligation to facilitate political participation.164 Frug
believes that participation, especially at the individual level, is an important value that is
best realized through small political units and, that to be meaningful, there must be a
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genuine transfer of power.165 In each of these conceptions, the state can and should retain
the power to craft local boundaries and governance bodies. This dissertation, too, seeks to
understand what role the “state” (and which “state” we mean) should play in creating
boundaries and governance models.
Fung and Erik Olin Wright encourage an increase in public participation, writing that
programs that devolve powers to associations,166 invite associations to share in public
power,167 or open public decisions to citizens directly168 all tie active citizen participation
closely to the exercise of public power. They suggest that tying public power to
participation can “forge connections between associative life and the quality of
democratic governance” in several ways. For example, when the medium of public
decision making becomes participation rather than money, status, or certified expertise,
weaker voices may be more easily included and heard.169 Their arguments acknowledge
that the balance of power in the municipal setting is disproportionately weighted towards
those with greater resources, putting the obligation squarely on these “weaker voices” to
take part in participation exercises, to be “easily heard.”
The second rationale in favour of local bodies is that the local scale deserves protection
based on legal principles. The principle of subsidiarity holds that “the smallest possible
social or political entities should have all the rights and powers they need to regulate their
own affairs freely and effectively.”170 From a legal perspective, the idea of a lower scaled
forum is connected to the principle of subsidiarity, which provides that government
powers should always reside at the lowest level possible.171 The roots of the term
subsidiarity trace back to philosopher Thomas Aquinas and ask fundamental questions
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about the relationship between political power and civil society.172 Subsidiarity in the
Canadian sense is a flexible legal principle that accommodates the involvement of
multiple scales in decision-making. Likewise, American scholar Gerald Frug argues that
smaller bounded jurisdictions – such as neighbourhoods – have a right to govern
themselves.173 Subsidiarity can be conceived as either negative, where the larger entity
must not intervene when the smaller can manage its affairs on its own, or positive, where
the smaller entity must be given powers to accomplish its goals.174 One of the aims of this
dissertation is to understand the appropriate scale of subsidiarity in different local legal
spaces of Toronto.
In Canada, the principle of subsidiarity has resulted in judicial deference to municipal
decision-making. In Canada, municipalities are not a constitutionally recognized form of
government.175 Their authority emanates from provincial statutes.176 Despite the fact that
subsidiarity is absent from the Constitution itself, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
has ruled that the principle of subsidiarity supports deference to decision-making by
municipal governments based on their closeness to the residents that they represent,
regardless of whether the subject matter of the decision falls within the strict scope of the
municipality’s prescribed powers.177 In the 2001 Spraytech decision, the SCC considered
the constitutionality of a municipal by-law that restricted the use of pesticides. Justice
L’Heureux-Dubé, writing for the majority, stated, “The case arises in an era in which
matters of governance are often examined through the lens of the principle of
subsidiarity. This is the proposition that law-making and implementation are often best
achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens
affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to
population diversity.”178 The court ruled that matters related to the environment are not
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exclusive to any particular level of government, but instead require the intervention of all,
thus permitting the by-law to stand. In a sense, Justice L’Heureux-Dubé echoes
Blomley’s conception of different legal spaces operating simultaneously in certain
contexts.
The SCC’s interpretation of subsidiarity has echoes in Santos’ work in asking how much
one focuses in or out on spaces to offer a more or less detailed perspective.179 Scale is
relevant in how law is crafted, as “laws use different criteria to determine the meaningful
details and the relevant features of the activity to be regulated.”180 A community or
neighbourhood body can thus be thought of in the context of large-scale law, where there
is a zooming in on the localized area and a study of the effects on the community. This
scale is the zoomed-in area of the city, enabling a more careful consideration of the
policies that affect a localized area. Subsidiarity acts as a legal principle to include this
scale in its decision-making model. In this dissertation, subsidiarity is understood as a
dynamic principle that offers “a degree of flexibility to governance by striking a balance
between respect for the diverse entities present and a level of state cohesion.”181 The
dynamic, flexible nature of subsidiarity means that it cannot prescribe specific normative
outcomes. Alain Delcamp states: “[i]t is evident that the notion of subsidiarity is
unfocused and cannot itself, except with great difficulty, generate legal effects.”182
When applied to state-based notions of local governance, subsidiarity thus serves as a
defense for delegation of power rooted in the assertion that a micro-examination of the
impacts of urban change is best made at a localized scale. However, as Delcamp states,
the dynamic nature of this term means that there are ever-changing arguments as to which
localized institutions and boundaries are the idealized sites for decision-making. In
Toronto’s case, as we will see in Chapter 3, wards and community councils each serve as
constructed realities, formalized by City Council yet operated flexibly through a
combination of rules and custom. Their roles in decision-making differ based on the local
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legal space that they occupy within Toronto. The rationality of subsidiarity enables
localized governance, yet the lack of precision in the specific roles of these formal units
of governance leads to disparate effects in differing parts of the city.
The third argument in favour of local governance concerns legislative efficiency, or the
better operation of government through delegation. The suggestion is that such local
bodies should have responsibility for certain localized functions like planning, parking
and zoning decisions to give City Council the time and mandate to focus on issues that
affect the city as a whole.183 Delegation need not be final decision-making power; it can
also mean that a committee or body deliberates on a matter to work out the relevant
policy issues before it comes to city council for final approval. However, in both cases,
the objective is to reduce the number of matters that appear on city council agendas for
debate and decision-making.
Delegation weakens centralized power where final decisions are made in a localized
forum. This is especially significant where a uniform policy across the city is desired or
where particular people are left vulnerable to localized decisions. The phenomenon of
“not in my backyard” or “NIMBY” refers to local protest movements opposing a
proposed development or land use.184 NIMBY is almost always used in a pejorative sense
and refers to participation that is self-interested and unrepresentative of the views of the
larger community.185 There are many concerns with an expanded delegation. In
particular, the issues of fairness and exclusion in neighbourhood decision-making have
been well-documented by numerous scholars. In the Unites States, Frug has written about
the effects of NIMBY decision-making at the neighbourhood level, and has argued that
marginalized and poorer residents disproportionately feel the ramifications of such
thinking.186 Ford suggests that too much delegation to the neighbourhood scale has the
effect of using zoning laws to push out or reduce the number of marginalized
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inhabitants.187 Young advocates that to address neighbourhood protectionism, final
decision-making must take place at the regional level, not at the local scale.188
In the Canadian context, Valverde writes that neighbourhood decision-making leads to
unfair, racist practices and that the regional level is better equipped to balance the
competing interests in question.189 She believes that community-level decision making,
rather than centralized planning, will lead to further inequality within Toronto.190
Valverde offers compelling evidence that the City of Toronto must revisit and reject Jane
Jacobs’ “village life” ideal of community involvement in favour of deeper governance
models that recognize the representative needs of complex cities. She highlights two
important reasons for regional rather than local decision-making: first, the “dysfunctional
dance of local governance” by local politicians and city staff who are more likely to
validate complaints if they are received from well-connected residents or groups.191
Second, she believes that community consultations exclude certain voices (mainly those
of vulnerable persons) in introducing housing designed to assist disabled, homeless, and
other marginalized persons. Kong, in arguing in favour of a regional body, argues that
“The regional district system enables representatives of municipalities to decide amongst
themselves what the relevant geographical contours of governance challenges in a
regional district are, and to determine the appropriate responses to these challenges.”192
Schragger notes that it is difficult to differentiate between local decisions that are meant
to affirm a way of life for one community and those meant to exclude. Both may, in fact,
be the same decision.193 Valverde cautions against delegating decision-making to
localized bodies, arguing that such bodies may exclude certain voices, particularly those
of vulnerable persons. She advances the notion that centralized planning may reduce
187

Richard Thompson Ford, “The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis” (1994) 107
Harv. L. Rev. 1843 at 1860-78; Richard Thompson Ford, “Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)”
(1999) 97 Mich. L. Rev. 843 at 847.
188
Young, supra note 141.
189
Mariana Valverde, Everyday Law on the Street: City Governance in an Age of Diversity (The University
of Chicago Press, 2012).
190
Ibid. at 103.
191
Ibid. at 82.
192
Kong, supra note 55 at 514.
193
Richard C. Schragger, “The Limits of Localism” (2001-2002) 100 Mich. L. Rev. 371.

47

inequality within Toronto.194 Young and Briffault have asserted that regional decisionmaking leads to more equitable decision-making, whereas the scale of the neighbourhood
results in exclusionary policies. The theme common to all these authors is that localized
decision-making means more exclusive, less equitable decisions, whereas regional or
city-wide decisions will consider a broader range of residents.
Ultimately, from the perspective of local governments, the identification of local
boundaries and bodies is an exercise that aims to find the proper site and scale of
governance, balancing political representation, inclusivity, and fairness in decisionmaking. This dissertation, too, aims to theorize how local boundaries and bodies can
achieve these distributive justice aims, but seeks to include other conceptions of local
governance, namely community-based bodies, explored next.

b) State iterations of local governance bodies incorporate other norms, orders, rules,
and practices
The next component in understanding local governance is to see the interplay between
state law, as articulated above, and other norms, orders, rules and practices. Although
state and non-state bodies co-exist and can be thought of as mutually constitutive, the
naming of norms, orders, rules, and practices outside of state law helps to identify what
state law has not included in its articulation of local governance. Given that different
legal orders are conceived as separate entities coexisting in the same political space,
naming these interlegal spaces may not be accepted by all as the legitimate encapsulation
of what is meant by local governance. My theoretical framework and normative argument
focus on how local governance is constructed by official actors and within official city
governance institutions and, as such, interviews with city officials together with other
data are the basis of my methodological approach. This analysis is meant to parse out
how non-state local boundaries and bodies are woven within the formal governance
model. The advantage of this analysis, within the context of the theoretical framework, is
to identify which interests are included within formal iterations of a local governance
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model. This stage of analysis sets the stage for the next, which is to conceptualize which
boundaries and bodies are excluded.
According to Jurgen Habermas, there is an ongoing negotiation between and within
groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or “community.”195 This is
especially true in Toronto, where residents and businesses at the neighbourhood and
community level craft boundary lines around particular geographies, forming associations
to reflect their interests and shifting the balance of power. According to Schragger,
communities are the products of contested political norms dependent on borders to define
them. He writes: “[T]he definitional work of “community” is accomplished intrinsically –
at the borders between places. The legal rules for incorporating or excluding others
generate both a community's identity and its claim to self-govern.”196 Similarly, Martin
writes that neighbourhoods are ultimately created by the political actions of those that
define and constitute neighbourhoods. As she says, “We do not know neighborhoods
when we see them; we construct them … based on common ideals of what we expect an
urban neighborhood to be.197”
Local governance must include knowledge of actors and bodies beyond the state.198
Robert Dahl observed that, within urban areas, many interests are involved in the policymaking process, all interests are reflected by an interest group and these groups are
equally powerful when it comes to negotiating decisions.199 According to Clarence Stone,
cities consist of “regimes,” which are the informal arrangements through which a
community is governed.”200 Certain regimes are more stable and powerful, and thus have
more power in the democratic model. In the Canadian context, scholars Christopher Leo,
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Timothy Cobban, and Kristin R. Good, all agree that, outside of formal governmental
institutions, a multitude of actors influence decision-making in Canadian
municipalities.201 Aaron Moore believes that scholars must consider the many interests,
bodies, and structures beyond the formal institutions of municipal government to
understand how decisions are made.202 Like Stone, this dissertation seeks to understand
which institutional actors influence local decision-making, although it does not assess
whether these actors form a regime, nor whether their relationship adds stability to the
political system.
This dissertation focuses on BIAs and neighbourhood associations as non-state bodies
that play a role in local governance. While this argument is fleshed out further in Chapter
3, for this theoretical framework BIAs and neighbourhood associations are the principal
non-state bodies that reinforce the notion that local governments are not the sole
decision-makers in municipal action.203 This is true of such bodies in other jurisdictions
as well. In a comprehensive study of the nature of BIA governance, researchers Göktug
Morçöl, Triparna Vasavada, and Sohee Kim studied BIAs in Center City, Pennsylvania to
evaluate the role of BIAs in urban governance. They noted that BIAs are conceptualized
in three different ways: as tools of governmental policies, as actors in urban governance
networks, and as private governments.204 The study showed that BIA directors play a
profoundly important role in this overall question of urban governance, as their
involvement in the city’s governance became “deeper and wider” over the years.205
Similarly, in a study of Toronto’s Downtown Young BIA, researchers observed that the
objectives of BIAs tend to evolve from basic operational and tactical tasks to more
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strategic tasks. This leads to improved data, cost-effective decision support, and increased
coordination at the city, regional, provincial and national levels.206 Likewise, as seen in
Chapter 3, Toronto’s BIAs differ dramatically in size, budget and mandate.
Neighbourhood associations may also influence local governance. Some scholars suggest
that neighbourhood association can influence development projects.207 Chaskin and
Greenberg believe that neighbourhood associations are central to local governance,
through fostering collective decision-making and encouraging civic engagement, whether
or not they are offered administrative and financial support (Los Angeles and New York)
or not (Chicago).208 Even where neighbourhood associations are not part of formal
processes, they are embedded in governance mechanisms by leveraging relationships
with allies and partners and negotiating on behalf of their membership.209 In Chicago,
they have been able to use this “interstitial” space successfully to shape policy and
allocate resources in the public realm, ultimately playing a more direct role in
governance.210 Buckman believes that neighbourhood associations representing their
interests should be listened to and involved in the development process.211
Two main concerns have been raised by theorists with regard to BIAs and neighbourhood
associations, both of which concern the decision-making power of these bodies and each
of which is relevant to understanding how these non-state actors may influence the
boundaries and governance of the “local.” First, some theorists are concerned that
utilitarian notions of neighbourhood and community can have negative consequences.
Alexander and Peñalver believe in a human or political need to belong, to participate and
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to contribute.212 Under this conception, community is not a place; it is a coming together
of people. They argue that the territorial conception of community – namely that
boundaries create togetherness, has destroyed the conditions under which the intimate
relationships that characterize communities may develop. As a result, associations and
institutions are the “new” community, where “solidarity is based on transitory
convergences of instrumental objectives, have replaced community as the dominant mode
of group life in modern America.”213
Toronto’s 184 neighbourhood associations are not officially sanctioned by the city, but
are instead private organizations comprised of neighborhood residents that are scattered
unevenly across the city.214 Chaskin and Garg suggest viewing the neighbourhood
association along a spectrum. At one end they serve as parallel institutions providing an
alternative form of provision of public good; farther along the spectrum they are separate
but complementary institutions to local government, offering goods and services beyond
the scope of local government; yet farther along, they are incorporated into local
government as formal methods of representation and action; and at the other end they are
in opposition to local government, advocating for change.215
BIAs go even farther in exacerbating the tension between “public” and “private,” as they
represent private interests, yet are often officially sanctioned by municipal governments.
Some studies have shown that BIA staff, especially executive directors, do not believe
they have any close identification with governmental institutions and see themselves as
firmly part of the private sector rather than any form of government.216 In his piece on
BIAs, Richard Briffault notes that the “public” and the “private” spheres are
interconnected in relation to BIAs, stating: “... the public’s use and enjoyment of the
streets, parks, squares and other public spaces that are at the heart of urban living,
[BIAs]—whatever their place on the public-private continuum—can enhance the public
212
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environment and contribute to an enrichment of the public life.” Similarly, Wolf
emphatically states that BIAs are “a part of urban governance and public
administration.”217 He argues that BIAs must be placed within the public administration
context, even if their objectives focus on the “private” concerns of their members.218 In
answering the degree to which BIAs govern the public and the private, the conversation
must in part include the differing roles of BIAs within a single city. Lewis notes that as
BIAs become service providers, development brokers and place makers, there is a
corresponding retreat of municipal government.219 Randy Lippert and Mark Sleiman
suggest that BIAs “defy a public or private designation, encounter resistance and failure,
and produce and transfer knowledge for their own and other institutions’ purposes.” As
such, they are not simply private actors seeking additional power, and they do not fit
easily within particular descriptions as exclusionary or inequality-enhancing. Instead,
they are complex organizations that cannot be easily categorized. Similarly, this
dissertation seeks to understand the role and significance of these bodies across the city,
including the effect of BIAs on residents.
Second, theorists note that neighbourhood associations and BIAs disproportionately
allow for the public engagement and influence of economically privileged residents.220
Neighbourhood associations, in particular, are seen as dominated by homeowners who
are white and middle class, who do not reach out to other members of the communities,
and focus largely on land use rather than social issues.221 Leslie notes that BIAs shape
boundaries, marketing neighbourhoods, and affect who may participate in governance.222
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Government-like powers are given to a group of business and property owners through
the establishment of BIAs.223 In Washington, BIAs have purportedly contributed to racial
and cultural inequality by favouring the views of mostly white property owners in their
decision-making.224 Some question whether the organizations emphasize the power of
affluent neighbourhoods in comparison to more vulnerable parts of the city, in part
because poor sections of the city do not have BIAs despite the existence of commercial
areas supporting residents.225
This means that BIAs and neighbourhood associations may exacerbate spatial and social
injustice.226 Susanna Schaller and Gabriella Modan argue that BIAs increase tensions
within localized areas.227 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and
ethnically mixed neighbourhoods, and where access to decision-making processes
varies.228 BIAs limit democracy and exclude particular perspectives of residency and
public space.229 The BIA framework reinforces political dynamics that exclude
marginalized and low-income residents, as well as small businesses.230
Richard Ford argues that social exclusion is exacerbated in a local-focused approach to
decision-making.231 He states: “Residence in a municipality or membership in a
homeowners association involves more than simply the location of one’s domicile; it also
involves the right to act as a citizen, to influence the character and direction of a
jurisdiction or association through the exercise of the franchise, and to share in public
resources” which ultimately disadvantages racialized residents.232 Martha Mahoney, 233
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and Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton234 argue that wealthier neighbourhoods will
use municipal tools such as zoning to limit the range of who may access the
neighbourhood. Gerald Frug recognizes that there are implications for those not included
within neighbourhoods, which at its most extreme can create the “other,” or classes of
“undesirable” people whom neighbourhood decision-makers seek to create a policy to
exclude.235
The conceptualization of local governance as proposed in this dissertation asserts the
relevance of these non-state entities. This study seeks to understand the extent to which
BIAs and neighbourhood associations are important actors in Toronto’s governance
model when overlapped with state-based local governance bodies like wards and
community councils.

c) State iterations of local governance bodies include and exclude certain people and
communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules
Next, a conceptualization of local governance must account for inclusion and exclusion
through the drawing of boundaries and based on the mechanisms for participation. This
next component of analysis considers the inclusivity of the local governance model,
including judgments about who is eligible to participate, in what manner, and with what
power. This step draws on Santos’ belief that there are a multiplicity of laws, institutions
and boundaries operating formally and informally, and that one articulation of law may
be rejected if it differs too dramatically from other notions of representation and space.236
In this dissertation, the empirical analysis of this component of the conceptualization of
local governance incorporates Santos’ examination of the orders, practices and
knowledges that produce unequal power relations.237
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The creation of boundaries necessarily identifies who is and isn’t included. Richard Ford
notes that “the work that jurisdiction does is left largely unquestioned” and that once
jurisdictions are created, institutions and legal orders take on a life of their own.238
Boundaries literally mark which residents are included, but can also be understood in a
participatory sense, where particular persons may not access or influence decisionmaking. It may not always be clear when city boundaries are meant to affirm a way of
life for one community and to exclude others from participating.239 As Schragger notes,
the creation of communities is ultimately a political process with equally plausible
“alternative localisms” existing as well, and that “the hardest questions are … choosing
between one iteration of the community and numerous other possible iterations of the
community.”240 The problem is that once created by government, these boundaries have
consequences, especially if they result in institutions with decision-making power.
Fundamentally, this means there is no single set of boundary lines that necessarily make
sense over others, but once drawn, these lines have significant consequences.
Scholars dispute what is a “just” local boundary line. American scholar Iris Marion
Young believed that metropolitan-wide or regional governments were preferable, in part
to address the inequality that may result from smaller units of government thinking only
of their own interests. Young concluded that, to promote the normative ideal of city life,
cities themselves “should cease to have sovereign authority.”241 Instead, “the lowest level
of governmental power should be regional.”242 She adopted this position because she
assumed that decentralizing power to cities means ceding power to separate, autonomous,
mini-states. She believed that local governments will act selfishly with disregard to the
needs of their neighbours, and that it is only through the adoption of regional policy that a
fairer distribution of urban resources will result. In the regional structure she imagined,
she tried to give neighborhoods some influence over decision-making, but did not
and knowledges are considered and only partially identified, rather than fully examined, as a result of the
constraints in scope. This limitation is further discussed in Chapter 6.
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meaningfully try to decentralize political power. She transferred to a regional government
all of the conventional city functions: “powers of legislation, regulation, and taxation,
significant control over land use and capital investment, and control over the design and
administration of public services - without significant change.”243 Similarly, Valverde
concluded that, in the context of planning, regional is the appropriate scale of decisionmaking based on the lack of inclusion and dominance by privileged residents at a more
localized scale.244
As noted by Young, Valverde and others, there are significant implications for those not
included within neighbourhoods, which at its most extreme can create the “other,” or
classes of “undesirable” people whom neighbourhood decision-makers try to exclude.245
In advancing the argument that a stronger role for localized decision-making will enhance
participatory democracy, Archon Fung argues that the design, membership, and authority
of local bodies must be carefully considered by a broad range of stakeholders, and must
be regularly reviewed to ensure that they advance inclusion and meaningful
participation.246
This dissertation queries the boundary lines that are created as part of local governance,
asking how these lines are crafted and the resulting implications for inclusive
participation. My assertion is that the diagnostic stages above provide a conceptual
understanding of how local as a legal space is understood and advanced within the
governance model articulated by municipal governments. I suggest that these components
of a conceptualization of local governance provide a framework to evaluate Toronto’s
local governance model in Chapters 4 and 5. This conceptualization also provides a
foundation for advancing a normative theorization of local governance, described next.
III. Characterizing local governance as an urban commons

243

Ibid at 252-53.
Valverde, supra note 189.
245
Frug, supra note 7 at 1053.
246
Archon Fung, "Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance" (2006) 66:1 Public Administration
Review 66.
244

57

Ultimately, this dissertation aims to promote distributive justice in the context of the city.
To acknowledge that a plural set of bodies play a role in local governance, to enhance the
legitimacy of state law in crafting particular boundaries and legal orders, and to offset
some of the effects of exclusion, I assert that local governance should be understood in
the context of an urban commons. Seeing local governance through the normative lens of
a commons clarifies that smaller-than-city legal spaces are comprised of public and
private spaces, and that the sum total of these spaces should be inclusive and
participatory. The urban commons, as an offshoot of progressive property theory, is one
way of conceptualizing how the law can be used to advance social justice. I argue that
viewing local legal spaces through the lens of an urban commons, founded on the norms
above, advances the normative objectives of a more inclusive, participatory framework of
local governance.
1. The meaning of the urban commons
The academic discourse on the commons is vast and varied. The notion of an “urban
commons” has no uniform definition or agreed upon principles, and includes the
application, critique, and acclaim of Ostrom’s view across a wide range of disciplines. In
law, notions of the commons have been applied to environmental law, communications
law and the rights of the homeless, to name a few.247 Christian Borch and Martin
Kornberger state that the city “is not a frictionless agglomeration of commoners, but
rather a site for ongoing contestation about what counts as a common and who counts as
commoners.”248
There are countless definitions of the “urban commons” making it challenging to offer a
singular definition that captures the many facets of the term, whether as a political
movement or a theoretical framework.249 This normative framework of local governance
focuses on the urban commons as a form of governance, in particular where multiple
247
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bodies claim to have rights to govern within an urban context, who mediates such claims,
and how.250 This is a different conception of the urban commons from Harvey, who
suggests that spaces become urban commons through social action. Like Maja Hojer
Bruun, this understanding of the urban commons believes that “the commons are
characterized by overlapping right to and claims in the commons.”251 However, while
Bruun focuses on the moral right possessed by people and communities who claim an
interest in the commons, this paper limits its scope to the conceptualization of the
governance of local legal spaces within an urban commons framework.
This conversation about the urban commons places property law at the centre of the
debate.252 Property law, in particular, serves a key role in this complex terrain of city
governance, both conceptually and because of its connection to planning. In regard to the
larger conceptual question, Blomley notes the centrality of property law in this way: “Not
only does the making of property entail the making of space … but property’s enactments
are also caught up in the creation of particular landscapes that are simultaneously
material and representational.”253 Many property scholars would agree. From the early
days of law school, students are taught that property’s lineage back to the origins of
English common law provides a stabilizing model upon which much of the legal system
can be understood. Property courses typically begin by categorizing the world into four
sometimes overlapping categories that more or less explain how title to land and goods
can be understood: private, common, public, and non-property or open access.254 In this
model, private property is the property owned by individuals who can exclude others
from access. Common property is collectively owned, while public property is managed
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and controlled by government. The final category has no ownership and can be freely
used by all.
Sarah Hamill notes that these categories are “hopelessly inadequate for the real world.”255
Similarly, recent years have seen an explosion of critique regarding what is understood as
an overly simplistic, strictly doctrinal understanding of property, with scholars opining on
tenets including the oversimplification of “owner” and the degree to which it obscures the
many parties who have legal and other interests in property,256 the link between
belonging and property,257 whether property includes obligations to third party, noninterest holders,258 and the transformative effects of environmental and indigenous law on
property.259 To Larissa Katz, the crucial question is who sets the agenda for the private
property in question.260 Alexander and Peñalver state: “Property stands so squarely at the
intersection between the individual and community because systems of property are
always the creation of some community.”261 Blomley notes the variety of communities
who live on land and put it to work, including squatters, without any desire to formalize
their rights.262
Common property presents a particular problem for traditional notions of property law.263
Common property interests are shared amongst many users, without necessarily having
divided lines, hierarchical interests, or the capacity to exclude, each of which features in
traditional conceptions of private property.264 In The Tragedy of the Commons, biologist
Garrett Hardin asserted that open-access commons were an unsatisfactory form of
interest based on the inevitability that depletion and destruction would occur as individual
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parties do not have an interest to conserve or sustainably use the resource.265 This has
been referred to as the “tragedy of the commons.” In this worrisome tale, free-riders will
take advantage of the public nature of the good or land and, because there are no
consequences to this abuse, the common property will ultimately be destroyed. By
contrast, Carol Rose has disputed the characterization of common property as an
inevitable tragedy, arguing instead that “inherently public property,” which is both owned
and managed by society at large, is not a tragedy, but a comedy.266 Common property can
be understood as a comedy because it can both expand wealth and bring community
members together, the latter of which she calls “sociability.”267 Rose asserts that law
allocates access to certain lands to the public because “public access to those locations is
as important as the general privatization of property in other spheres of our law.”268
Henry George understands common property as integral to understanding and addressing
injustice, including within cities.269
Ostrom critiqued Hardin’s work on the basis of governance, among other reasons. She
asserted that a commons is not solely a resource, as Hardin would understand, but is
instead a resource plus the social community and its corresponding values, rules and
norms that are used to manage or govern the resource. In her book, Governing the
Commons, for which she won the Nobel Prize in 1999, Ostrom offered real-world
examples of the management of common goods such as fisheries, land irrigation systems,
and farmlands.270 She found that the tragedy of the commons could be avoided and
identified a number of factors conducive to successful resource management: first, the
resource should have definable boundaries; second, there should be a perceptible threat of
resource depletion and it must be difficult to find substitutes; third, there should be small
and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting
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conservation; and fourth, there should be appropriate community-based rules and
procedures in place with built-in incentives for responsible use and punishments for
overuse.271 This facet of the commons – the implications for governance in the context of
local legal spaces – is explored next.
2. Connecting the urban commons and local governance
Under Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s version of the urban commons, the resources
in question within the urban commons are very broad and diverse, including public
streets, public parks, public and neighbourhood amenities, and public spaces.272 To them,
shared urban resources that include local streets, parks, spaces, and neighbourhood
amenities are subject to Hardin’s free-rider problem regarding resource depletion since it
is difficult to exclude potential users who lack incentives to conserve or use them.273 To
Vinay Gidwanu and Amita Baviskar, the urban commons are public goods that may be
classified in two ways: first, as ecological commons (e.g. air, water, landfills), and,
second, as a civic commons (e.g. streets, public spaces, public transit, public schools).274
The commons are a dynamic, collectively owned variety of resources governed by
custom and are constantly negotiated through law or social norms and values. To these
scholars, the urban commons are inclusive of the resources that are shared among all
persons which lie at frontiers or within a particular territorial area. Put another way, all
spaces and resources within the city’s boundaries form part of the “urban commons.”
By asking how Foster and Iaione’s conception of the “urban commons” maps onto “local
legal spaces” presented in the first part of this chapter, I assert that the urban commons
framework can be normatively applied to the governance of local legal spaces, regardless
of the underlying legal interests within those spaces. In Foster and Iaione’s conception of
the urban commons, it does not matter how the resource in question is owned, whether

271

Ibid.
Foster & Iaione, supra note 44.
273
Foster, supra note 41 at 1995-1996, online:
<www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/stable/pdf/41511325.pdf>.
274
Vinay Gidwani & Amita Baviskar, “Urban Commons” (2011) 46:50 Economic and Political Weekly 1 at
2, online: <http://environmentportal.in/files/file/Commons_1.pdf>.
272

62

privately or publicly.275 Likewise, to Blomley, the idea of an “urban commons” includes
community gardens, land trusts and squatting, as well as his own description of a large
private property development in downtown Vancouver which resulted in the eviction of a
sizeable homeless population.276 Blomley recommends that the lens of the commons be
rethought as a model that is not as “radically dissimilar from private property as one
might suppose.”277 He recognizes the political heft of property as enabling “individuals
and groups in the city a language for naming, blaming and claiming.”278 Here, the
“commons” uses the language of a private property right to assert that non-property
owners have a right to a parcel of land. Blomley is not troubled, as Hamill is, by an
understanding of the urban commons that includes a private property ownership model of
the right in question.279
Instead, for Blomley, the focus is on the nature of governance. Institutions are meant to
protect and enhance shared resources in a city.280 Under this view, urban commons are
unrestricted and unregulated open access resources which enable uncoordinated
stakeholders to overconsume or overexploit finite city resources. Land use regulations are
seen as an avenue to manage the enhanced utility or value within an urban landscape. To
some scholars, the city government is the appropriate decision-maker.281
However, Foster and Iaione suggest looking to Ostrom’s work on the commons to
appreciate a third option: cooperation among private actors to manage certain
resources.282 Foster and Iaione explicitly critique the notion that there are only two
possible choices in ensuring the urban commons, between centralized governmental
275
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regulation and privatization of the urban commons. In their view, these choices do not
include the alternative avenues for decision-making and management for the urban
commons such as those for cooperative natural resource management regimes. It is
uncertain how Foster and Iaione’s vision of governance dovetails with Rose’s notion of
decision-making in regard to “inherently public property,” although presumably a local
government consents to this collaborative approach.283
Foster and Iaione link Ostrom’s resource management factors to qualities possessed by
common resources in the city, especially the lack of rivalry in consumption and a lack of
excludability in access to and enjoyment of their benefits.284 This conceptualization is not
meant to undermine the existence of private property rights in the city; instead, Foster
and Iaione argue that the city as a whole is an urban commons. They demonstrate the
applicability of an urban commons framework to the city through the observation that, if
a local government does not properly manage the urban commons for whatever reason,
“regulatory slippage” can occur, whereby the common resource is degraded in value or
attractiveness for other types of users and uses.285 At this point, the space in question
“creates conditions which begin to mimic the type of commons problem that Hardin
wrote about—that is, such resources become rivalrous and prone to degradation and
perhaps destruction.”286 The openness of many cityscapes produces benefits of social
value but quickly mimics the susceptibility of a common pool natural resource to overuse
in either volume or intensity. Similarly, Tara Lynne Clapp and Peter Meyer further use
the commons framework to describe the governance practices of institutional actors
regarding the environment.287 Clapp and Meyer critique the ability or city governments to
limit environmental depletion owing to existing municipal institutions of varying scales,
regulatory structures, land markets, and state and local government policies and
regulations. Thus, they argue, to ensure distributional equity, municipal institutions
should allow for communities to protect themselves from harm through the establishment
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of shared cooperative normative structures. In this way, governance beyond the state
achieves a degree of fairness that is otherwise not possible.
Under this view, if the city government is not acting as a proper steward of city space,
some other form of governance can and should be invoked to limit the degradation of city
resources. Foster and Iaione refer to this form of commons governance as “bottom up,”
making room for co-partners, or co-collaborators, users of the commons and other actors
who have a stake in the commons.288 They focus their analysis on the possibility of
bringing more collaborative governance tools to “decisions about how city space and
common goods are used, who has access to them, and how they are shared” among a
diverse urban population.289 Under their view, urban commons are spaces that afford
residents shared access to local urbanized resources, thus urban residents who are
accessing urban resource pools have a common stake in ensuring the longevity of the
resource.290
The purpose of looking at the local governance model through the lens of the urban
commons, especially where non-government actors play an important role, is to protect
the “common good.”291 Zoning bylaws can be rethought as tools to promote the common
good, for example, the use of exclusionary zoning tools as a tool to open access to the
particular areas of the city to those who have been excluded.292 Non-state actors can get
involved in a governance model where governments are too strained to address a broader
range of city issues. Beyond pragmatic considerations, Foster and Iaione assert this
broader claim in support of the view that, regardless of whether spaces are privately or
publicly owned, the city is a territorial space in which citizens claim to have a role or
stake, and this claim is reinforced by law.293
This dissertation adopts Foster and Iaione’s conception of the urban commons to argue
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that this framework may serve as a helpful model for a normative understanding of the
smaller-than-city spaces to which a local governance model is then applied. The next
section details the advantages of such a framework.

3. The urban commons as a normative framework for local governance
Local governance as understood within the lens of an urban commons framework is the
crucial normative pillar in identifying and advancing a framework to understand a local
legal space. What, then, would such a “local” urban commons look like? How would it
advance the theoretical framework of a local legal space? The urban commons is
consistent with a framework of local legal spaces that is multi-scaled, continuously
created and recreated as a function of time, and measured based on the degree to which it
enables a more inclusive, participatory approach to governance. This is the conception of
local governance advanced in this dissertation.
Viewing local governance through the lens of an urban commons has three normative
benefits. First, the scalar logic of urban governance means that local governance can be
understood as a cooperative decision-making model that moves beyond the state to
include empowered non-state actors. To Foster and Iaione, the urban commons can be
governed in a manner that empowers the local government and persons by having
conditions that allow communities to autonomously decide on and enforce the rules for
sharing and managing commons resources. In Foster and Iaione’s view, it is possible to
re-situate city’s role as an enabler and facilitator of collaboration. Here, the state would
create the conditions under which a city’s residents can develop collaborative
relationships with each other and with public authorities. The idea is that the urban
commons can then be used as a tool to reverse city inequalities by “empowering residents
to collaborate in order to undertake the care and regeneration of the resources.”294 This
collaboration, they argue, can take place across multiple scales, including more localized
versions that exist in Toronto. For example, Foster provides extensive evidence that this
is already taking place through organizations like BIAs and park conservatories that
294
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receive authority to manage a city resource.295 This presumes that common interests exist
among residents, local governments and other parties, such as businesses.
Foster and Iaione use the concept of subsidiarity to “re-orient public authorities away
from the central state to an active citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common
resources.”296 As mentioned, the principle of subsidiarity provides that government
powers should reside at the lowest level possible.297 The commons makes room for
“bottom up” governance by co-partners, or co-collaborators, users of the commons and
other actors who have a stake in the commons at the city-wide scale. Foster and Iaione
endorse the urban commons as an opportunity to include collaborative governance tools
in “decisions about how city space and common goods are used, who has access to them,
and how they are shared” among a diverse urban population.298 They suggest that
subsidiarity can be a design feature for urban commons governance as the citizen is
conceived as active and willing to take care of shared resources. Perceived this way,
residents have a role in the ongoing decision-making related to the city. Building on
Santos’ notion of scale, this dissertation looks at the scale of local governance to
understand how boundaries and governance would be impacted by such a reorientation
and what it means for inclusivity.299 This first consideration is mindful of debates about
neoliberal shifts in urban power and the retreat of governments and, as such, maintains
that inclusive participation must be the underlying objective of a normative framework of
local governance.300
Second, the urban commons is consistent with the theoretical framework of local
governance advanced in this dissertation in regard to flexibility. Norms and rules in
respect of boundaries and governance shift over time, as is described in Toronto’s case in
Chapter 3. Local legal spaces are continuously created and recreated. In pursuing the
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objective of a local legal space that enables participation and inclusivity, this dissertation
adopts a flexible and contextualized approach to governance. This flexibility is inspired
by the work of scholars who urge a less rigid concept of commons management.301
According to Santos, the model for this public engagement and involvement should be
complex and sophisticated to reflect the importance of overlapping, multifaceted,
multiplayer decision-making at the municipal level. He favours this decisional
complexity in stark contrast to the approach of Max Weber, who argues instead for
rational bureaucracy. Santos proposed the following hypothesis: “in internally
differentiated societies, the stronger the bond between democracy and distributive justice,
the more complex the methodology that guarantees such bond tends to be. The decrease
of complexity that bureaucracy allows for cannot but bring about the loosening of the
bond between democracy and distributive justice.”302 Thus, a rational system of decisionmaking misrepresents the messy reality of participatory democracy, which is
interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation. Santos notes the
tendency that, “irrespective of the plurality of normative orders circulating in society,
each one of them, taken separately, aspires to be exclusive, to have the monopoly of
regulation and control of social action within its legal territory.”303 But, what might
happen if the foci of local governance are shifted without rigidity as to particular
configurations? Can local legal spaces be contextual and flexible, even varied across
different geographies?304
Third, I argue that the urban commons provides a normative framework for distributive
justice. Foster and Iaione state that, “The core impetus to conceive of the city as a
commons aims at changing the democratic and economic functioning of the city,”305 to
move towards “a system which at its core redistributes decision making power and

301

Rose, supra note 266.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Toward a Redistributive
Democracy” (2008) 26 Politics & Society 461.
303
Santos, supra note 85 at 458.
304
See Paul S. Berman, “The Globalization of Jurisdiction” (2002) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 (who asserts at
322 that legal jurisdiction can be described as “social interactions that are fluid processes, not motionless
demarcations frozen in time and space”).
305
Ibid. at 335.
302

68

influence away from the center and towards an engaged public.”306 To Foster and Iaione,
“a commons-based governance approach envisions cities as vehicles for collaboration
across formal governance arrangements toward social and economic inclusion.”307 Foster
and Iaione flag the following issues as ones to be considered in an urban commons:
“[A]re collaboration arenas able to guarantee equal access by underrepresented groups
who are too often unable to access political and larger decision making processes, or can
the potential of such collaborative processes represent a significant step towards a more
egalitarian process than currently exists? How can we avoid the risk that the collaborative
ecosystem produces output that results in a patchwork, instead of a network, of
governance arrangements for the urban commons?”308
Likewise, this dissertation argues for a normative framing of local governance that is
inclusive and participatory. In Chapter 6, I develop this normative argument in relation to
Toronto’s local governance model, advancing four principles for local governance.

IV. Conclusion
This dissertation uses the conceptualization of local governance as set out in this chapter
to investigate the overlapping geographic boundaries and decision-making roles of
Toronto’s four main localized governance bodies. This chapter sets out the framework to
be used in the dissertation. First, this chapter sets out the framework that serves as the
basis for the conceptualization of local governance, including the meaning and relevance
of interlegality as drawn from legal pluralism and legal geography.
Second, as the core element of this chapter, I bring together these literatures to offer and
defend a two-part conceptualization of local governance that, first, local governance is
pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative orders such that local
spaces cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous units; and, second, that state
iterations of local governance bodies create political, social, and spatial realities, through
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multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms, orders, rules and practices;
and include and exclude certain people and communities through the setting of
boundaries and participation rules.
The chapter concludes by arguing that this conceptualization of local governance,
examined alongside Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione’s concept of the urban commons,
may be used to explore and evaluate how local bodies make overlapping and
contradictory claims about their legal jurisdiction over segments of the city; and, second,
to propose a local governance model that improves the inclusivity and participation of
historically marginalized people.
We next turn to the methodology adopted by this dissertation to understand the legal
spaces of Toronto’s local governance model.
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Chapter 2 – The Methodological Puzzle
Susan Fainstein writes, “[L]ocal policies make life better or worse for people. There are
many decisions, especially involving housing, transport, and recreation, made at the local
level that differentially affect people’s quality of life.”309 Taking the City of Toronto as
its focus, this dissertation asks how local governance is conceptualized and reflected in
the overlap of formal bodies empowered under applicable law and through the uneven
involvement of non-state bodies that assert geographic boundaries and a representative
role in local areas of the city. Fundamentally, as a dissertation rooted in law, it asks how
legal rules may be used to foster inclusive connections and a just city.310
On the one hand, this is a dissertation about how the law is used to create and reinforce
physical boundaries and overlapping governing institutions within the city. On the other
hand, this study also seeks to understand how institutions are used and acted upon outside
of the formal contours of law. As such, the dissertation steps outside of a doctrinal review
of applicable legal codes to invite a mixed methodological approach. The methodology
adopted in this study combines doctrinal analysis with qualitative and basic quantitative
empirical methods.
My methodological approach is informed by the interplay of theory and method, and by
the concept of positionality. Socio-legal researchers whose academic training is in law
have been criticized as “methodologically unsophisticated.”311 To avoid such criticism,
Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney suggest careful consideration of the adoption of an
approach and method in light of the research question; review of academic literature on
theory and method; and waiting until the research method and theoretical approach are
clear before proceeding to the collection of data.312 While my approach included careful
consideration of the underlying theory and method, and was clear as data collection took
309

Susan S. Fainstein, “The Just City” (2014) 18:1 International Journal of Urban Sciences 1 at 14.
Gregory S. Alexander, Dillemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community,
(1989) Cornell Law Faculty Publications 466.
311
Fiona Cownie and Anthony Bradney, Socio-legal studies: A Challenge to the Doctrinal Approach in
Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton, Research Methods in Law (New York, Routledge, 2013) at 37.
312
Ibid. at 38
310

71

place, I left space to undertake what Elinor Ostrom called “moving back and forth from
the world of theory to the world of action.”313 As Ostrom notes, without theory, one is
unable to understand the many dynamics that operate in different situations. Empirical
work helps to centre theoretical work. This meant, during field work, continually coming
back to my theoretical approach and research question to ensure intellectual honesty.
Ostrom’s approach is consistent with those of Allaine Cerwonka, and Liisa H. Malkki,
who do not agree with a reduction of observed practices to mere illustrations of ideas and
who instead reflect on the process of observation as “partial understanding, as well as
floods of insight.”314 An interpretive process in the approach of Ostrom, Cerwonka, and
Malkki involves a “continuous movement between explanations (theories) about the
object or process at issue and the parts that force adjustment or reaffirm the researcher’s
initial “guessing.”315
This interplay of theory and method held true in my research process. I initially decided
to focus on community councils as my sole object of inquiry. As time progressed, I
realized that a singular examination of community councils as expressions of local
governance would limit my ability to understand the many bodies that informed how
smaller-than-city spaces are governed, and that I needed to broaden the study to
incorporate wards, neighbourhood associations and business improvement areas, each of
which claimed physical boundaries and a mandate of representation.
This realization mirrors the recognition in my theoretical framework that the nuances of
local areas of the city are instrumental to understanding how these legal spaces are
crafted through boundaries and governance. I began my dissertation with a reasonably
clear sense of the theoretical framework that I would use during the study, believing that I
would engage Gerald Frug’s meaning of “community” as a spatiotemporal concept that
had limited application in Toronto given the differences in municipal legal structures in
Canada and the United States. However, as I began to craft my detailed project outline
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and to research the “law in the books” related to governance (what is now Chapter 3), the
theoretical framework went through a period of adjustment. As I learned new details
about the City of Toronto’s local governance model, my theoretical lens shifted, seeking
to better explain what I was learning. I expanded the literature that I was engaging with
beyond the familiar contours of legal scholarship, discovering theorists including
Valverde and Blomley, whose research became central to my own. As my writing
progressed, I used this work to articulate a conceptualization of local governance that
could be evaluated using the case studies.
The research question also became more refined as my field work and writing progressed.
In late 2015, I had developed a conceptualization of local governance outlined in Chapter
1 and was grounded within a prescriptive framework. As I interviewed councillors and
senior staff members and explained the project to them, I observed the absence of a
normative objective in my research question. This led me to consider the larger question
of what I intended to advance as a theoretically-grounded meaning of local governance,
ultimately leading me to consider the urban commons. What does this concept mean in
the case of Toronto and its local legal spaces? Can the urban commons animate the goals
of legal geography to move beyond analyzing how the “legal” and the “spatial” are
mutually constitutive and instead to examine what the legal forms and geographies mean
for inclusive, participatory governance grounded within an urban commons
framework?316 Attending academic conferences and obtaining feedback on this
intellectual and methodological journey were – and continue to be – particularly helpful
tools to refine and make sense of the material with which I was engaging.
My work is also deeply impacted by my own experiences working at Toronto City Hall
and, as such, my positionality and prejudgments can never be erased from the knowledge
production process that I engaged in throughout the data collection period. At the time
that I began my doctoral work in 2012, I was working full-time as a civil servant in the
City Manager’s Office working on intergovernmental files, mainly related to transit,
infrastructure, and housing. I very consciously chose a topic that was unrelated to my
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day-to-day work in order to create an intellectual distance between my dissertation
project and what I called my “professional work.” I wanted to avoid concerns regarding
ethics of engaging with relevant material outside of the strict parameters of permissible
methods of data collection. However, my desire to engage in doctoral work was
motivated by a gap in the analysis of Canadian urban governance that I had observed as a
civil servant. In the transit, infrastructure and housing files that I worked on, I observed a
lack of systemic processes for addressing the “local” aspects of city-wide decisions. This
puzzle has undeniably influenced my perspective on local governance, much as I tried to
avoid bridging my academic and professional work. This background further contributed
to the desire for a normative understanding of “local governance ” that may guide how
governments may enable a more inclusive, participatory city through the design of legal
processes and institutions.
The interplay of practical experience and scholarly work is not new in academia,
particularly in the field of law, as constitutional law professor Erwin Chemerinsky
observed in his scholarly work related to the development of neighborhood councils in
Los Angeles.317 Chemerinsky recounted his role as a commissioner setting up the
councils, including working with community stakeholders, weighing options and
confronting political realities, observing at the end, “As with everything else in charter
reform, the provisions concerning Neighborhood Councils were a compromise. It made
me appreciate how much the United States Constitution, too, was a compromise.”318
Thus, his expertise as a scholar and day-to-day experiences as a commissioner could not
be disassociated, but instead merged in both his experience in city government and his
analysis of neighbourhood councils.
Philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer observes that method does not properly capture how
knowledge gathering occurs.319 Instead, the act of interpreting always involves a “fusion
of horizons” influenced by the historical specificity of the researcher, and the history and
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character of the object of study.320 What we see as researchers is necessarily mediated by
a vantage point that prioritizes particular information and questions to understand the
phenomenon.321 In this study, my experiences at City Hall, both before and during the
crafting of the dissertation, informed my interest in the topic, the lens through which I
understood the issue, and facilitated connections to interview subjects that might not have
otherwise been available to me.
Research is “an attempt to discover something.”322 It is with the methodological tools
described below that I embarked on the discovery that follows in this dissertation.
I. Doctrinal analysis: textual review of case law and legislation
Hoi Kong remarks that cities are “creatures of the law.”323 Likewise, this dissertation
advances the idea that the legislative foundation of the city of Toronto provides an
essential context for understanding the city’s governance institutions, as well as its view
of what “local governance” means. While this dissertation draws on interdisciplinary
work – particularly from the legal geography project – to challenge core concepts, the
analysis is fundamentally rooted in a study of law. From a legal perspective, Toronto’s
governance model is set out “in the books,” including provincial legislation and
municipal bylaws. Similarly, this research seeks to understand how state law shapes
narratives of engagement and participation, and to understand which voices are excluded
within usual engagement practices, necessitating knowledge of how legal codes set out
the local governance. The dissertation incorporates the analysis of legal doctrine, which
includes both statutory interpretation and case law, to set out and understand Toronto’s
institutions, legislative powers, and governance rules. This approach is also called “black
letter law” or “formal” law and assumes that there exists a systemization of law that can
be interpreted and known.
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There is no agreement by legal theorists on the nature of doctrine as a discipline and the
degree to which it draws from hermeneutic, argumentative, logical and normative
elements.324 In property law, which I view as the legal family within which this study
resides, a doctrinal approach has typically been used, professing to relate what the law is,
not what it should be.325 Property law is considered to be a particularly complex exercise,
where the question of “what is the law?” is the most difficult research question of all.326
Mary Jane Mossman accounts for this complexity as follows:
[P]roperty scholarship must take account of statutes, both ancient and modern,
which are interwoven with common-law principles; as well, it must
accommodate a background of ideas, often only implicit, about the
constitutional protection of property interests. The tasks of enunciating the law
and demonstrating the efficacy of its application in a particular context may be
overwhelming in themselves; and these difficulties may provide at least a
partial explanation for the absence of property scholarship that advances
beyond explication of this sort. Moreover, the combination of provincial
jurisdiction over property and the nature of property law analysis - an amalgam
of statutes, common law, and constitutional principles - makes the task a
daunting one indeed.327
In Chapter 3, I follow these steps to set out the applicable law as it relates to the City of
Toronto’s governance model. The legislation, namely COTA and other statutes such as
the Planning Act, 2000, constitutes the City of Toronto as a corporate entity under
provincial dominion. This legislation sets out the city’s boundaries, obligations and
powers. I analyze provincial legislation that outlines Toronto’s powers and constraints, as
well as legal decisions, particularly of the Supreme Court of Canada, that have
interpreted the scope of municipal authority. There are nuances in the applicable law,
especially regarding the interplay of provincial law and municipal bylaws, and of court
cases and decisions of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB). The dissertation benefits
from a close textual reading of the relevant provisions, in particular the rules and
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performance of community councils. I also examine the legislation that previously
defined Toronto’s powers and obligations, particularly at the time of amalgamation in
1998, as part of the story of how the city’s governance model has evolved.
Chapter 3 describes wards and community councils as the local governance bodies
formally endorsed by the city, analyzing the roles that these bodies play in local planning
and other decisions. The city is divided into discrete electoral districts called wards, each
of which has a population of approximately 60,000 residents who elect a councillor to
represent them. In the 1998 amalgamation of seven municipalities to form the City of
Toronto’s current municipal boundaries, the Province of Ontario created “community
councils,” which were intended to bring the local voices of the pre-amalgamated
municipalities formally within the city’s political structure. The City of Toronto’s
procedural bylaw permits community councils to operate differently from other standing
committees. This section illustrates the history and role that wards and community
councils play in the City of Toronto’s formal local governance model.
However, the city’s authorities under provincial legislation, and wards and community
councils as the city’s formal local bodies, are only one part of the City of Toronto’s local
governance story. As such, Chapter 3 examines business improvement areas (BIAs) and
neighbourhood associations (NAs) as institutions that play a key role in the city’s
governance. I explain how these bodies are created, managed and integrated into city
decision-making in and outside of the law, including significant distinctions between the
two types of bodies in their connections to councillors and bureaucrats, their uneven
presence in the city, and their involvement in local planning decisions. Chapters 4 and 5
each set out case studies to illustrate how Toronto’s formal local governance bodies
(wards and community councils) interplay with informal bodies (BIAs and NAs) in
decision-making at the smaller-than-city scale.
The approach taken in this dissertation has two principal strengths. First, this dissertation
contributes to an emerging legal scholarship on municipal governance in the Canadian
context. In 2006, Ron Levi and Mariana Valverde published an article on the legal status
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of Canadian cities by canvassing relevant doctrine and noting the lack of constitutional
space for an expanded municipal authority.328 Since then, Hoi Kong has published several
articles on cities, federalism, and administrative law.329 Kong’s articles include statutory
interpretation and analysis of case law, contributing an understanding of the evolving
political role of cities and the legal instruments that are used to both frame their powers
and enable self-governance.330 My work builds on this emerging scholarship on Canadian
municipal law by conceptualizing what is meant by local governance and how the urban
commons may apply a normative framework in the Canadian urban context. I add to this
conversation by theorizing the city in the context of legal pluralism and legal geography
as comprising a plurality of laws, norms, and codes, and both state and non-state bodies
that unevenly impact decision-making. Ultimately, I share many Canadian scholars’
objective to understand how municipal authority contributes to more inclusive cities.
Second, legal analysis can expose particular aspects of the law through a careful textual
analysis and a thorough reading of legislation and case law. Here, a close reading of the
legislation and municipal bylaws in Chapter 3 suggests a set of powers for community
councils that are rarely practiced. Thus, a review of law demonstrates a law “in the
books,” but not “in action.”331 Likewise, Chapter 3 sets out an argument concerning
subsidiarity that can be used in subsequent arguments for an augmented municipal
authority. This approach also emulates Ostrom’s approach in her commons research
whereby careful attention was placed on definitions and the institutional structures at the
heart of the research.332 This dissertation’s doctrinal analysis will contribute to an
understanding of how the law shapes Canadian cities that may be used by legal educators
and practitioners, as well as those in the academy.333
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However, in this dissertation and elsewhere, this traditional approach to legal analysis is
rapidly expanding to include theoretical approaches such as law and economics, critical
legal studies, law and society, critical race theory and others, resulting in transformations
in the kinds of methodologies used.334 For example, scholars who ground their studies
within a critical legal studies approach may move beyond doctrine to include semistructured interviews or participatory observation, in part, because doctrinal analysis does
not acknowledge the liberal bias inherent in the law’s professed rationality and logic.335
As Blomley notes, the way in which laws are described by governments does not assist us
in fully understanding the legal space in operation.336 If black letter law or legal doctrine
is the limit of the inquiry, then the research is failing to address the social, political and
economic reality in which the rules sit.337 However, there is no consensus as to the extent
to which these “non-law” or societal perspectives must be considered.338 At minimum,
Mary Jane Mossman argues that an acknowledgment of the perspective from which a
scholar is writing, their underlying values and assumptions, and the limits of rational
discourse are essential in property law scholarship.339 In property law classes, these
perspectives are referred to as “relevant policy considerations and societal goals.”340
But, is this enough? I suggest that a layered, creative approach that moves beyond
doctrine may better understand the legal dynamics at play in the creation and
enforcement of jurisdictional boundaries, as well as the nature and inclusivity of the
resulting governance model. This dissertation recognizes that “state” and “non-state” are
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rudimentary distinctions that are not, in practice, simple to distinguish.341 However,
incorporating a qualitative approach through the methods described below provides a
more fulsome analysis of Toronto’s governance model than reviewing provincial and
municipal statutes, and by examining case law, which provides an incomplete picture as
to how wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations inform the
meaning of local legal spaces in Toronto. From an information-gathering perspective,
learning from those who both designed and work within these bodies helped me to
understand why decisions were made or events took place, absent data available on
paper, in City Council decisions or on Hansard. To understand the local governance role
of councillors, watching community council and other meetings helped me to observe the
dynamics between councillors, representatives of neighbourhood association and BIAs.
The two case studies allowed for an exploration of how geographic boundaries and
overlapping governing institutions used and acted upon in city decision-making. In short,
a methodological approach that integrated an examination of both doctrine and
qualitative methods was consistent with the theoretical framework that guides this
research.
II. Case studies
The lens of legal pluralism helps to see that many governance entities and institutions
overlap within a localized space. This dissertation adopts a case study approach to
understand how Toronto’s boundaries and governance institutions overlap.342 Case
studies are used to explore a particular context and to understand how the people within
interact with one another and the outside world.343 As stated by Chris Hart, case studies
allow a researcher to “evaluate research within the paradigm in which it has been
conducted,” in this case permitting me to understand the process of local governance

341

Note also Peer Zumbansen’s thoughtful contributions regarding the challenge in distinguishing between
legal and a non-legal forms of regulation within the context of transnational law (Zumbansen, supra note
74).
342
G. Thomas, “A Typology for the case study in social science following a review of definition, discourse
and structure” (2011) 17(6) Qual Inquiry 511.
343
Satnam Choongh, “Doing Ethnographic Research: Lessons from a Case Study” in Mike McConville and
Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) at 70

80

within the structures that it is operating.344 Case studies are not meant as a tool to create a
grand, generalized theory of urban governance in Toronto or elsewhere; rather as a way
of understanding how local governance occurs in a particular place and time.345 Authors
must make clear why the case studies have been selected amongst the universe of
possible studies and should set out sufficient contextual boundaries.346
Case study research is helpful in illustrating, capturing and gaining insights on the
complexity of Toronto’s local governance model. Most importantly, I selected cases that
allowed me to test the conceptualization of local governance advanced in Chapter 1 as to
how wards, community councils, BIAs and NAs framed their geographies and roles in
regard to decision-making, and to identify which geographies and roles are included and
excluded by the formal local governance model. This both serves a diagnostic purpose,
meaning the application of the conceptualization of local governance, and sets the stage
for the normative goal, which is to advance local governance that incorporates an urban
commons framework.
I used four criteria to determine case study selection. The first criterion, overlapping local
governance institutions, means that wards, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood
associations played or could have played a role in decision-making. This meant that the
case studies must have been limited to the boundaries of the City of Toronto, rather than
a decision that involved multiple municipalities. I did not purposely decide upon case
studies that necessarily involved these four governance bodies; instead, I wanted to
observe without prejudging the degree to which wards, community councils, BIAs and
neighbourhood associations did or did not assert themselves as relevant. Second, I
selected as case studies matters that were deemed to be “city-wide” issues – that is,
matters where Toronto City Council served as the final decision-maker under applicable
law. As will be described in Chapter 3, numerous studies have concluded that Toronto’s
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councillors are rulers of “fiefdoms,” exercising an overwhelming degree of power within
their wards. As such, the case studies are each of “city-wide” issues, meaning that they
are not confined to a matter solely concerning a single ward.347 Third, I selected case
studies that concerned or tested geographic boundaries of local governance, meaning that
the spatial aspects and governance elements were considered in tandem. Fourth, the case
studies concerned distributive justice in that the issues to be decided would have
localized implications for the health, safety and democratic power of residents.
These criteria were consistent with the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 1. The
two-part conceptualization of local governance queries what state law has done to cement
an understanding of local and through what legal mechanisms and the competing legal
notions of local within one context. Case studies allow for the exploration of a particular
context or setting to understand how local governance is understood and shaped. The
focus on specific case studies reveals how state iterations of local governance base
themselves on rationales of closeness to residents, subsidiarity and legislative efficacy. It
allowed me to test how entities and institutions are included in performances of local see
what has been included in – and what has been left out of –state law’s conceptualization
of local governance.
Ultimately, three case studies were chosen. Chapter 4 sets out the first two, the 2012-13
and 2015 casino decisions. In the 2012-13 casino debate, four casino options in two
community council areas were identified as possible locations for a new casino in the
City of Toronto. The 2015 casino decision concerned the expansion of the Woodbine
Racetrack in the northwest part of the city. These two case studies provided insight into
whether the site of a casino is a “local” or a “city-wide” matter and which bodies should
be included in decision-making. It also illustrates differing levels of involvement of BIAs
and neighbourhood associations as participants in the City of Toronto’s governance
model.
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Chapter 5 sets out the third case study, the ward boundary review, which was initiated in
2013. This case study took place over two terms of City Council and concerned the
drawing of new electoral district boundaries in Toronto. This was the first fulsome ward
boundary review since amalgamation, as a more limited review in 2000 gave the City an
opportunity to divide the 22 federal electoral districts in two to create 44 wards. This case
study examined the meaning of local governance by examining which parts of the city’s
local governance model was and should be engaged in decision-making; how
“communities of interest” can and should be identified; and the interplay between wards,
BIAs, neighbourhood associations and other bodies. The chapter also examines broader
claims to local governance made during the review, including the number, mandate, and
design of community councils and other place-based local governance institutions.

III. Empirical research methods
For my empirical research (namely, the case studies and the characterization of the
institutional framework of the City of Toronto’s governance model), I employed a mix of
qualitative methods including semi-structured interviews, participant observation at
meetings and consultation sessions, archival research, and media analysis. I also used
geographic information systems (GIS) and other quantitative data to illustrate other
findings. This combination of methods allowed me to draw on a variety of sources and
perspectives to develop a nuanced understanding of local governance.
1. Semi-structured interviews
The strengths of interviews, particularly semi-structured interviews, as a research method
are well documented. As Kevin Dunn states, interviews are a respectful and empowering
method for research participants, in that their views can be heard. As Gill Valentine
notes, participants are free to respond openly, as opposed to providing fixed, categorized
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responses, and have the opportunity to explain their responses and redirect the question,
which is not possible with techniques like questionnaires.348
Semi-structured interviews rely on a predetermined line of questioning but allow for
additional questions during the process of the interview.349 I conducted semi-structured
interviews with former and current city staff and city councillors. The interviews are cited
in Appendix A. City staff described the circumstances that led to the creation of and
changes to community councils, how the ward boundary review and casino decisions
were initiated, the way in which BIAs and neighbourhood associations are included in
decision-making, and relationships between ward councillors and city staff. City
councillors provided information on their roles and participation in the casino debates in
particular, including how they saw their role in the local decision-making of a “citywide” issue and the degree to which they interacted with and involve BIAs and
neighbourhood associations. I focused on interviews with staff and councillors to
understand how they see the operation of local governance through the lens of formal
structures. The purpose was to understand how these formal municipal actors understand
the roles of BIAs and neighbourhood associations in decision-making processes. I drafted
and forwarded to participants a list of broad questions in advance, but ultimately
structured the interview as a conversation, rather than a series of rehearsed and carefully
worded questions. In some cases, participants agreed to have the interviews taped, in
which case they were recorded on a digital recorder and later transcribed. For those who
preferred not to have their interviews recorded, I took detailed notes during the interview.
In accordance with applicable human participant research standards, I honoured the
requests of individuals to remain anonymous.
Community councils were created at the time of amalgamation and were intended to
serve as the locus of local participation, consultation and decision-making within the
boundaries of the pre-amalgamated lower-tier municipalities. Community councils were
348
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later reviewed by city staff, resulting in changes to the City of Toronto’s procedural
bylaws setting out the role and function of these bodies. I was especially interested in
speaking with senior staff from the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto and the former
pre-amalgamated municipalities who were involved in the creation of community
councils in 1998, and those who authored the City of Toronto report on community
councils in 2003 to better understand the rationale for the boundaries selected and the
mandate of the community councils.350 As set out in Chapter 1, this dissertation argues,
as Valverde and Massey do, that space and time are not discrete, separated concepts; they
are instead part of one another. Similarly, the history of Toronto’s governance model, and
especially the story of amalgamation, is present in contemporary rules and practices, too.
These municipal actors are or were senior decision-makers in the city involved in the
three case studies, so I was able to solicit information on how wards, community
councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations were involved in their decision-making
processes. Having engaged in work at the City of Toronto, I drew on my own knowledge
and professional networks as starting points for who to interview. I asked each
interviewee who would be helpful to interview next until I began hearing the names of
those who had already been interviewed.351
Table 2.1 summarizes the categories and number of interviewees.
Interviewee
category

Number of
interviewees

Interview dates

Focus of interview

Relevant
municipal
governance body

City staff
(retired and
current)

6

• December,
2015
• March 2015
• April 2016
• February
2016
• February
2016

• Ward role in
local decisionmaking (6)
• Decisionmaking in citywide debates (6)
• Design of
community
councils (3)

• Ward
• Community
Council
• BIA
• NA

350
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• May 2016

Municipal
councillors
(past and
current)

4

April 2015

Civil
society
activists

3

March 2015

• 2012-13 casino
case study (3)
• Ward boundary
review (3)
• Approaches to
civic
engagement (2)
• Decisionmaking in local
planning
processes (1)
• 2015 casino
case study (1)
• Ward role in
• Ward
local decision• Community
making (4)
Council
• Decision• BIA
making in local • NA
planning
processes (4)
• Decisionmaking in citywide debates (4)
• Design of
community
councils (4)
• 2012-13 casino
case study (3)
• 2015 casino
case study (2)
Ward
• Origin of the
2012-13 casino
debate
• Role of
councillors in
the 2012-13
casino debate

Table 2.1 - Interview participants and topics
There are two limitations to my interviewing approach. First, three of the four councillors
that were interviewed were from the Toronto-East York Community Council area. These
86

three councillors were interviewed to understand their role in the 2012-13 casino debate
in particular and their novel use of community councils in decision-making, as they
represented wards identified as possible sites for a casino. I also wanted to interview
councillors who were involved in the 2015 casino decision, which involved a ward in the
Etobicoke-York community council area, but despite many attempts to reach out I was
not able to secure interviews with these councillors. I attempted to overcome this
limitation through a careful review of news media during the six-month period of the
municipal debate, as well as interviews with a city staff member who was involved in the
file. However, the lack of participation of councillors from this area serves as a
significant limitation of the 2015 casino case study.
Second, except for the 2012-13 casino decision case study, wherein I interviewed three
activists who were the public of the involved in the opposition to a downtown casino, I
did not interview non-staff members or non-councillors who attended consultations or
interacted with ward councillors, community councils, BIAs or neighbourhood
associations. This dissertation was focused on local governance as constructed by formal
actors and within formal city governance bodies rather than the direct experiences of
residents. For information on city engagement and civic participation in city processes, I
relied on the work of scholars including Deborah Cowen and Vanessa Parlette, as well as
news media.352 To understand the roles of BIAs and NAs, I supplemented my qualitative
research with GIS mapping and quantitative methods, as outlined below.
2. GIS data and Quantitative methods
When I started the research, I was able to locate some case studies on the roles of BIAs
and NAs in past municipal decisions, as well as a central databank of information with
raw data on the city’s 81 BIAs.353 However, there was very little information on NAs.
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There were also no studies such as the ones by Jill Gross examining the overall data on
such bodies within a specific city.354 Given the dissertation question, I felt that an
important exercise was gathering information on the locations, sizes, and budgets of BIAs
and NAs throughout the City of Toronto. This exercise was relatively straightforward in
the case of BIAs, where a great deal of information could be found on the City of Toronto
website or obtained from city staff. As detailed in Chapter 3, the process was
significantly more difficult in the case of NAs, as there is no centralized information,
organizations may be inactive, and activities rely on the volunteer efforts of NA
members. This methodological approach was invaluable in understanding the role of
BIAs and NAs in governance, by identifying where they are geographically located, how
they overlap with wards and community council boundaries, and their organizational
sizes within different geographies of the city.
Chapter 3 includes maps produced using GIS, setting out where BIAs and NAs exist
within the city. Their locations are compared with ward and community council
boundaries. The chapter also sets out the locations vis-à-vis other indicators including
income levels to provide further information on the role of these bodies within particular
areas of the city. This part of the dissertation also provides more quantitative data,
including descriptive statistics on the specific locations of these bodies, their
organizational size, budget, mandate and creation date. As noted in Chapter 3, this
information was collected by canvassing the websites of BIAs and NAs, and by e-mailing
them directly. Chapters 4 and 5 also include GIS maps of the showing the locations of
BIAs and NAs in relation to the specific case studies. The purpose of these maps is to
better illustrate the significant differences in the presence of these bodies across ward and
community council areas and the overall effect on city governance.
I did not interview representatives from BIAs and NAs, opting instead to use GIS
mapping and the use of quantitative methods. This decision was based on three
rationales. First and most importantly, my theoretical framework and normative argument
354
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are interested in how local governance is constructed by official actors and within official
city governance institutions and, as such, I concluded that I could base my analysis on
interviews with city officials together with other data. Second, I was able to locate
information on the roles of BIAs and NAs in the case studies that form part of this
dissertation. Many BIAs and NAs have detailed websites that include their deputations to
the city, positions on issues, and commissioned planning reports. Also, the contributions
of BIAs and NAs were noted in the reports prepared by the ward boundary review
consultants and in media reports, especially newspaper articles. In my observations of
ward boundary review open houses, I was able to observe the actions of BIA and NA
representatives. Third, I was able to gather a significant amount of detail on the way in
which these bodies understood their overall role in governance through their websites and
by contacting them directly. As a result, I concluded that I had data outside of interviews
to draw on regarding the local governance role of BIAs and NAs in the case studies and
concerning the overall research question.

3. Participant observation
Participant observation is “the systematic description of events, behaviors, interactions,
and artifacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study."355 This approach allows
researchers to locate themselves within the natural setting of the people or institutions
under study through observing activities.356 Irus Braverman notes that observation and
ethnography have specific relevance to legal scholars, suggesting that due to “our
familiarity with administrative structures and bureaucratic reasoning, as well as our
affiliation and heightened access to professional experts and government schemes, legal
scholars may play an important role in what cultural anthropology has termed ‘studying
up’, ‘multi-sited’, ‘engaged’, and ‘para’-ethnographies.”357 She states that in exercising
355
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this role, legal scholars are “familiar with legal language and therefore ‘insiders’ in the
legal world. As a result, we are probably both better-situated and better-equipped than
scholars in other disciplines to explore the intricacies of various administrative
structures.”358
Participant observation allowed me to understand the practices of community council
meetings and consultations. Toronto’s four community councils meet monthly, other than
in August, on the same day. I attended one of each monthly community council meetings
in 2015 and 2016, staying from 9:30 am, when the meeting began, either to the
conclusion or until 5:00 pm, whichever was earlier. I also attended committee meetings
where issues relevant to the case studies were considered, such as the Executive
Committee meeting in May 2015 where the expansion of the Woodbine Casino was
considered. In addition, I attended and participated in two consultation sessions in
Toronto and Scarborough concerning the ward boundary review.359
By attending these meetings and observing dynamics, I was able to see how councillors
and staff interacted, the types of sub-issues considered, and the role and engagement of
the public, including BIA and neighbourhood association representatives. Community
councils largely serve as local planning committees, with oversight over matters like
amendments to the city’s zoning bylaw, whether trees may be removed from private
property, and front-yard parking. At the first community council meeting that I attended,
I became aware of the difference in atmosphere when certain planning issues were
considered by the community council, and the room transformed into what I call “triallike.”360 In the morning, developers and lawyers sat at a table in front of the community
council members and were interrogated as to height densities and other similar matters.
Later, when issues like street parking and trees were considered, the developers and
lawyers left, and the room felt relaxed, with councillors and members of the public
speaking far more informally with one another. Likewise, at the meeting of the Etobicoke
358
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Community Council on January 19, 2016, I felt the physical separations limiting the
degree to which residents could see councillors sitting at the front of the room. I was also
able to see distinctions amongst the four community councils, including the degree to
which “community” issues beyond transactional planning matters were raised.
Observing meetings also helped me understand who was attending, including
representatives of BIAs and NAs. This proved to be especially important to the ward
boundary review consultations, as representatives of BIAs and NAs were the main
attendees and contributors. While the ward boundary review consultants published
detailed accounts of the meetings, attending in person helped to understand their roles
and contributions to the debate. By attending the meetings in person, I was better able to
understand the nuanced operation of community councils. Without attending in person,
the only records are the electronic meeting agenda, the list of deputants, the motions
introduced and the voting record. Unlike City Council and the Executive Committee
meetings, community council meetings are not recorded on video. In some ways, they are
like any other City Council committee, delegated a decision-making role over a particular
subject area and operating with a sharp division between councillors and the public.
However, they also have attributes of the community or neighbourhood forums that were
originally intended when the City of Toronto was amalgamated in 1998, and the
procedural bylaw was redrafted in 2006. These experiences would not have been possible
without attending the meetings.
4. Archival research
Archival research consists of documents and textual material by and about an
organization created in the past that may not be otherwise available.361 Consistent with
the theoretical framework that underlies this project, I understand that archived material
is created within particular institutional, social, political and economic contexts and that
the documents that I was reviewing were telling a very specific version of history, mainly
from the perspective of councillors and staff members. While the archived materials are
361
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not a “true, accurate or absolute account of the past,”362 they do offer a part of the story
and, in particular, additional materials beyond the online repository for staff reports to
add context and understanding to the decisions made at particular junctions.
As Marc Ventresca and John Mohr observe, written records can act as an essential tool of
bureaucratic decision-making: “Indeed the production of written documents may well be
the most distinctive quality of modern organizational life. Few official actions of any sort
are conceived, enabled, or enacted without having been written down both in advance, in
retrospect, and invariably several more times in between.”363 The crammed boxes from
city councillors, filled with drafts and redrafts of selected city staff reports, meeting
minutes and agendas, reflected these materials as the tools of city government.
Documents are a fundamental element of bureaucracy, solidifying the positionality of the
actors who tell the story of particular events.364 Even the Toronto City Archives itself, a
municipal department, exhibits bureaucratic control, requiring researchers to sign in to
access boxes, introducing finding aides, and expecting researchers to interact with
archived materials in very specific ways, such as working exclusively on one desk and
limits on copying or photographing material.
The pluralist framework of this dissertation recognized that formal laws are based on
official decision-making, and the on-line and archived materials affirmed that municipal
and provincial governments considered and enacted rules that framed the city’s “local”
boundaries and governance bodies. The minutes, agendas, staff reports and studies
contained within the busy archived boxes included notes written in margins by
councillors, noting the points that they acknowledged as especially important in debates.
The boxes also contained newspaper clippings.
I canvassed two kinds of archives: the online archives, available through the City of
Toronto website, and boxes and materials found at Toronto City Archives. The archival
research took place in the early stages of this project to help in defining the key questions
362
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of the dissertation and to establish a base of evidence for events that took place in part
decades ago.365 I used these materials to create an inventory of decisions on the creation
of local boundaries and governance bodies that had been taken by the Province of Ontario
and relevant municipal governments, including the City of Toronto and the preamalgamated municipalities. This inventory served as a timeline that was drafted and redrafted as more information became known.
Attention was placed on finding reports, notes and decisions related to three key events in
the consideration of local legal spaces: the consideration of community councils by the
Toronto Transition Team in 1997-98; the Toronto ward boundary review in 2000; and the
refinement of community councils in 2002-2003. The online archive system for the
period in question resulted in limited findings, so visits to Toronto City Archives were
crucial in retrieving relevant materials. For example, only by going through archived
boxes was I able to find hundreds of pages of meeting materials of a 2003 sub-committee,
chaired by then-Councillor David Miller, devoted to the question of community councils.
This discovery was an “aha!” moment in this early period of research.366 This material
was invisible in the city’s online archive system.
Online archives were invaluable in finding more contemporary information on the case
studies. The City of Toronto’s online portal includes all staff reports, attachments, voting
records, motions and lists of deputants for all City Council and committee decisions
dating back to 2006. Having worked at the City of Toronto, I was comfortable and adept
at navigating the online portal.
It was my intention to help to tell part of the story through the material gathered,
particularly the way in which local legal spaces were considered and crafted by city
officials. While unexpected, these archived materials were also helpful for the conduct of
semi-structured interviews. Staff reports and other written materials were used to
“trigger” the memories of key staff members who were a part of key decisions. Within
365
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the pluralist framework of the dissertation, the use of archived materials helped me to
revisit with interviewees the environment of the city between 1997 and 2003, when
amalgamation took place, and key decisions were made regarding ward boundaries and
community councils, and to interpret the rationale and context for the production of
certain reports by city staff.367
5. Media analysis
This dissertation also adopted media content analysis. The principal use was to overcome
a methodological weakness of not having secured interviews with councillors in the
Etobicoke-East York community council area regarding the 2015 casino debate. As
media analysis was a supporting methodology, I adopted clip-counting, which means,
“relevant articles are collected and typically sorted chronologically or by date.”368 I
conducted a careful review of these news media during the six-month period of the
municipal debate.
In conclusion, this dissertation adopted a mixed methods approach to investigate the
conceptualization of what local governance means in the City of Toronto as a result of
the overlap of various local governance institutions. This is a dissertation primarily
rooted in law, and therefore details the relevant legislation, case law and policy reports
that inform this question, in particular, the role of wards and community councils as the
bodies with formal authority to represent local geographies and residents. However, this
dissertation adopts a mixed methodological approach to understand how formal and
informal bodies claim to represent those within smaller-than-city areas of the city,
examining their legal structures, the geographies of local that they advance, and the
implications for the meaningful participation of residents across the city. The theoretical
framework and the conceptualization of the term local governance identified in Chapter 1
inform the methodology outlined in this chapter and are then queried in the empirical
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studies that follow. The intention is to provide a deeper account of the meaning of local
governance in Toronto.
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Chapter 3 – Demystifying Toronto’s messy local governance model
Local legal spaces in Toronto are governed by a complex set of municipal, provincial and
federal statutes, bylaws, and policies, as well as informal processes and relationships. The
aim of this chapter is to analyze local legal spaces in law and action and to apply the
conceptualization of local governance provided in Chapter 1. This chapter animates the
theoretical framework in Chapter 1 by conceptualizing “local governance” as a pluralist
space comprised of state and non-state actors that assert boundaries and rules and
analyzes the implications for who is excluded as a result of this model. I argue that
amalgamation led to a gap in inclusive, participatory local governance which the city
government has yet to fill, a weakness in the model that this dissertation seeks to address.
I argue that four factors contributed to an uncertain and unequal local governance model:
the unfulfilled, post-amalgamation mandate of community councils; the empowerment of
the ward, rather than the community council, as the site of local decision-making; the
geographically uneven rise in the number and influence of neighbourhood associations
and business improvement areas; and the City of Toronto’s procedural distinction
between “local” and “city-wide.” In Chapter 6, this dissertation turns to the normative
question of how understanding local governance within the framework of an urban
commons could be used to reimagine the City of Toronto’s local governance model.
This chapter first sets out the legal framework for understanding the evolution of
Toronto’s authority and the power it presently has to determine its governance model.
This section first provides context for how local governance changed as a result of
amalgamation, shifting what was once regional (Metro Toronto) to city-wide (City of
Toronto), but without empowering local legal spaces within the new governance model.
The purpose is to clarify that under COTA and case law that advances subsidiarity as a
judicial principle, Toronto has sufficient power to create a governance model that
empowers localized decision-making.
Second, I set out the law and role of the city’s formal local legal spaces: community
councils and wards. Community councils, while purportedly set out in law as
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replacements for pre-amalgamated municipalities, are in practice disempowered planning
committees that rarely exercise their procedural mandate to consider “neighbourhood
issues.” This section revisits the literature canvassed in Chapter 1, arguing that the city
has opted not to delegate greater authority to community councils, notwithstanding their
capacity to bring a broader set of voices to local decision-making. Here, I introduce and
critique the city’s procedural distinction between “local” and “city-wide” issues.
I argue that, within this formal model, ward councillors serve as the principal drivers of
local decision-making. Wards themselves have long served as defenders of boundaries
that define particular communities and interests, some of which have historical
significance as distinct villages or towns. In this capacity, wards are meant as spatial
areas that serve both as the locus of public contact with decision-makers and empower
ward councillors to represent the interests of those within their boundaries. However,
drawing on interviews with senior staff members and councillors, I suggest that the
absence of other formal local legal spaces leaves councillors serving as the “ward boss,”
granted considerable deference in matters that affect the spatial and other decisions
within their boundaries. The power of the councillor includes the extent to which
community councils will be used as bodies considering “neighbourhood issues.”
Third, I analyze the role and rise in number of business improvement areas and
neighbourhood associations since amalgamation. Scholars including Moore and Martin
have observed the crucial importance of these bodies in particular when it comes to city
governance.369 Like wards and community councils, these bodies are spatially based
within smaller-than-city areas within the city. They each claim to represent some or all
residents or businesses within their boundaries. From this perspective, they appear to
challenge the formal city structure as bodies with other versions of boundaries, and their
distinct claims of representation and participation. These bodies also interface with
elected and city officials in a range of manners, with delegated powers for park
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redevelopment or city beautification.370 From a legal perspective, their connection to city
governance manifests differently, with BIAs having a formal connection to the city, as
“city boards” with access to funding and with institutional assistance, while NAs serve as
local lobbyists with uneven roles across the city. The purpose of this part is to highlight
the importance of these bodies in framing local governance within certain localized areas
of the city, while at the same time contributing to significant challenges for inclusive
representation.
I conclude the chapter by drawing on the work of Santos and Valverde to argue that a
ward-based power at the local level leads to uneven governance. Local legal spaces in
law are framed within a ward-based model, highly contingent on the objectives and
practices of individual councillors. Ward councillors serve as the primary local decisionmakers despite the existence of community councils, which have authority “in the books”
to exercise more power in local decision-making. The City of Toronto reinforces the
focus of local governance to the ward level by creating an artificial procedural distinction
between “local” and “city-wide,” and by exercising considerable power in the creation
and operation of BIAs and neighbourhood associations, which themselves are
unrepresentative of the residents within their boundaries. The effect is a governance
model that empowers the ward councillor, disproportionately focuses attention on
planning issues to the detriment of other city matters, and undermines the inclusivity of
participation.
I. Governing Toronto
The city has been an object of study in countless disciplines, both in and outside the
law.371 It has also been studied amongst disciplines – for example in politics and law - in
recognition that it is an inherently interdisciplinary subject.372 Cities have been studied
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from the “bottom up” and the “top down,” and within the context of street-level activity
through to its relationships at regional, provincial, federal and international levels. As a
corporation and a government, it is a fascinating site for legal and socio-legal study, as it
is enabled and restricted by legislation, owns and manages its land, and has fiduciary and
other kinds of obligations. The city is also understood as a party with interests that it may
assert concerning other governments or actors – it can sue and be sued, buy and sell, and
create legal structures for its effective operation.
The city may be understood within the context of the one or more pieces of legislation
that empower it to exist and to act.373 “Municipal” in this context means the one or more
statutes that give corporate entities their powers. The term “city” is, in statutory terms in
Ontario, undefined. The most recent set of municipal statutes removed references to titles
like “city,” “town” and “village.”374 However, my framing of the “city” within the
context of legal pluralism and legal geography places it outside of the familiar and safe
contours of municipal statutes.375 In particular, this chapter situates Toronto’s local
governance model as an overlapping set of “local legal spaces” that explicitly include
“formal” bodies set out in law and “informal” bodies with relationships to the City of
Toronto, each of which represents distinct boundaries and governance roles. I suggest
that the local governance model impacts who may participate in decision-making by
privileging particular organizations and city issues deemed to be “local” under city
bylaws and provincial law, namely ward-based planning decisions.
This first section of the chapter focuses specifically on the legal history of the City of
Toronto since amalgamation to demonstrate how the legal meaning of “local,” “city-

that political perspectives on municipal autonomy and excessive governmental power guide judicial
decision-making, rather than precedents relating to cities' resources and responsibilities).
373
In Ontario, there are two principal pieces of legislation that determine the powers and obligations of
local governments: COTA, supra note 11 applies exclusively to Toronto, while the Municipal Act, 2001,
S.O. 2011, c. 25 applies to all other 444 municipalities. There are dozens of other pieces of legislation that
impact local governments as well, including the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P. 13, the Places to Grow
Act, 2005, S.O. 2005, c. 13, and Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.50, to name a few.
374
Municipal Act, s. 457(1).
375
Note e.g. Statistics Canada’s 2011 changes in the definition of “urban” which offers three categories to
reflect what it calls the “urban-rural continuum”: Statistics Canada, From urban areas to population centres,
online: <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/subjects/standard/sgc/notice/sgc-06>.

99

wide” and “regional” has changed as a result of new provincial legislation, case law, and
changes to municipal bylaws. The section builds on the work of Frug, Layard and
Schragger to explain how the City of Toronto sets out its local governance model,
including applicable institutions and geographies under the various rules to which it is
bound and has considerable authority to redesign its local model. This section provides a
foundation for the remaining sections of this chapter by setting out the vertical tensions
and interlegalities that claim to represent smaller-than-city areas of the city and the
implications for the meaningful participation of residents.
1. A brief history of Toronto’s boundaries
The land upon which the City of Toronto sits has a rich history of colonial desettlement
of indigenous peoples, incorporations, annexations, amalgamations, legislative
enactments and governance reviews.376 The British government asserted power over the
Indigenous communities residing in what it is the City of Toronto beginning from the
period of contact ultimately leading to treaties that limited the expression of indigenous
sovereignty over this land.377 European populations gradually moved into these spaces,
and many of the areas that are now known as “wards” were independent villages and
towns. Since 2001, the Province of Ontario has granted authority to municipalities to set
city-wide (meaning the boundaries of the city as a whole), as well as local or ward
boundaries, otherwise known as “electoral districts.”378
In Chapter 1, I introduced local legal spaces as including the notion of time as integrated
and interpenetrated.379 As an empirical matter, as we will see in this section, time is not
just a relevant, but a crucial element of analysis. Toronto began as a minor post and
warehouse as part of the French fur trade but had been long inhabited by Indigenous
376
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peoples prior to this time.380 Lieutenant-Colonel John Graves Simcoe incorporated York
(later Toronto) as a township in 1793, bounded by George, Berkeley, Adelaide and Front
streets.381 It was essentially a garrison town, given its strategic proximity to the Great
Lakes.382 Simcoe entrenched in Upper Canada (part of present-day Ontario) “top-down
government in the colony, and encouraged York’s superiority, with its haughty customs
and attitudes, and the distinctive British and Anglican character it would retain for
decades.”383 It was incorporated as a city and renamed “Toronto” in 1834 and, by this
point, the boundaries extended from Parliament, Bathurst and Queen streets down to
Lake Ontario.384 The first elected mayor was Canada’s future prime minister, William
Lyon Mackenzie.385 Upon its incorporation, the city was divided into five wards: St.
Andrew’s, St. David’s, St. George’s, St. Lawrence and St. Patrick’s.386 The legal
authorities of the city included police, firefighters, taverns, Sabbath observance and
billiards, and the mayor served as chief magistrate for city quarter sessions, which
deliberated on issues of public morality, like drunken and disorderly conduct.387 The
mayor of the city was chosen by the ten aldermen elected in five wards who, along with
ten common councilmen who represented the city as a whole, formed Toronto’s first city
council.388 From 1834 until the 1880s, the outer boundaries of what was then the City of
Toronto largely remained unchanged.
Toronto grew substantially during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries by
annexing surrounding territory, an approach to municipal expansion that occurred in
many other cities in North America. Many of these communities continue to maintain
strong identities and are acknowledged in ward names and by neighbourhood
associations, as we will see in the next section. These annexed areas were previously
380
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comprised of both incorporated and unincorporated communities. By 1901, the
boundaries of Toronto extended west to High Park, north to the country beyond Yorkville
Village, and east to the Don.389 These annexations included the Yorkville Village in
1883, the Annex in 1887, Seaton Village in 1884 and, the following year, the town of
Parkdale, all of which have retained their names and have been maintained as
“communities of interest,” as we will see in Chapter 5.390 After the war, the city expanded
to St. Clair Avenue, past Danforth Avenue and west to Jane street.391 In terms of notable
land masses, High Park was given to Toronto in 1873, along with a deed that the park
remain, “for the free use, benefit and enjoyment of the citizens of Toronto.”392 West
Toronto Junction and North Toronto were annexed in the early 1900s. After 1910, most
districts located outside of the city core incorporated as separate political entities.393 By
1941, the western suburbs included the Village of Swansea, Long Branch, Mimico, New
Toronto, the Townships of York, North York and East York, together with the Villages
of Forest Hill and Leaside. To the east, Scarborough Township remained largely rural.
The ward has remained constant in Toronto’s history since its colonial creation in 1834,
regardless of assertions of legislative power that have molded geographic boundaries and
authorities to govern. The concept of a ward has its genesis in the United Kingdom,
where it served as an administrative division of a country with its own local decisionmaking body, represented by land owners, which met monthly and was used to resolve
private disputes and criminal matters.394 Now, the ward is an electoral district of a city or
borough that is represented by an elected official.395 The “ward” is not defined in
Ontario’s provincial or municipal statutes, but serves a crucial role in the city’s
governance model for the representation of local interests.396 Within this model, wards
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serve as demarcated boundaries that define particular “communities of interest” some of
which have historical significance as distinct villages or towns. Then and now, wards are
also entrenched in the city’s governance model as vehicles for representative democracy,
with councillors playing both a legislative and constituency role.397 In their legislative
roles, they pass laws, create policies and programs, determine the service mix and service
levels, and oversee the work of departments.398 In their constituency activities, they are a
direct connection between their residents and city governments, a function that absorbs a
substantial amount of their time.399 As a City of Toronto senior staff member told me,
“One of the advantages of the ward and riding system is there actually is somebody to go
to and somebody who can convey a geographic area’s interest… So each councillor has
dual roles, they’re part of a government, in the absence of a party, they’re all part of a
government, but they’re also representatives of community.”400
In 1954, the Province of Ontario formed a regional (or upper-tier) municipality,
comprised of members from lower-tier municipalities, called the Metropolitan Toronto
Federation (“Metro”).401 Metro had the same geographic boundaries as the current City of
Toronto. At the time, there were 13 lower-tier municipalities, later amalgamated to form
a total of six cities and boroughs.402 One of the purported reasons for the decision to form
a regional government was the great inequality across the Metro region, and the belief
that Metro would more fairly equalize transit and core social services.403 Metro would
manage matters of “regional” interest, while the six lower-tier municipalities including
Toronto would oversee “local” matters.404 However, at the local level, the municipalities
397
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in the metropolitan area, except Mimico, “guarded their respective neighbourhoods like
medieval warlords.”405

Illustration 3.1: Map of Pre-amalgamated City of Toronto, 1967-1997406
Illustration 3.1 shows the boundaries of the pre-amalgamated City of Toronto between
1967 and 1997. The period between 1954 and 1997 saw changes to the division of power
amongst the upper and lower-tiers and the way in which decisions were made within the
municipalities. For example, representation on both the Metro and lower-tier councils
were initially decided based on the electoral district: two councillors were elected from
each ward and the one with the most votes represented the ward on both their local and
the Metro council, while the second-place finisher served on the lower-tier council.407
The result was that success for Metro councillors ultimately meant preoccupation with
405
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local issues and interests.408 This changed in 1988, where councillors were directly
elected to serve on Metro council.409 Continued friction ultimately led to the
establishment of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) Task Force, led by Anne Golden, on
April 1, 1995.410 The Task Force’s mandate was to recommend a governance model best
suited to address lagging economic growth, costs urban development patterns and
authority for service delivery, among other concerns.411
As such, the timing of provincial legislation to reconsider the governance of the Metro
area was not entirely surprising, although the lack of clarity around the rationale was
mystifying.412 In 1997, the Province of Ontario introduced Bill 103, a highly
controversial piece of legislation that would ultimately establish the new amalgamated
City of Toronto. At the time that this legislation was introduced, seven municipalities
existed within the geographical boundaries of the City – the upper-tier Municipality of
Metropolitan Toronto (“Metro”), which was responsible for “regional” issues like transit,
regional planning and libraries, as well as the six local municipalities of the Borough of
East York, the City of Etobicoke, the City of North York, the City of Scarborough, City
of Toronto and the City of York. What was once regional (the upper-tier Municipality of
Metropolitan Toronto) would become city-wide (the amalgamated City of Toronto),
although some of the regional functions – in particular, transit and planning – were
retained by the province rather than delegated to the new City of Toronto.
The power to create a ward system has only very recently been delegated to
municipalities. At amalgamation, the Province set the number of single member wards at
57, down from the 106 elected officials across the regional and local municipalities, and
gave the next City of Toronto the power to create to designate the number and location of
wards.413 This power was revoked by the province within a year and only reinstated with
408
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the introduction of COTA.
In December 1998, shortly after amalgamation, City Council adopted a new ward
structure based on 57 single member wards for the 2000 election. A March 1998 staff
report set out the purpose of moving to a single member ward structure – rather than
emulating the Metro structure of a two-tier representative model – was to “increase the
accountability of Members of Council and reduce confusion on the part of residents.”414
Staff explored five possible approaches and ultimately recommended the creation of 57
wards on the basis that, “The average ward population per elected official would remain
at its current level of around 39,000.” City Council enacted By-laws Nos. 228-1999 and
275-1999 to create the new wards.415 These by-laws were appealed to the Ontario
Municipal Board (OMB), and were upheld, with some amendments, but were never put
into effect.416
Instead, in 1999, the Province introduced the Fewer Municipal Politicians Act, aimed at
reducing the overall number of councillors.417 The legislation tied Toronto’s ward
boundaries to those of the Province, who had adopted the same boundaries as the federal
electoral districts in the mid-1990s. The Province designated 44 wards for Toronto: the
22 provincial/federal ridings, divided by two.418 Federal ridings are strictly reviewed
every ten years by an independent commission based on population and other criteria.419
The Act also removed Toronto’s just-granted authority to enact a by-law to change the
ward structure or Council composition, although allowed Toronto to recommend how
each of the 22 provincial electoral districts should be divided to create 44 wards.420 Over
a single month, in January 2000, the City through the City Clerk’s Office held public
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open houses to gather public input concerning the appropriate boundaries.421 On January
19, 2000, City Council adopted recommendations to divide the 22 electoral districts into
44 wards and forwarded those recommendations to the Minister. On March 20, 2000, the
provincial government issued Ontario Regulation 191/00, establishing the City of
Toronto's new ward structure, effective December 1, 2000. Illustration 3.2 shows the
current ward boundaries of the City of Toronto, which have remained unchanged since
2000.
As a result of COTA’s enactment, the city now has full authority over its system of
representation, including powers related to “establishing, changing or dissolving
wards.”422 The Act clarifies this power in section 128(1), where it states: “Without
limiting sections 7423 and 8,424 those sections authorize the City to divide or redivide the
City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards.” The City is empowered to determine
its manner of representation – whether through the election of councilors based on wards,
elected at-large, or some combination of the two.425 This means that the City may also
eliminate all wards.
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Illustration 3.2: Map of Toronto’s ward boundaries in 2016426
However, provincial law again includes a minimum standard for Toronto’s governance
decisions: the Act empowers five hundred electors in the City of Toronto to petition City
Council to pass a bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards or dissolving existing
wards.427 If the City does not pass a bylaw within 90 days after receiving the petition, any
of the electors may apply to the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) to divide, re-divide or
dissolve the wards.428 The OMB may hear the application and make an order.429 The date
the order will come into force depends on when the OMB order is made.430 The order is
deemed to be a by-law of the City, which may be subsequently amended or repealed.431
The irony of this legislative provision is that the process for conducting a ward boundary
review, as we will see in Chapter 5, is long and complex, with numerous required rounds
of public consultation and that may, in turn, be appealed to the OMB. By contrast, city
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staff estimated that the timeline required for the introduction of new ward boundaries
would be at least two years, far more than the 90 days prescribed in the Act.432 It is
notable that this section of the Act has not been triggered, despite the sharp inequalities in
representation across the City’s wards, as detailed in Chapter 5.
This articulation of historical events is relevant to this dissertation for two reasons. First,
it demonstrates that the City of Toronto is the product of many local areas that have been
added and adjusted over almost 200 years. These changes have been imposed by colonial
and later provincial governments, creating municipal corporations that in themselves may
not identify as particular communities. Second, many of these annexed towns and
amalgamated municipal entities continue to have defined identities as “legal ghosts” in
Toronto that continue to be maintained by the geographies of the city’s wards and the
influence of other kinds of bodies – namely neighbourhood associations – which advance
decision-making claims, as we will see later in this chapter.
The next section shows how Toronto’s legal authority to govern has evolved over time.
2. Toronto’s decision-making authority
Valverde notes the benefits in setting out the specific laws that apply in particular
settings. This “inventory of laws” both clarifies the specific laws that apply and illustrates
the complex overlapping of rules that govern particular issues. Figure 3.1 provides a
detailed inventory of the laws and institutions applicable to local governance in
Toronto.433 I argue that a reading of these laws, coupled with case law advancing
subsidiarity, gives the City of Toronto sufficient authority to determine a local
governance model premised on a more inclusive, participatory framework.
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Municipal
Procedural bylaw;
the Official Plan;
zoning bylaw;
staff reports;
policies

Provincial
City of Toronto
Act;2006;
Planning Act;
OMB Act; and
other legislation

Federal
Constitution Act,
1982; Charter of
Rights and
Freedoms

Figure 3.1. Inventory of Laws
Municipal authority in Ontario has been shaped by four key factors: a nineteenth century
doctrine of municipal authority known as Dillon’s rule, the Constitution Act, 1867,
legislation introduced by the Province of Ontario, and case law. “Dillon’s rule” is an
important doctrine that has framed Canadian municipal authority. It emerged in reaction
to municipalities incurring massive debts to finance public improvements. Dillon’s rule
refers to the framework of municipal authority established by John Dillion, a 19th-century
American jurist who objected to “municipal largesse and waste.”434 Under this doctrine
of “prescribed powers,” municipalities can act only when expressly authorized by
statute.435 This doctrine reinforces a long-standing narrative on the negative aspects of
cities. As Frug notes: “From colonial times to the present day, a long and powerful
tradition of anti-urbanism has been articulated by a wide variety of Americans: the
founding fathers (Jefferson, Franklin), major novelists (Hawthorne, Henry James),
philosophers (Emerson, Dewey), architects (Frank Lloyd Wright), even the classic works
of urban sociology.”436 In the Canadian context, Dillon’s rule suggests a relationship
between municipalities and provinces like that of a parent and child, with provinces
keeping a “watchful eye” on how municipal powers are exercised in concern that they
will be inappropriately used.437 On a practical level, it means that municipal authority
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may not be exercised unless the Province explicitly grants these governments explicit
power to do so.
Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867 states that “municipal institutions in the
Province” are within the province’s exclusive jurisdiction. With municipalities
colloquially referred to as “creatures of the province,” provincial governments are
constitutionally empowered to set rules regarding what municipalities can and cannot
do.438 While early jurisprudence debated whether municipalities were to be considered
governments or corporations under the law, it is now well-established that both provincial
and municipal decisions are subject to review per the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Courts have interpreted the provisions of provincial acts as enabling municipalities to act
as “governments” based on powers delegated from the provincial legislatures, and that
municipalities must be able to govern based on the best interests of their residents and
based on conceptions of the public good.439
The notion of cities as “creatures of the province” was fervently articulated in the 1997
decision of the Ontario Superior Court in East York v. Ontario (Attorney General). 440
This case challenged the unilateral decision of the Province of Ontario to create the
Toronto's megacity in 1998 without the consent of the amalgamated six municipalities.
While referencing the lack of evidence of consultation and the vast number of people
who voted against the amalgamation, the Superior Court concluded that the unilateral
action did not exceed the province's constitutional authority to make laws relating to
municipal institutions in the province. The court determined that the power to restructure
Toronto is within provincial authority under section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, and set
out four “clear” principles regarding the constitutional status of Canadian cities:441
(i) municipal institutions lack constitutional status;
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(ii) municipal institutions are creatures of the legislature and exist only if provincial
legislation so provides;
(iii) municipal institutions have no independent autonomy and their powers are
subject to abolition or repeal by provincial legislation; and
(iv) municipal institutions may exercise only those powers which are conferred
upon them by statute.
The Supreme Court of Canada referenced Dillon’s Rule most recently in 1993 in R. v.
Greenbaum. This case involves a street vendor who was unable to receive a permit to sell
t-shirts on Toronto streets as a result of a city by-law. In critiquing the City’s exercise of
unauthorized power, Justice Iacobucci stated in Greenbaum:
The courts, as a result of this inferior legal position [of municipalities], have
traditionally interpreted narrowly statutes respecting grants of powers to
municipalities. This approach may be described as 'Dillon's rule,' which states that a
municipality may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those
powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and
those indispensable powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation
of the purposes of the corporation.442
Less than ten years later, the Supreme Court of Canada challenged the idea that
municipalities are mere creatures of the province. In Spraytech v. Hudson,443 the Court
allowed the town of Hudson, Quebec, to ban the use of aesthetic pesticides, although
considered non-toxic by provincial and federal regulators. In permitting a municipality
the power the protect the general welfare of it residents, the Court relied on a key text in
Canadian municipal law, quoting that: “the legislature cannot possibly foresee all the
powers that are necessary to the statutory equipment of its creatures…”444
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The Court also introduced a conceptual approach to interpreting municipal authority.
Justice L'Heureux-Dubé invoked the European Union's principle of “subsidiarity.”445 As
Levi & Valverde note: “This principle, which European Union sources stress is not a
justiciable legal doctrine but rather a political principle, is invoked to elaborate the basic
political character of municipalities, with the Court addressing something much larger
than the traditional questions of ultra vires and the standard of review…”446 While
subsidiarity cannot override the status of municipalities as creatures of the province, it
operates as a principle affirming that “legislative action is to be taken by the government
that is closest to the citizen and is thus considered to be in the best position to respond to
the citizen’s concerns.”447 Peter Hogg describes subsidiarity as “a principle of social
organization that prescribes that decisions affecting individuals should be as far as
possible, be made by the level of government closest to the individuals affected.”448
In Croplife, the Ontario Court of Appeal adopted this expansive interpretation of
municipal authority, stating that general welfare powers are to be interpreted broadly and
generously within their context and statutory limits to achieve the legitimate interests of
the municipality and its inhabitants.449 The court signaled a shift away from the
traditionally restrictive, prescribed approach to the interpretation of municipal power in
favour of a broad purposive approach recognizing more flexibility in municipal
government.450
Alongside judicial decisions, there were important legislative progressions that
contributed to more expansive power for municipalities, especially Toronto. Most
notably, the Province of Ontario introduced COTA, which was enacted when Premier
Dalton McGuinty and Toronto Mayor David Miller were in power.451 The intention was
445
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to give Toronto more expansive powers to self-govern in matters within its
jurisdiction.452 A major change brought about in the new legislation was the introduction
of section 8, which granted broad discretion to the City to pass laws related to “general
health and safety.” This “permissive” legislation has been likened to the unique “home
rule” status of some American cities, who are given exclusive jurisdiction over matters
within areas of responsibility, such as education, zoning, and planning, although in
practice, Toronto’s powers fall well short of those in home rule jurisdiction and the
province has retained its power to override the municipality’s decisions.453 The
province’s deference to the City of Toronto has been inconsistently applied: at times, the
province refuses to endorse municipal decisions;454 other times it defers to them
entirely.455
However, unlike home rule, which confers full authority to local governments within
clearly demarcated areas of authority, the City continues to be subject to numerous
restrictions, ranging from the mechanisms it may use to raise revenue to the levies of tow
truck drivers.456 In addition to COTA, the Province of Ontario has introduced many
pieces of legislation that impact Toronto’s decision-making powers, including the
Planning Act,457 the Ontario Municipal Board Act,458 the Municipal Conflict of Interest
Act,459 the Municipal Elections Act, 1996,460 and the Municipal Freedom of Information
and Protection of Privacy Act.461 These and other pieces of legislation restrict the actions
that municipalities may take and set out the consequences of any breach.
Lower courts over the last five years have proven not to be comfortable in interpreting
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subsidiarity to disregard the division of powers as set out in the Constitution Act and
granting unlimited authority to municipalities. In 2012, the Ontario Superior Court struck
down a municipal bylaw banning the possession, consumption, and sale of shark fin
products on the basis that the bylaw was ultra vires Toronto’s legislative powers.462 The
court held that, although the power to make decisions on “municipal issues” is broad, the
issue to be addressed by a bylaw must relate to the municipality as a local entity. The
court stated, “A by-law must have a proper municipal purpose; otherwise it falls outside
the jurisdiction of the City and the powers delegated to it by the City.”463 In this case, the
protection of sharks could not have been a concern of the City of Toronto, as there are no
sharks near the city. It also failed the health and safety prong as there is no threat to the
health of Torontonians due to the consumption of shark fin soup. As such, the shark fin
ban was not a “municipal issue” as it did not concern the environmental well-being of the
city, protect sharks, and or protect the health and safety of consumers. Put another way,
the courts appear to have pulled back on the strong presumption of validity for municipal
laws.464
In Magder v. Ford, the court held that even with the “generous approach” to
interpretation of municipal powers, courts have never departed from the principle that
municipalities are creatures of the province.465 Similarly, in Wainfleet Wind Energy Inc.
v. The Corporation of the Township of Wainfleet, the court found that a bylaw prohibiting
wind farms within two kilometres of “a property” was void for vagueness.466 The court
also commented in obiter that, while the township could enact bylaws related to the
economic, social and environmental well-being and the health, safety, and well-being of
persons, the Province of Ontario already had enacted the Green Energy and Green
Economy Act, 2009 and, thus, there are significant limits on a municipality’s ability to
enact bylaws which touch on defined areas of provincial authority.
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Thus, the constitution empowers provincial governments to constrain and regulate
municipal authority in Ontario generally by permitting the provincial government to
override municipal decisions. Also, the principle of subsidiarity complicates the notion of
“creature of the province.” We are left with a constitutional and legislative framework
that leaves uncertain the extent to which municipal decisions may later be determined to
be ultra vires or beyond their jurisdiction. Despite this uncertain framework, the next
section argues that considerable deference has been given to City Council to determine its
governance model.
3. Authority for local governance
This section sets out the legislative provisions and judicial interpretations that enable the
City of Toronto to delegate some of its powers to local bodies. This section then outlines
the City’s decision in relation to these powers, including delegation to committees and
staff under the procedural bylaw. In addition, to provide context for one of the chief
arguments in favour of delegation to local governance bodies – namely, enabling richer
resident involvement in decision-making – this section provides information on the legal
requirements for public participation.
COTA was enacted to provide the city with a broader, more flexible framework within
which to work.467 It begins with the centrality of governance, stating: “The City of
Toronto exists for the purpose of providing good government for matters within its
jurisdiction, and the city council is a democratically elected government which is
responsible and accountable.”468 Section 2 of the Act pronounces that, “The purpose of
this Act is to create a framework of broad powers for the City which balances the
interests of the Province and the City and which recognizes that the City must be able to
do the following things in order to provide good government,” including the power to,

467

Fourth Generation Realty Corp. v. Ottawa (City), 2005 CarswellOnt 1939, 197 O.A.C. 389 (C.A.);
1786889 Ontario Inc. v. Toronto (City), 2013 CarswellOnt 14904, 2013 ONSC 5697.
468
COTA, supra note 11 at section 1(1).

116

“Determine the appropriate structure for governing the City.”469
Section 6 of COTA also gives broad powers to the City of Toronto to design its
governance model, stating: “The powers of the City under this or any other Act shall be
interpreted broadly so as to confer broad authority on the City to enable the City to
govern its affairs as it considers appropriate and to enhance the City’s ability to respond
to municipal issues.”470 It further provides that, “The City may pass by-laws respecting
… Governance structure of the City and its local boards.”471
Notwithstanding this broad permissive language, COTA carves out power for the
Province to make specific regulations that fall squarely within the city’s powers
enumerated above, including that the Lieutenant Governor in Council may: require the
city to establish an executive committee472 and may prescribing the composition, powers
and duties of the committee; requiring the head of council to appoint the chairs and vicechairs of specified committees of council and specified local boards; and requiring
council to appoint specified committees composed of members of council elected from
specified geographic areas of the city and requiring the city to delegate prescribed powers
and duties to the committees.473 COTA also sets out that the City must pass a procedure
by-law for “governing the calling, place and proceedings of meetings,”474 and provides
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that the city shall adopt and maintain policies with respect to:475
5. The manner in which the City will try to ensure that it is accountable to the public
for its actions, and the manner in which the City will try to ensure that its actions are
transparent to the public;
…
7. The delegation of its powers and duties.
Rather than asserting provincial dominance, these provisions establish the minimum
requirements of the city’s governance model, which were implemented by the City of
Toronto shortly following COTA’s introduction. The province has yet to intervene on the
City of Toronto’s decisions about its governance model.
Indeed, COTA contemplates the primacy of City Council as the chief decision-making
body of the city. The overarching role of City Council is referenced in section 132. (1) of
the Act, which states: “The powers of the City shall be exercised by city council.” As a
senior staff member at the City told me: [O]ne of the messages that I’m really trying to
get across to people when I explain governance … is the main sentence in the City of
Toronto: ‘all the powers of the city must be exercised by city council.’ [I]t’s not a throwaway line, it’s a very important line because it establishes the paramountcy of council, it
establishes the weak mayor system, it establishes the foundation for delegation.”476
However, in setting out City Council’s role, COTA does not suggest that all or most
decisions must be made by City Council. Instead, it enumerates City Council’s role as
stewarding the city through actions such as: representing the public; considering the wellbeing and interests of the city; determining which services the city provides; ensuring
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accountability and transparency in operations; and maintaining the financial integrity.477
Within this framework, certain actions must be taken by City Council and, therefore,
cannot be delegated. This includes the power to impose taxes, to adopt or make changes
to the official plan, or to adopt or amend the city budget.478 However, COTA clearly
provides for delegation to committees and other bodies, subject to various restrictions.
COTA sets out that the city can delegate its powers, including its administrative
powers.479 The words “administrative” and “administration” are broad enough to
encompass all conduct engaged by a governmental authority in furtherance of
governmental business and otherwise.480 A delegation may be revoked and may be
subject to any conditions that City Council considers appropriate.481
The resulting rules regarding delegation are also broad. Under the Act, legislative and
quasi-judicial powers may be delegated to:
(a) one or more members of city council or a council committee;
(b) a body having at least two members of whom at least 50 per cent are,
(i) members of city council,
(ii) individuals appointed by city council,
(iii) a combination of individuals described in subclauses (i) and (ii); or
(c) an individual who is an officer, employee or agent of the City.482
Read together, these sections of COTA point to the primacy of City Council as the chief
governance body, subject to the inclusion of certain outlined governance bodies and
bylaws. COTA also provides that the city may delegate many of its functions to “local”
governance bodies, subject to the enumerated restrictions. We now turn to the rules and
institutions that the City of Toronto has created for local governance.
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4. The community council: Toronto’s “local” governance body?
In Toronto, community councils were created as a hasty political response to the
perceived lack of direct access to city hall as a result of the 1998 amalgamation. This
section canvasses the legal role of community councils and concludes that community
councils fall short of their intended local role, despite legislation that positions them as
possible stewards of a broader local area than the ward. This section sets out their history,
structure, membership and authorities, and the distinction between “local” and “citywide,” which lies at the foundation of their function.
The forced amalgamation led to unprecedented civic activism throughout the former
municipalities, focused largely on what would happen to local identity and the ability to
access more localized bodies. Globe & Mail journalist Colin Vaughan wrote at the time:
“Those who fear their local neighbourhood will sink into the megacity morass should
prepare themselves for grimmer news. The province has promised that neighbourhood
issues will be dealt with by six advisory community councils made up of local, elected
officials from the megacouncil along with hand-picked local residents. … But there is no
mention of such bodies in Bill 103, the legislation setting up the megacity, just a vague,
two-line reference to the establishment of neighbourhood committees: without a mention
of powers and responsibilities.”483
Referendums were held in each of the six lower-tier municipalities in Metropolitan
Toronto.484 The turnout for the referendums was 36%, and opposition to the proposed
amalgamated City of Toronto ranged from 70 to 81% of voters depending on the
municipality.485 The referendum results were not binding on the Province and would not
change the provincial government’s decision.486 The former municipalities also launched
a lawsuit against the Province of Ontario, challenging the amalgamation under sections
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2(b), (d), 7, 8 and 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.487 Among other
arguments, the municipalities argued that the amalgamation would weaken the
representation of citizens. Justice Borins of the Ontario Court (General Division)
ultimately held that section 92 of the Constitution allowed the province to amalgamate
the municipalities, regardless of the “megachutzpah” of the action. He also noted that
among the six-member Transition Team’s responsibilities was active community
consultation in reviewing the role and scope of responsibility of community councils.488
The Province appointed a Transition Team comprised of councillors from the former
municipalities489 to address legislative and governance issues related to the
amalgamation, including “community councils and neighbourhood matters” as one of the
eight governance issues to be studied in detail.490 As part of their process, the Transition
Team undertook extensive consultations with residents, bureaucrats, and local politicians.
They produced, first, an interim report and, following more consultation, a final report
with recommendations. As a senior staff member from the City of Toronto told me, this
legislation “left it up to the city to decide what the community councils would do. So
when it started off, the province set up this Transition Team with Alan Tonks491 and they
came up with a model, it wasn’t all that well thought through, it was an absolute
compromise… So it was a cobbled together, very quick, political compromise.”492
The Transition Team recommended the creation of six community councils with the
boundaries of the former municipalities, with stewardship as a primary responsibility. To
the Transition Team, stewardship went beyond local planning matters to “keeping in
487
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touch with citizens and their concerns” and that “community councils should be a focal
point for involving people in community affairs.”493 This stewardship would be executed
through three functions: local planning and development matters, other neighbourhoodrelated issues, and involving the community and monitoring its well-being.494 The
transition team ultimately concluded that: “people want to be able to influence what
happens in their neighbourhoods” with a government “that understands local community
matters.”495 Under the Transition Team’s recommendation, community councils were
meant to act as the voice of the former local municipalities. It was believed that these
councils would soften the negative response the government received from amalgamation
and would provide for decentralized governance within the province’s new, large
municipalities.496 Ultimately, community councils were not given budgets, and roles for
community and neighbourhood organizations were not included as part of their function.
A senior staff member at the City, who helped design the community council model, said,
“community councils were a last minute addition, they were thrown in as a softening
blow to amalgamation.”497
At the core of the governance review was the notion of “local” and “city-wide.” These
concepts were both a question of jurisdiction (where the matter would be decided) and
content (what matters apply only to localized areas as opposed to the city as a whole).
Under city rules, “local” issues may be determined by the ward or community council,
but the “city-wide” issue may only be decided by City Council.
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Illustration 3.3: Map of City of Toronto wards and community council
boundaries498
Illustration 3.3 shows the City of Toronto’s ward and community council boundaries. In
1999, the City of Toronto had six community councils – Etobicoke, Toronto, East York,
Midtown, Humber, and Etobicoke. Their boundaries were based on those of the former
municipalities, and their members were those councillors whose wards existed within the
boundaries. In 1999, shortly after the amalgamated city was created, the Province of
Ontario introduced the Fewer Municipal Politicians Act.499 As detailed in Part II of this
chapter, under this legislation, the Province mandated that the ward boundaries within the
new City of Toronto be reduced from 57 to 44.500 The City of Toronto was required to
quickly undertake a ward boundary review that would divide each electoral district in two
to create 44 wards. The result was that the membership of some of the six community
councils became very small. For example, only two councillors served on the East York
498
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Community Council.501
In considering the role and mandate of Toronto’s community councils at the time of
amalgamation, the transition team concluded that: “people want to be able to influence
what happens in their neighbourhoods” with a government “that understands local
community matters.”502 Their view was that stewardship was crucial: “Stewardship of the
community implies more than making decisions on local planning matters. It means
keeping in touch with citizens and their concerns. The community councils should be a
focal point for involving people in community affairs. It also means understanding how
the community is doing.”503 This stewardship was intended to be executed through three
functions: local planning and development, other neighbourhood-related issues, and
involving the community and monitoring its well-being.504 More than fifteen years after
amalgamation, one of these three functions does not occur at the community council level
in Toronto. Local planning decisions are at the core of the core the community council’s
mandate, while neighbourhood-related issues, and involvement of the community and
monitoring its well-being instead form part of the mandate of other standing committees.
In 2003, City Council reduced the number of community councils to the current-day four:
Etobicoke, North York, Toronto-East York and Scarborough.505 Other than in
Scarborough, community council boundaries only roughly match those of the preamalgamated cities and towns. At present, each community council is aligned with the
city’s service districts (planning, building, licensing and transportation functions) and
represents close to the same number of City of Toronto residents, similar to the current
average ward population size of 61,000, as noted in Table 3.1.506
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Name

Councillors

2011 Population

Representation
(councillors/population)

Etobicoke

11

620,180

56,380

North York

11

667,840

60,713

Scarborough

10

624,675

62,468

Toronto-East York

12

701,145

58,429

Table 3.1: Population and representation of City of Toronto community councils507
In 2005, in anticipation of COTA’s introduction, city staff embarked on a governance
review to redesign the city’s governance model. The governance review was led by a
three-person Governing Toronto Advisory Panel (the “Panel”), which embarked on a
detailed study of Toronto’s existing governance model, undertook extensive
consultations, and ultimately made a series of recommendations that were forwarded to
City Council for review.508 The Panel’s task was monumental: it aimed to look critically
at the existing governance model, eight years in from amalgamation, and consider how
the model could be rethought given COTA’s potential. Specifically, the Panel was given
the mandate to provide information, findings, and options to Council to make decisions
about its governance system; to ensure “a civil, robust and informed discussion of options
among all sectors of Toronto society interested in a well governed City”; and to integrate
related issues resulting from the final report of the Bellamy Inquiry.509
The Panel remarked that a strong city-wide agenda was necessary to achieve COTA’s
purposes.510 It stated: “The new City of Toronto Act will give Toronto, for the first time,
507
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the power to choose how it governs itself. Torontonians will have the power to choose the
system that will deliver the city we want. Toronto’s system of democratic selfgovernment was designed for a different era. It is inherently unable to cope with the
policy challenges of the 21st century, or to wield the promised new powers to address
those challenges under a revised City of Toronto Act.”511 The fundamental cause of the
city’s governance issues, the Panel felt, was that City Council had two roles: as a
legislature, whereby broad planning, social policy and taxation issues needed to be
decided; and as an administrative decision-maker, which involved the implementation of
policies already decided.512 The latter types of decisions dominated City Council’s
agenda leading to long meetings and insufficient time to focus on city-wide matters. As
such, the Panel recommended that the City introduce a governance model that delegated
more powers to the local level.
In regard to governance in smaller-than-city areas, the Governing Toronto Advisory
Panel recommended an empowered set of community councils, with delegated functions,
at least four annual engagement sessions, the role of interfacing with neighbourhoods,
meeting in the evening to ensure greater public attendance of meetings, and incorporating
neighbourhood input using the City’s 140 identified neighbourhoods.513 They also
identified the need for greater citizen engagement and recommended the retention of
wards “to help ensure that marginalized communities are not further disadvantaged.”
The proposed changes were an opportunity for councillors to demarcate the forums in
which they were to examine issues from a localized or city-wide perspective.
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Amalgamation ultimately eroded the two-tier perspective but integrated large parts of
what were regional issues to the municipal level. As a senior staff member told me that
“the two-tier did give you the ability for different people to look at things differently.
Either from a sort of citywide, or region-wide perspective and a local perspective.”514
Now, politically, councillors have to look at both a local and city-wide lens and “it’s hard
for them to do both, it really is, it’s almost impossible.”515
The City considered the Panel’s recommendations and ultimately introduced significant
changes in the City’s governance model.516 One of the main objectives of the new
governance structure was to reduce the number of days that councillors say in City
Council meetings, which required delegation to committees. The new governance model
introduced an Executive Committee and seven city-wide standing committees.517
However, City Council did not implement the recommendations related to community
councils.518
In 2007, City staff set out the following principles to determine which issues should be
considered “local” and “city-wide”:519
1. local routine matters should be delegated to Community Council for final
decision;
2. only matters that can be legally delegated will be delegated;
514
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3. matters that are City-wide will not be delegated; and
4. Community Councils should not have final decision-making powers on matters
that fetter Council’s subsequent decision on a City-wide matter or on a matter that
cannot be delegated.
According to a senior staff member who made recommendations on which powers should
be delegated, one of the central criteria regarding the distinction between “local” and
“city-wide” was the notion of “tolerance” for different rules across the city. As this
interviewee states, “What tolerance do we have for things evolving in a different
approach? Can we tolerate the approach to four-way stop signs being different?” City
Council decides what matters may be “tolerated” as being different across the city and
which ones should have uniform applicability. This has resulted in the tree canopy as a
“city-wide” issue, whereas cycling lanes have gone back and forth between local and
city-wide.520
Now, the procedural by-law sets out a confusing description of when community councils
may consider “local” or “city-wide” matters. The term “city-wide” has no definition in
the staff report or in Chapter 27, other than in Appendix B-IV (5), where community
councils are given authority to make recommendations on policy and research about
“local” matters, tautologically suggested to be matters that are “not of city-wide
interest.”521 Community councils may also get involved in “city-wide” interests, but only
those involving recommendations to the Planning and Growth Management Committee
(PGMC)522 on reports of the Chief Planner about planning applications of city-wide
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interest,523 and convening community meetings to inform the public of planning
applications of city-wide interest and to hear public presentations.524
Regarding local or neighbourhood issues, community councils are given broad authority
to make public presentations and recommendations on “neighbourhood” matters,
including exemptions to ravine and tree by-laws525 and any matter “which affects more
than one Community Council.”526 Community councils may only make recommendations
to City Council on City's official plan and zoning by-law amendments that concern a
local focus,527 and make recommendations to City Council on other planning applications
that are not of City-wide interest (emphasis added).528
In practice, “local” issues end up as whatever matters fall under the laundry list of powers
delegated to community councils. The specific powers are set out in § 27-152 of the
Toronto Municipal Code and its Appendix B-IV, and can be roughly grouped into three
categories: planning; community land use; and community interest. To better understand
what kind of matters community councils considered, I reviewed all community council
decisions in 2013, counting what kinds of decisions community councils were making
based on these three categories.529 The objective was to understand how community
councils were fulfilling their delegated duties and to understand what other kinds of
decisions, if any, they might be playing, to better understand their local role. The
following chart sets out the decisions of each community council according to the three
categories outlined above.
Planning/

Land use

Zoning/Heritage
Etobicoke

77

Community

Total

interest
258

38

373
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North York

114

222

22

358

Scarborough

54

150

29

233

Toronto-East

251

504

35

790

York
Table 3.2: Number of community council decisions by category (2013)530
Table 3.2 presents the number of community council decisions by category of activity
and yields the following observations. First, community councils may hold quasilegislative hearings on matters within the urban area the Community Council represents
unless the subject matter is of city-wide interest or is within an area represented by more
than one Community Council.531 These decisions involve amendments to the Planning
Act and the city’s zoning by-law, but not “minor variances” which are the responsibility
of the four committees of adjustment, whose boundaries align with those of the
community councils.
In evaluating local planning decisions, the members of community councils balance the
following considerations: whether proposed changes to lands located in an areas
designated as “neighbourhoods” in the Official Plan are “sensitive, gradual and generally
fit the existing physical character;”532 the degree to which city-wide housing policies
should be assessed in regard to individual neighbourhoods;533 and the relationship
between local zoning and the Official Plan in a rezoning application.534 Community
councils may make decisions related to heritage matters. In this category of authority,
community council decisions are not final. Local planning decisions are subject to the
review of the applicable committee of adjustment where proposed developments do not
adhere to the city-wide Official Plan. Community Council decisions must then be
approved by City Council, and may, in turn, be appealed to the OMB. When community
councils consider these issues, the committee room in which the hearings are held
530
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transforms dramatically into a quasi-judicial forum. One staff member described them as,
“more like attending court than a meeting.”535 Community councils act almost as minicourtrooms, with a large degree of formality, rather than sites where the public can come
with community issues for discussion and resolution.
Second, community councils are responsible for the regulation of specified activities and
land use matters which affect neighbourhoods and local businesses. These include onstreet traffic regulation and permit parking, noise by-law exceptions, street food vending,
liquor licenses and boulevard café permit appeals.536 City Council has delegated final
decision-making authority for most of these powers, but not others. Through my
observations of community council meetings held in 2015, the environment is far more
casual when these decisions are heard. There is an exodus of about half of the audience,
suit jackets are removed, and there is far more movement of councillors throughout the
committee room. The environment comes closer to what the Transition Team imagined
as a community forum for hearing “local” issues.
Third, under the procedural bylaw, community councils can hear matters of “community
interest.” By this, I mean presentations on matters taking place within the community
council boundaries, appointments to community bodies such as Business Improvement
Areas, requests for staffing at meetings, and community matters like the siting of
rooming houses and casinos.
The findings conclude, first, that the vast majority of community council decisions relate
to planning, zoning, heritage and land use matters. This is consistent with Enid Slack’s
observations in 2005 that community councils are essentially “local planning
committees.”537 Rather than serving as forums for the consideration of neighbourhood
issues, their major function is as a councillor-led body making quasi-judicial decisions
under the Planning Act. This perspective was affirmed by a senior staff member at the
535
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City of Toronto, who said, “The term ‘council’ ascribes more … autonomy, or more of
governance role than I think in reality. … I just see them as geographic standing
committees of council.”538
Second, Toronto’s community councils do not generally consider neighbourhood or
community issues and, of those that are considered, the bulk relate to the appointment of
residents to museum and community boards rather than public presentations and
recommendations on “neighbourhood” matters. The exception to this general finding is
the Scarborough Community Council, which opens each of its meetings with a
presentation on a community issue that is affecting Scarborough.539 Community council
members hear the presentations, ask questions and, at times, pass motions related to the
issue. In the fifteen years since community councils were introduced, Toronto’s
community councils have focused largely on local planning, with minimal attention to
“community” issues that the Transition Team and Governing Panel considered integral
for Toronto’s local governance model.
Third, little authority is delegated to community councils, despite municipal power to do
so. As a senior staff member of the City of Toronto told me, “We actually have the tools
and the legislation to further empower the community councils. We can delegate more to
the community councils than we have delegated. And you leave the big council to deal
with policy frameworks, strategic things. There’s actually very little legislation that
cannot be delegated. It’s the official plan, it’s the budget, it’s things like that, which
should not be delegated, they’re the framing things.”540 In this staff member’s view, not
only can the city delegate, they should: “The city council should set the broad policy
framework …, the measures to protect, and what is the decision making process,” then
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delegate decision-making to a local body.541 Put simply, “There’s not enough being
delegated.”542
Thus, in the fifteen years since they were introduced, Toronto’s community councils have
focused largely on local planning issues, with minimal attention to the stewardship role
originally intended. Wards and community councils, as the city’s formal local
governance model, include limited participatory spaces for residents to engage in
decision-making. Community councils do not include residents as representatives, nor do
they allow for residents to raise issues related to their neighbourhoods. Little is delegated
to community councils, other than certain powers under the Planning Act, and these
decisions include considerable deference to the local councillor and minimal
opportunities for the public to engage beyond giving deputations.
Thus, community councils do not serve the purpose they were original intended: as
stewards of a local spaces larger than the ward, but smaller than the city. Instead, they
have limited delegated powers and do not act as spaces for civic participation. In the
absence of a formal local body, the next section considers the overlapping roles of wards,
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in local decision-making.

II. The governance of Toronto’s local legal spaces
Wards and community councils are the two formal articulations of local governance in
Toronto, each with their own histories and authorities as smaller-than-city entities.
Building on the earlier part of this chapter, this section outlines the role of ward
councillors and community councils, concluding with the argument that this formal local
framework has resulted in a local governance model that prioritizes the ward, with
community councils serving a different role than is articulated under the city’s procedural
bylaws.
This section builds the foundation of the next section of this chapter, which adopts legal
541
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pluralism as a lens to look beyond formal law, as chiefly described in provincial laws and
municipal codes, to understand how local is governed and the many levels of norm
creation.543 I later argue that, in reaction to this formal model, two chief bodies – the BIA
and the neighbourhood association, have asserted themselves as representative bodies
within this framework.
1. Formal spaces: wards and community councils
Under the law, wards serve a two-fold function in the City – as demarcated boundaries
that define particular communities, some of which have historical significance as distinct
villages or towns. They define the spatial areas with communities or histories, which are
in turn represented by a councillor that assists them with day-to-day matters, providing
information, and helping to resolve neighbourhood disputes.544 Second, wards act as a
unit of representation for city-wide decision-making, whereby the councillor represents
the interests of his or her residents as located within particular spatial boundaries.
However, in practice, wards serve as a crucial foundation for local governance in Toronto
by asserting an enormous degree of power in the mediation and exercise of local power.
This section builds on the early information in this chapter by setting out the power of the
ward in law and practice.
Wards are empowered by their election of councillors who serve as a Member of
Council, each of which has the power of a single vote on City Council. In law, wards act
as demarcated boundaries and as a unit of representation for city-wide decision-making,
whereby the councillor represents the interests of his or her residents as located within
particular spatial boundaries. 545 In practice, wards serve as a crucial foundation for local
governance in Toronto, exercise a considerable degree of power. The overwhelming
sentiment in my interviews from municipal staff members and councillors alike was the
extent to which councillors hold local decision-making power.
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Wards have been described as “fiefdoms,” with one senior City of Toronto staff member
affirming this point by stating, “Oh yeah, absolutely, it’s characteristic of our system, for
sure.”546 Staff acknowledged the advantages of this model, namely that “there actually is
someone to go to and somebody who can convey a geographic area’s interest. It’s not a
bad thing,” however, “the ward is not the government.”547 Another senior staff member
told me, “so much does depend on the councillor and they provide the leadership on a lot
of projects and issues at a local level.”548 This contact later characterized councillors as,
“The ward boss.”549 Another staff member said, regarding the power exerted by
councillors, “This is supposed to be a democracy? No, it’s a fiefdom.”550 This power may
be even handed down to the next generation. As one person said, referring to the three
councillors who are the children of previously-elected Members of Council, “Look what
has happened in terms of the children of ward councillors getting into power. How many
sons of former politicians are coming into power? It’s a complete fiefdom.”551
Councillors agree with this characterization, with some questioning the extent to which
such power was appropriate. In affirming the ward councillor as having considerable
power, one councillor told me that it is, on te one hand, “democracy with all its
foibles.”552 This same councillor said, “The doorway to make something a bigger deal is
the councillor – “inevitably, you’ve got to go through that doorway,” and “There’s a lot
of power with the local councillor in the City of Toronto, especially around planning
matters.”553 Later, this same councillor said, “One of the consequences of having a
relatively weak civil society in certain large geographies in the city is, is that the guys
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who get elected can get away with murder”554 One councillor went even farther, saying
that the authority held over spending from development monies meant that, “I had way
too much power,” and concluding, “it’s a terrible thing.”555
The interviewees noted some of the drawbacks of the power held by councillors. First, it
limits the extent to which changes to governance are possible. As one staff member told
me, “[Councillors] want to be the ones who are the white knights who are the fixers …
maybe that’s one of the limitations of having a ward system”556 As a result, individual
councillors “are very resistant to giving up control of individual, on-the-ground
decisions.”557 One concrete example of limits to change was the inability to create
neighbourhood committees following amalgamation: “[T]he politicians would not allow
that to happen, because they want to be ward bosses.”558 This characteristic of local
governance is important as there tends not to be a lot of councillor turnover. For example,
in the 2014 municipal election, all but one of the 37 councillors who ran for office again
were re-elected.559 As one person I interviewed said, “There has to be some shift, and
legislative shift, in terms of the power of the incumbent. The power of incumbency is just
too much, it does not allow for new blood in it.”560
A second issue is the extent to which “city-wide” issues can be adequately addressed. As
one staff member told me, “The two-tier [metropolitan government] did give you the
ability for different people to look at things differently. Either from a sort of city-wide, or
region-wide, perspective, and from a local perspective. Whereas now, politically,
[councillors] have to do both and it’s hard for them to do both, it really is, it’s almost
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impossible”561 This means a focus on localized effects rather than the implications from
the city-wide level, “We have too many people on council who are very quick to take
positions [on city-wide issues], without taking any responsibility for the consequences of
those positions.”562 Put another way, councillors “have a tendency to look at the issues in
a very isolated way; they don’t connect it to the larger whole.”563
A third issue concerns the extent to which councillors serve as “brokers” of other
governance bodies, both formal and informal. Regarding the councillor role in decisions
regarding his or her ward, councillors will not trump other councillors’ decisions at
community council: “for sure the councillor wins.”564 One staff member told me that the
relationship between the city and residents is “brokered through the councillor,”565 which
can also mean that councillors pick and choose how they engage with the community.566
In some cases, “councillors have been in their wards for so long and they’ve been in
power for so long that they’ve created pockets of interest groups.”567 This means that
some councillors will help to form some interest groups like business improvement areas
and neighbourhood associations, canvassed in the next section, “because it makes our
lives easier. Because if I have to consult … on a change in traffic, or in the on-street
parking, I’d have to go and consult every single business. Whereas with the BIA, the BIA
does it. And [neighbourhood associations] are the same thing.”568 The councillor role in
creating them is crucial: “if the councillor’s offices don’t see value in it and don’t put the
time in then they’re never going to happen.”569 The brokered relationships between the
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councillors and residents, “depends on their own style and electoral prospects.”570
In short, the amalgamation of the City of Toronto led to what was “regional” to become
“city-wide” without the introduction of a “local” level of governance. When the province
amalgamated seven municipalities to form the current-day City of Toronto, it included in
the legislation a requirement to consider the introduction of “community councils.” As
detailed in this section, their roles, boundaries, and mandates have since been reviewed
several times. Despite provisions that enable them to have a more participatory, inclusive
role in local decision-making, community councils remain disempowered local planning
committees with few delegated powers.
Ward councillors thus serve a leadership role in formal determinations of local
governance, with community councils acting under a limited mandate rather than as
spaces for inclusive, participatory governance. This reinforces the notion that local
governance is comprised of formal and informal spaces that, as Santos asserts, normative
orders seek exclusivity and control within their legal territory.571 As noted in Chapter 1,
legal spaces refers to notions of space that have been given formal legal meaning, as well
as an articulation of alternative norms, rules, customs and practices within these same
spaces. While individual understandings of legal space can differ, such spaces are replete
with a complex range of interconnecting institutions and entities that have been given
social meaning, which in turn affect individual understandings of space.572 We now turn
to a study of other competing bodies – BIAs and neighbourhood associations – to better
understand local governance in Toronto.

2. BIAs and Neighbourhood Associations as competing spaces of local governance
The previous sections outlined the City of Toronto’s local decision-making as it pertains
to formal city bodies. It identified the ward as the locus of local representation and
community councils as geographically-based committees that largely conform to
570
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Toronto’s pre-amalgamated boundaries. While wards and community councils are the
state bodies that purport to represent groups of Toronto’s residents based on geographic
areas, BIAs and neighbourhood associations purport to be representative of particular
members within their boundaries based on this geographic affiliation and claim that they
are inclusive of and beneficial for their residential populations broadly speaking. They
exist unevenly across the city and work together with ward councillors as pivotal
institutions in defining local boundaries and influencing decision-making. My defence of
BIAs and NAs to the exclusion of other local bodies in Toronto was outlined in Chapter
2. I also set out details of the primary research that I conducted on the organization and
geography of these bodies in Toronto.
A core goal of this dissertation is to understand the role of state and non-state actors
within Toronto’s local governance model and how they inform the local legal spaces of
the city. Their presence helps to reveal what other interests are excluded or included in
decision-making. This dissertation advances the argument that BIAs and neighbourhood
associations affect Toronto’s local governance model, both as non-state actors involved
in ward-based decision-making and as bodies that unevenly map within the city, leading
to differences in representation.
As a study rooted in legal pluralism, this dissertation suggests that the governance of
local legal spaces is not merely about the bodies that are created by municipal
governments, nor are these bodies fixed in time or geography. Other studies have
similarly concluded that non-state bodies affect local decision-making processes, in
particular through their emphasis on political participation within localized areas of urban
spaces. In their seminal study on neighborhood associations, Berry, Portney and
Thomson argue that the “key to making America more participatory is by making
political participation more meaningful in the context of the communities people live in”
by looking at the depth and breadth of democratic bodies.573 Thomson articulates that
small-scale decision-making bodies are fundamental to civic participation, but that there
must be a link between these bodies and the public and these groups must have a link to
573
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political decision-making.574 Put another way, these small-scale bodies are “brokers”
between the public and democratic institutions. This section asks how BIAs and
neighbourhood associations assert their own boundaries and roles in governance in
smaller-than-city spaces in the city. Based on their legal structures, degree of formal
connection to city councillors and staff, and geographies, are BIAs and neighbourhood
associations “brokers” meant to represent local interests? Do they govern exclusively the
private interests of their constituents, or are they part of the larger fabric of public
governance?575
BIAs and neighbourhood associations each play a role in local governance in Toronto.
Each use geographically demarcated boundaries to determine and represent their
members. Neighbourhood associations serve largely to shape planning decisions, while
BIAs actively aim to change the public realm. Both types of organizations may carry out
roles typically reserved for municipal governments, namely graffiti removal, street
beautification and consultations with residents. At times, the functions of these bodies
overlap, with some neighbourhood associations purporting to represent business interests
and BIAs permitting non-business owning residents to sit on their boards.576
There are also important distinctions between these two forms of bodies. BIAs have
institutional support from the City of Toronto. This support includes collecting
information on the city’s 81 BIAs and storing it in a publicly accessible website;
providing training and support to their organizations in regard to their governance;
collecting and remitting a levy which enables BIAs to hire staff and consultants, hold
events in their neighbourhoods, and promote local business; and councillor membership
on every board. From a legal perspective, BIAs are bound by the requirements of
574
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Toronto’s procedural bylaw and must adhere to strict accountability and representation
requirements.
In contrast, neighbourhood associations do not have institutional support beyond the
assistance that local councillors and planning staff may provide. Their budgets rely on
donations and membership fees and are typically limited.577 As a result, there are
significant differences in the mandates, memberships and practices of neighbourhood
associations across the city, and an absence of clear information on elections and other
internal practices that could shed light on their adherence to principles of democracy and
meaningful representation, and their commitment to accountability practices. The only
legal requirements to which neighbourhood associations must adhere are those contained
in legislation where such bodies are incorporated.578 Such legislation, however, does not
concern any responsibilities relating to the associations viz the public, including
accountability.579 To staff, however, there may not be significant differences between
BIAs and neighbourhood assoications. When asked the difference, a senior staff planner
told me, “they’re stakeholder groups, I wouldn’t weigh one over the other necessarily.
I’m very interested in making sure that we hear from them both.”580
To understand the role that BIAs and neighbourhood associations play in local
governance, I first set out the legal status of and data on BIAs and NAs. I drew from
provincial legislation, city bylaws and policies, and decisions of the City of Toronto’s
Committees of Adjustment and the OMB, as well as COTA’s key provisions. I also set
out the findings of primary research that I conducted aimed at understanding the range of
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in Toronto. Next, I draw on the academic literature
referenced in Chapter 1 to analyze the role and significance of BIAs and neighbourhood
associations in conceptualizing local governance in Toronto.
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a) Business Improvement Areas
The Waterfront BIA created the “Whose Job Is it?” poster reproduced in Illustration
3.4.581 Alongside City departments, BIAs plays a role in maintaining the public realm.
The poster suggests that BIAs see themselves as reflecting more than just the interests of
their direct stakeholders (local businesses and property owners), but the public as well, in
maintaining city streets and the flourishing of the built environment. This poster
encapsulates the questions of the role of BIAs in local governance: where are they
located, who do they represent, and how does their power and authority differ across the
city?

Illustration 3.4: “Whose Job is it?”
There is no single, uniform definition of BIAs.582 Other terms have been used to describe
the construct, including “Business Improvement District” or BID, which is often used in
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the United States and the United Kingdom, and “City Improvement District,” the name
adopted in South Africa.583
Toronto defines a BIA as an association comprised of commercial and industrial property
owners and business tenants within a specified geographic area district, which is
officially approved by the City to stimulate business and improve economic vitality.584 I
prefer Gopal-Agge’s definition of BIAs, which are “privately directed and publicly
sanctioned organizations that supplement public services within geographically defined
boundaries by generating multiyear revenue through a compulsory assessment on local
property owners and/or businesses."585 Hoyt and Gopal-Agge’s definition encompasses
three crucial features that are not necessarily made clear under Toronto’s meaning: first,
the BIA is meant to provide a specific set of powers to business and property owners in
order to achieve their mandate, most notably an organizational structure and direct access
to the local councillors who serve on their boards. Second, BIAs are funded through a
required levy against local property owners or businesses, which functions as a form of
taxation. Local businesses cannot back out of paying even if they voted against forming a
BIA or disagree with their activities.586 Third, the definition acknowledges that BIAs
supplement public services offered by the City, which more broadly defines their
entrenched governance role.
Toronto was the first city in the world to create a BIA, introduced in Bloor West Village
in 1970. The BIA advocated in favour of an independent, privately managed body that
would have the power to impose an additional tax on all commercial property owners in
the area to be directed to local revitalization initiatives.587 Local business leaders believed
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that a stable and effective funding source, drawn from member businesses, would help
with beautification and improvement, promote urban business areas, and ultimately allow
them to compete with suburban malls, which were increasingly replacing traditional
business areas in localized areas.588
The Province of Ontario passed the enabling legislation as an amendment to the thenMunicipal Act, authorizing the City of Toronto to pass a bylaw to establish BIAs.589
Through the provincial legislation, Toronto and other municipalities were legally
permitted to require the payment of a levy by the businesses in the area, with the levy
then directed to the BIA as a steady source of revenue. The organizational form has not
changed substantially in the 45 years since it was introduced.
The following details are meant to illustrate the extent to which they are regulated in
Toronto. Section 8(2) of COTA broadly enables the City to establish BIAs as they
concern the “Economic, social and environmental well-being of the City.” Under COTA,
BIAs are defined as “local boards,” which has been affirmed under Chapter 19 of the
Toronto Municipal Code and in case law.590 Their purposes are to oversee the
improvement, beautification, and maintenance of municipally-owned land, buildings and
structures in the BIA beyond City standard levels; streetscaping; promotion; graffiti
removal services; safety and security measures; strategic planning; and advocating on
behalf of the interests of the BIA.591 The establishment of BIAs is set out in detail in the
Procedural Bylaw and their funding is collected through the city’s formal levying
authorities, coordinated through an office dedicated to supporting their operations.
BIAs are subject to strict requirements under COTA, and are highly regulated, but
empowered local bodies. To one staff member, they are “self-funding, defiant
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organizations that operate in neighbourhoods” that “aren’t very democratic.”592 A
councillor called them, a “little tiny city.”593 BIAs must pass a procedure bylaw for
governing the calling, place, and proceedings of meetings.594 All meetings must be open
to the public unless the subject matter of the meeting falls within one of the enumerated
exceptions.595 Whether or not the meeting is closed, the BIA must record all resolutions,
decisions and other proceedings at a meeting of the body.596 The city may appoint an
investigator to review whether a BIA has properly complied with COTA’s requirements
where it opts to close all or part of a meeting to the public.597 BIAs must also retain and
preserve their records in a secure and accessible manner.598
The Municipal Code sets out further procedures guiding the establishment and operation
of BIAs and are detailed here to illustrate the extent to which BIAs are municipally
regulated.599 Many steps are required for City Council to pass a by-law designating a
BIA.600 The first step is for local business and property owners to form a steering
committee that, together with city staff, defines the boundaries of the BIA area and
creates a communication strategy for businesses in the area.601 Next, city staff conducts a
formal public consultation meeting with all commercial and industrial property
owners.602 If there is sufficient interest, the General Manager then recommends that
Council enacts a by-law to establish a new BIA.603 “Sufficient interest” is determined by
a secret ballot at the formal public consultation meeting, whereby 50 percent plus one of
592
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those potential BIA members in attendance must agree to proceed with the creation of the
BIA.604 The next step is to proceed to the polling of BIA members. A minimum of 30% or 100 - of businesses and commercial or industrial property owners must reply. And, of
the parties that reply, at least 50% must agree to the creation of the BIA.605
Once a BIA is established by bylaw, a Board of Management for the BIA is created.606
The Board of Management is considered to be “a City board and is an agent of the
City.”607 The directors of a board are be appointed under delegated authority by the
community council within whose geographic area the BIA is located.608 The number of
directors is fixed by bylaw609 and, as an exception to the City's Public Appointments
Policy, directors are not required to be residents of the City of Toronto.610
Each director and the board must operate in compliance with all applicable law and City
policies including, but not limited to, COTA, the Municipal Freedom of Information and
Protection of Privacy Act, the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, and Public
Appointments Policy.611 This means that BIAs have significant limitations in the exercise
of their authority, including a requirement that it does not borrow or lend money, pass a
resolution or take a position contrary to any Council-approved policy or decision, support
political candidates, or participate in OMB or committee of adjustment hearings unless
members agree.612
Once a BIA is approved by City Council, every business within its boundaries
604
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automatically becomes a member. Once designated, any and all businesses within the
BIA boundary area are required to pay BIA levies.613 The City collects an annual levy
from local businesses and forwards it directly to the BIA, which becomes its budget for
the year.614 All members of the BIA are legally obligated to pay the municipality their
portion of the levy, which is based on the assessment values of the individual and
neighbourhood properties. The levies are collected by the City through the property tax
billing process and remitted in full to the BIA. No remuneration is paid to members of the
Boards of Management.615 BIAs may also raise funds and eligible for City of Toronto
grants. Lower courts have affirmed the legality of municipalities establishing a BIA and
imposing a BIA levy that all member businesses must pay.616
Appendix B sets out data regarding Toronto’s 81 BIAs. The budget amounts under the
authority of BIAs are considerable. Collectively, BIAs levy approximately 35 million per
year for commercial area improvements, marketing and promotion, and other economic
development initiatives.617 There is wide variation in the amounts of levies in individual
BIAs across the city, from a few thousand dollars to $2,508,760 for the Bloor-Yorkville
BIA.618 Some BIAs operate with volunteers, while other BIAs require paid staff to run
day-to-day operations. The size of the BIA budget is largely a function of the assessment
base in the area; BIAs with large assessment bases are often able to levy more funds from
its members at the same tax rate as a smaller BIA with smaller assessment base. In
practice, BIAs receive considerably more from their member businesses in the TorontoEast York community council area than BIAs receive from their members in other parts
of the city.619
613
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In practice, there is wide variation in the budgetary power of BIAs, largely along
geographic lines. Most represent under 500 businesses and have budgets of under
$400,000 per year. In respect of the 2016 budgets, most or all of Etobicoke, North York
and Scarborough’s BIAs have budgets under $400,000. The vast majority of Etobicoke
BIA budgets are under $200,000. In contrast, almost all of the BIAs with budgets over
$700,000 are located in the Toronto-East York community council area, with three of
these BIAs having annual budgets over $2,000,000.620 The largest BIAs are located in the
Toronto-East York Community Council area and have budgets of over $1,500,000. This
is significant because it means that not all sections of the city have these bodies taking
part in governance or municipal service delivery, nor are all BIAs playing the same role
in local governance based on their size and locations.
The City’s bureaucratic structure includes oversight over and partnerships with BIAs,
housed within the same office. The City of Toronto has a BIA Office in the Economic
Development & Culture Division, which provides professional operational and
administrative support to BIAs to ensure compliance with the Municipal Code and other
relevant City policies.621 The BIA Office oversees partnership projects with BIAs,
including a BIA capital cost-share program, which includes approximately 100
streetscape improvement projects per year with an annual value of approximately $5
million. These revitalization and street beautification initiatives are implemented at half
the cost to the City through the 50% cost-share formula with BIAs. The BIA Office also
administers the Commercial Façade Improvement Program, where the City provides
approximately $500,000 per year in grants to commercial property owners within BIAs
across the City to upgrade the physical appearance of their buildings.
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In contrast to neighbourhood associations, BIAs have strong connections to city
government, both through the involvement of the local councillor in setting up and
serving on BIA boards, and within the administrative structure of the city. Ward
councillors may be deeply involved in setting up a BIA, with the rationale that having the
organization allows the councillor to work more effectively when it comes time for
consultation. That said, helping to set up BIAs may have “a lot to do with the councillor’s
own priority,” as one councillor told me. “If the priorities aren’t organizing businesses,
and maybe that they’re just not aware of how important a vehicle it can be, or just not
have the experience of how you go about a project like this, going from point a to point b
from a community organizing standpoint.” The desire to set up BIAs may also speak to
the style of representation of particular councillors. One councillor helps to create BIAs
within their ward to “strengthen the voice of our neighborhoods, to make them a player
and active in the organized, political structure, rather than just be ambivalent and not
know what’s going on.”622

b) Neighbourhood associations
Neighbourhood associations are defined as, “a civic organization oriented towards
maintaining or improving the quality of life in a geographically defined residential
area.”623 They are also known by such terms as “resident,” “ratepayer” or “homeowner”
associations or organizations. In this section, the term “neighbourhood association” is
broadly used to include all such organizations. One Toronto councillor described them
this way:
[T]here is no sort of legal, or political structure around what [neighbourhood
associations] are. And so you have different models, there’s the ratepayer
association, the resident’s association, and the community association. Ratepayer
being property owners, or residential property owners. Resident being residents, so
tenants are included. And community association, which from time to time will take
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in, say, a representative of a hospital that’s in the neighborhood, or some businesses.
So there are no clear boundaries in terms of who is allowed in and who isn’t.624
Toronto’s South Rosedale Residents Association (SRRA) is one of Canada’s oldest
ratepayer groups. 625 It was incorporated in 1931 to represent the residents of South
Rosedale, an affluent neighbourhood. Some neighbourhood associations have been
enormously successful in shifting political debates in the city, the most famous of which
are the lobby efforts of the Annex Residents’ Association (ARA), which resulted in the
defeat of the proposed Spadina Expressway. The legacy of this involvement is the view
that neighbourhood associations “can be a tremendous force for improvement, and for
creativity,” according to a staff member in the city’s planning department interviewed for
this project.626
Very little is documented regarding the sizes, geographical boundaries, objectives and
sources of revenue of the city’s neighbourhood associations. One councillor affirmed that
there is, “no sort of legal or political structure around what those things are.”627 Toronto
has hundreds of neighbourhood associations, which differ dramatically in their size,
structure, formality, history and involvement in local governance. Neighbourhood
associations are not formally embedded within the City’s bureaucratic structure and,
therefore, data collection is difficult, as neighbourhood associations come and go over
time and the organizations generally have limited resources. However, there is no official
list of neighbourhood associations. Unlike New York’s community committees628 or Los
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Angeles’ neighbourhood councils,629 there are no departments within the City of Toronto
tasked with assisting or otherwise keeping track of neighbourhood associations. The only
formal interface with the city is the retention of an outdated consultation list. In Toronto,
the only way to understand or contact the city’s neighbourhood associations was to
engage in a scavenger hunt, identifying how many there are, their geographic placement,
and the roles they play in local government. This information was necessary in order to
understand what role they play in local governance. There is considerable contrast with
the accessibility of neighbourhood association and City of Toronto’s support of the 81
BIAs, which are listed with contact information, offered training and given other forms of
institutional support.
To understand more about neighbourhood associations, including their location within
the city, I decided to create a detailed list of each organization. I took the following steps
to do so. First, I started with a map created by a David Topping, a city resident630 who
created the map because, “I moved to a new neighbourhood and couldn't figure out where
I could go if I wanted to get more involved. I figured other people might benefit from the
same information for their neighbourhoods. And so it went. That was four years ago and
I'm still updating this damned map every month or so.”631 Asked how he updates the
information, Topping remarked, “The data comes from each organization's website, for
the most part, if they have one—or from members if they don't have a website. Some
organizations I knew about and found information about myself; others came from people
who saw the map and wanted to help make it as up to date and accurate as it could be.”632
I used Topping’s map as a starting point for my data collection.
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After comparing Topping’s map to lists of neighbourhood associations elsewhere, I
prepared a “master list” of Toronto’s neighbourhood associations.633 I took the master list
to create a chart with each of Toronto’s neighbourhood association, including columns
for the association name, date of establishment, its geographic boundaries, eligibility for
membership, whether the association charged a membership fee, its mandate, its
community council and ward locations, and a section for any addition information. I
reviewed the neighbourhood association websites, where available. Where the
information was incomplete or unavailable, I conducted extensive online searches for
contact information for the applicable neighbourhood associations. In many cases, I was
unable to locate the information needed to complete the chart.
Based on this research, 184 neighbourhood associations in Toronto, scattered throughout
the city, are listed in Appendix C to this dissertation. I was able to find comprehensive
information on 100 of these organizations. As set out in Appendix D, I recorded their
year of creation, their locations within Toronto, whether they collect dues, who may be a
member, whether they were incorporated, and the purposes of the organization. These
categories relate to the overall purposes of this chapter of the dissertation, which seeks to
understand how organizations exercise and assert themselves within the notion of
Moore’s semiautonomous social fields with different strengths and powers, and which are
more or less bound by the formal rules within localized areas of the city.634 To what
extent are neighbourhood associations self-contained organizations with power to make
decisions, versus connected to or reliant on state-based decision-making?
Notwithstanding thorough online searches for websites and active contact information,
such as the email account of a member of the association. In some cases, websites and
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email addresses were located, but attempts to confirm information with the associations
revealed that email addresses were defunct. There are countless possible explanations the neighbourhood association may be dormant, defunct, led by someone without
computer access, or the association may conduct its work offline. This may be the result
of neighbourhood associations forming as a result of some sort of planning controversy
or development, then become dormant once the issue had concluded.635 For example, the
Victoria Village Ratepayers Association operated for forty years as a robust, incorporated
association.636 However, in the, early 2000s the association unincorporated due to
volunteer apathy and stopped asking for membership revenue, and they now serve as a
forum for community news and information, and advocate for or on community issues as
needed. Similarly, the Woodbine Park Residents Association was formed in the late
1990s due to concerns about the impact of new developments on basement flooding.637
The organization had major achievements, including the introduction of new City of
Toronto policies regarding the monitoring of melt water and rain water, safety issues, and
the development of Woodbine Park. After about fifteen years of work, the association
retracted its functions, took down their website, and no longer collects dues. For this
study, the absence of a formalized governance role means that definitive information is
not available on all of the city’s neighbourhood associations.
Based on the data in Appendix D, neighbourhood associations vary widely in their legal
structures, membership requirements and fee structures. Based on this data, I analyzed
how pre- and post-amalgamated neighbourhood associations differ. More than half of
Toronto’s neighbourhood associations were established following amalgamation. Postamalgamation associations differ in their functions, with more a greater emphasis on
community events, environmental objectives, safety, and information dissemination. By
contrast, pre-amalgamation associations placed a greater emphasis on planning and
concerns regarding the economy within their spaces of the city. Another key difference
635
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between pre- and post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations is that the latter are far
less likely have a resident-only policy; instead, non-residents and businesses may also
serve as members. Post-amalgamation associations are also significantly less likely to
collect a membership fee.
However, for both pre- and post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations, 83% of
neighbourhood association cite planning as a core function. In addition, 52% are
incorporated either provincially or federally, as non-profits or for-profit corporations,
which means they can participate in OMB hearings. Participation in OMB hearings is an
important aspect of planning. As such, this data supports the findings that 83% of
neighbourhood associations are created to impact planning and land use in the area. This
is consistent with Moore’s conclusions that Toronto’s neighbourhood associations may
have broad or general mandates, but their predominant function is to represent their
members in regard to planning.638

c) BIAs, neighbourhood associations and local legal spaces
The following section analyzes the data above to analyze the roles played by BIAs and
neighbourhood associations in the local governance model.
The geographies of BIAs and neighbourhood associations
As noted, Toronto has 81 BIAs. 639 There are several observations to be made about the
locations of these bodies. First, BIAs are not uniformly located across the city. The
Toronto-East York Community Council area has the vast majority of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations, as seen on Illustration 3.5. Etobicoke and North York are
next with a roughly equal number of BIAs, while Scarborough has the least, at 7%. In
some cases, the boundaries of the associations overlap, whereby multiple neighbourhood
638
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associations claim to represent a particular area.640 Illustration 3.5 shows the locations of
BIAs and neighbourhood associations in Toronto. The map indicates which
neighbourhood associations are inactive.

Illustration 3.5: Locations of BIAs and neighbourhood associations641
Also, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are located in similar parts of the city. This
means that certain sections of the city have representation from both BIAs and
neighbourhood associations. As seen in Illustration 3.6, the locations of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations lie alongside the areas of the city with the highest income

640

See e.g. a block of Marion Street, a one-way street near High Park, that is represented by at least three
neighbourhood associations. It is within the stated boundaries of the Sunnyside Community Association,
the Roncesvalles-Macdonell Residents’ Association, and the Parkdale Residents Association (David
Topping, “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015), online: <
http://davidtopping.tumblr.com/torontoresidents>).
641
Original research (Alexandra Flynn).

155

levels.642 This means that some parts of the city have overlapping bodies representing
residents, while other parts are representing only by wards and community councils.

Illustration 3.6: BIAs and neighbourhood associations, and income levels643
Examining the map alongside the data gathered on neighbourhood associations, just two
of Toronto’s neighbourhood associations are located in the city’s vulnerable areas.644
Rather than focusing on planning issues, these two neighbourhood associations instead
collaborate with social providers. For example, the Bathurst Finch Network (BFN),
which began in 2009, describes itself as “a group of community residents and workers
from community agencies and the City of Toronto in the Bathurst-Finch neighbourhood.
We work together to plan community-based programs and make positive change in our
neighbourhood and our city.”645 The BFN is located in one of the City of Toronto’s 13
642
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priority neighbourhoods, and currently one of the eight transitioning neighborhood under
Toronto Strong Neighbourhood Strategy.646 It uses participatory processes to create and
run community-based programs, including a monthly community women's dinner; a
monthly 'free school' exploring topics of interest in a community setting; a talent night; a
monthly immigration legal clinic; and a weekly English conversation circle.647
Post-amalgamation role in local governance
BIAs and neighbourhood associations have each doubled in number since amalgamation.
Their increased presence suggests a replacement for a direct connection to local
government. In their evaluation of changes in the City of Toronto’s approach to
governance given COTA and other legislative and policy initiatives, Meghan Joy and
Ronald K. Vogel reference “the ascendance of neoliberalism as the governing
philosophy.” They posit that federal, provincial, and city governments have each adopted
“a neoliberal policy agenda grounded in austerity policies that include lower taxes,
greater reliance on market processes, scaling back or dismantling the welfare state, and
embracing new public management policies.”648 They state: “Post-amalgamation Toronto
operates like a private corporation and participatory processes often appear as an
afterthought rather than a space to let citizens proactively bring their issues to city staff
before policies and plans are made.”649
BIAs can be characterized as forms of organization that allows the state to govern at a
distance, characterized as a form of neoliberal management meant to “compensate for
declining public resources” in increasingly privatized economies.650 BIAs reflect an
“ethos of low taxation” in an era of “if you want it, you’re going to have to fund it
yourself.”651 On the other hand, councillors help to form and further the involvement of
646
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BIAs and neighbourhood associations in their wards, as “the glue between different
neighbourhoods,”652 bodies that allow councillors to have “greater reach within a
community,”653 and that serve as “citizen experts.”654
However, these bodies may exacerbate socioeconomic inequalities within and between
neighbourhoods.655 BIAs contribute to increased space-based tension both in areas with
and without BIAs.656 This tension is especially prevalent in economically and ethnically
mixed neighbourhoods, and where access to decision-making processes varies.657 The
result is a limit to democracy and the exclusion of particular perspectives of residency
and public space.658 In Washington, BIAs have purportedly contributed to racial and
cultural inequality by favouring the views of mostly white property owners in their
decision-making.659 Some question whether the organizations emphasize the power of
affluent neighbourhoods in comparison to more vulnerable parts of the city, in part
because poor sections of the city do not have BIAs despite the existence of commercial
areas supporting residents.660 This dynamic enhances Washington’s support of vocal and
well-organized areas, rather than poorer, largely African American neighbourhoods.661
There are three chief concerns relating to inclusivity in the context of Toronto’s BIAs.
First, BIAs exacerbate inclusivity issues through their internal governance model. Areas
with BIAs may advocate for particular kinds of inclusivity. There is little question that
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BIAs themselves do not represent the overall community, as residents have few if any
votes on BIA boards.662 Some argue that this organizational structure leads to
undemocratic practices where power is concentrated amongst property and business
owners. This undemocratic structure is called into question because BIAs play a role in
the management of public space.663 BIAs both shape boundaries and affect who may
participate in governance.664
Second, Toronto’s large BIAs go beyond representing businesses through activities like
street fairs and marketing and instead play an active advocacy role for the benefits of
their members.665 For example, one of the largest of Toronto’s BIAs is the Toronto
Entertainment BIA. It was created in 2008 and is located in the Toronto-East York
Community Council area. It straddles two wards, owing to its large size of 156 blocks. It
represents over 1,800 businesses and had a budget in 2016 of $2,079,199. In 2013, it
funded a Master Plan drafted by consultants, setting out in over 100 pages the BIA’s
proposals for the public realm, focusing on details such as streetscaping, planters, cycling
lanes and other matters squarely within the jurisdiction of the City of Toronto.666
Regarding any city proposals relating to the BIA area, the Master Plan outlines in what
circumstances the BIA should provide “official written endorsements,” only where “the
BIA is assured that the spirit and intent of the Master Plan are respected.” It proposes a
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set process for councillor and staff review of the Master Plan in connection with proposed
developments. The Master Plan further states that, “Where proposals are deemed to be
fundamentally at odds with the spirit and intent of the Master Plan, the BIA reserves its
right to voice its opposition to the application to the City and/or Ontario Municipal
Board.”667
Third, BIAs call into question inclusivity in their attempts to influence local governance
more broadly, for example, to influence social policy. As one staff member I spoke with
said, BIAs “ have, sometimes at their peril, weighed into the geopolitics of the area”
because of their site-specific private interests.668 For example, in 2015, Toronto’s
Chinatown BIA objected to the plan to introduce a youth homeless shelter within the
boundaries of the BIA.669 The BIA noted a lack of consultation on the proposal and the
negative impact on the area, stating: “the BIA had worked hard for a decade to ‘clean up’
the area, and business owners are worried the facility will turn Spadina into a ‘centre of
homelessness’.”670 The protest culminated in placards within member businesses, as well
as a demonstration of over 50 people at City Hall.671 The BIA suggests that it is
sympathetic to the need for having soup kitchens and drop-in centres, but argues that they
should not be located in tourist areas, even though numerous homeless and vulnerable
people call such “tourist areas” home.672 In this case, as Schragger advances, BIAs affirm
recognition of their members’ business interests in priority to others.673
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Likewise, researchers have observed that neighbourhood associations are positioned to
exercise a tremendous amount of power within local decision-making as compared to
other stakeholders, exemplified by their access to councillors to the exclusion of other
local actors. As Logan & Rabrenovic note, while other kinds of civic organizations may
play a role in representing resident interests, the neighbourhood association “is
commonly the vehicle through which neighbors learn about problems, formulate
opinions, and seek to intervene in the political process to protect their local interests.”674
Such communities have a very strong identification with their neighbourhood, and the
neighbourhood association representing their interests should be listened to and involved
in the development process.675 This may be due, in part, to the presence of
neighbourhood associations in predominately wealthy neighbourhoods, as individuals
and households with higher incomes are more likely to be engaged in civic
participation.676 Similarly, Toronto’s neighbourhood associations are seen as dominated
by homeowners who are white and middle class, who do not reach out to other members
of the communities, and focus largely on land use rather than social issues.677 Not all
neighbourhood associations are created equal: organizations with expertise, institutional
memory, and neighbourhood self-governance capacity are better able to achieve
results.678
The false dichotomy of “public” and “private”
Neither BIAs nor neighbourhood associations are easily classified as “public” or
“private” bodies, meaning the distinction between their role as representing their
members and serving as a unit in a larger local governance system. The extent to which
they may be characterized is informed by many factors, including the financial power of
674
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the organization, their connection to city and business leaders as important players in
local decision-making, and their transformation over time.
Regarding BIAs, one councillor said, “They have a … board of directors, supported by
city staff, who are at every one of these meetings, and an employee who can manage the
back office stuff. You have this institutional stuff and a source of money, and that’s great.
But, we have to be very careful to constrain them.”679 BIAs have a direct relationship
with local governments. Their establishment is sanctioned through municipal law; they
are partners in the delivery of some governmental services; the government has
accountability mechanisms to oversee their conduct; and their fees. However, despite
these formal connections with municipal governments, studies have shown that BIA staff
do not believe they have any close identification with governmental institutions and see
themselves as firmly part of the private sector rather than any form of government.680
Randy Lippert and Mark Sleiman describe BIAs as “ambassadors,” serving as a
“knowledge brokers within a broader urban governance assemblage.”681 Lippert and
Sleiman suggest that BIAs are not simply private actors seeking additional power and
they do not fit easily within particular descriptions as exclusionary or inequalityenhancing. Instead, they are more complex organizations that defy easy categorization.
Richard Briffault suggests that the “public” and the “private” spheres are interconnected
in relation to BIAs.682 Briffault states, “... the public’s use and enjoyment of the streets,
parks, squares and other public spaces that are at the heart of urban living, BIAs—
whatever their place on the public-private continuum—can enhance the public
environment and contribute to an enrichment of the public life.”683 Similarly, Wolf
emphatically states that BIAs are “a part of urban governance and public
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administration.”684 He argues that BIAs must be placed within the public administration
context, even if their objectives focus on the “private” concerns of their members.685
In a comprehensive study of the nature of BIA governance, researchers Göktug Morçöl,
Triparna Vasavada and Sohee Kim studied BIAs in Center City, Pennsylvania to evaluate
the role of BIAs in urban governance, concluding involvement in the city’s governance
became “deeper and wider” over the years.686 In particular, BIAs began to advocate on
positions that went beyond the BIA to citywide matters like land-use planning, zoning,
and intergovernmental funding for infrastructure repair.687 Similarly, a study of Toronto’s
Downtown Young BIA, researchers observed that the objectives of BIAs tend to evolve
from basic operational and tactical tasks to more strategic tasks. This requires improved
data, cost-effective decision support, and increased coordination at the city, regional,
provincial and national levels.688 Put another way, the longer they are in operation, the
more they exert a role in local governance.
It remains uncertain the extent to which BIAs cooperate with other neighbourhood
organizations. For example, in his study of the development of the “creative city” in one
of Toronto’s largest BIAs, the Entertainment District BIA, Sébastien Darchen observed
the tension between the local planning process, whereby the BIA carried a far stronger
voice in community deliberations and their interests were specific to the advantages for
the member businesses.689 While council ultimately supported a mixed use
neighbourhood which includes a diverse range of economic activities than those proposed
by the BIA, including an environment where emerging artists can live and work in the
neighbourhood, Darchen concluded that the promotion of arts and culture as imagined by
the BIA will lead to revitalization of the area: “The creative city is used to legitimize a set
of objectives — put forward by key stakeholders — to transform the space into an
684
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appealing urban environment conducive specifically to investment for residential and
business development.”690 The BIA articulated “already packaged regeneration
processes,” whereby the creative city concept does not result in a neighbourhood balance
or representation. Instead, only the particular interests of those with a vested stake are
promoted.”691 Illustration 3.7 shows Toronto BIAs mapped alongside population density
and their year of establishment, showing that amongst areas where these bodies exist,
density is greater the earlier that the BIA was established.

Illustration 3.7: Map of BIAs, neighbourhood associations and density
Neighbourhood associations, too, have been described as having an “insider/outsider”
status in local governance. Miller suggests that this characterization is greatly informed
by whether the neighborhood council or association is officially sanctioned or “certified”
by the city; if not, the neighborhood associations are simply private organizations
comprised of neighborhood residents.692 Related questions include the degree of financial
support, whether they have final decision-making powers or a predominantly advisory
690
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role, and the extent to which the decisions of such bodies are respected.693 Chaskin and
Greenberg believe that neighbourhood associations, regardless of affiliation with
municipal governments, are central to local governance, through fostering collective
decision-making and encouraging civic engagement.694 While they are not part of formal
processes, they are embedded in governance mechanisms by leveraging relationships
with allies and partners, and negotiating on behalf of their membership.695 In Chicago,
they have been able to use this “interstitial” space to successfully shape policy and
allocate resources in the public realm, ultimately playing a more direct roles in
governance.696 Chaskin and Garg suggest viewing the neighbourhood association along a
spectrum, where they serve as parallel institutions providing an alternative form of
provision of public good; as separate but complementary institutions to local government,
offering goods and services beyond the scope of local government; as incorporated into
local government as formal methods of representation and action; or in opposition to
local government, meant to advocate for change.697
In Toronto, this “insider/outside” characterization has been influenced by amalgamation.
As noted earlier, the number of neighbourhood associations has increased steadily over
the years, with more than half of the city’s active neighbourhood associations having
been created since amalgamation. This means that neighbourhood associations are
asserting themselves in local governance to a greater degree than they did prior to
amalgamation. Like BIAs, some neighbourhood associations seem to have taken on
functions that would normally fall to the municipal government or to a BIA. Based on the
data collected for this dissertation, post-amalgamation neighbourhood associations are
more likely than those established prior to 1998 to assert a role in bringing the
community together, protecting the environment, disseminating information, and
addressing safety. For example, the Trefann Court Residents Association, established in
2008, sidewalk and pothole repair, addressing graffiti removal, and working directly with
693
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the police.698 The Swansea Area Ratepayer's Association offers public forums, ensuring
the Town Hall is managed according to neighbourhood needs, and collaborating with the
City of Toronto to ensure safe and well-designed pedestrian and cycle paths along the
lakeshore and Humber River.699
Neighbourhood associations exercise a range of authority and power in local areas. In
their famous study of neighbourhood associations in five American cities, Berry, Portney
and Thomson also observed that strong neighbourhood associations are chiefly focused
on mobilizing civic participation, through demand from residents, legitimacy from local
government.700 However, as Chaskin and Garg note, there is no clear system to determine
how neighbourhood associations will be incorporated into the overall governance
model.701 On one hand, they may be vehicles to enhance civic participation in local
government and planning decisions, thus promoting democracy. On the other, they may
help with service delivery or other tangible functions. Either way, “they are neither
politically nor administratively independent.”702
In summary, while BIAs are, as one councillor called them, bodies that “create their own
little tiny tax base and they tax and spend on themselves, and they all act in selfinterest,”703 neighbourhood associations are more likely to react to local politics and
determine their activities accordingly, rather than have stand-alone missions separate
from what the city does. In turn, “city administrators and elected officials respect the
neighbourhood associations … because of the authority they have within the structure of
government.”704 Together, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have dual roles: on the
one hand, they are created and reinforced by ward councillors, and privileged in their
participatory role in local decision-making in order to mitigate opposition within the
698
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ward. On the other hand, they are not representative of the diversity of residents. The
local governance model includes the formal and informal sanctioning of neighbourhood
associations and BIAs by elected officials and staff. The implications for local
governance are discussed in the next section.
III. Conclusion
This dissertation examines Toronto’s local boundaries and overlapping governance
bodies to query the meaning of local governance, balancing representation and fairness in
decision-making. Building on legal geography and legal pluralism, I assert that local legal
spaces comprise state law and other norms, orders, rules and practices. Although state
and non-state co-exist and, indeed can be thought of as mutually constitutive, the naming
of norms, orders, rules and practices outside of state law helps to identify the dynamics of
these interlegal spaces, including what state law has not included in its articulation of
local governance.
However, wards are not the only component of local governance. As Santos asserts, there
are a multiplicity of laws, institutions, and boundaries operating formally and
informally.705 This combination of laws creates literal and metaphorical boundaries,
manifesting in Ford’s conclusion that jurisdiction is left largely unquestioned. When
applied to Toronto, we see that the ward serves a central role. In interviews with staff
and councillors, the councillor was informally referred to as the “ward boss,” with wards
as the “fiefdom.” Beyond these characterizations, wards are the basis of representation in
Toronto, with COTA setting out that all decisions are to be made by “City Council,”
meaning (at present) the 44 councillors and mayor. Wards also serve as the chief
intermediary between residents and local government.
In Toronto, while wards serve a privileged role in the formal local governance model,
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations assert competing claims that
may reinforce or contradict the boundaries and representation of wards. Some wards and
705
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neighbourhood associations act as ongoing expressions of communities that predated
confederation, yet which reinforce the ghosts of previous towns and villages. Community
councils largely and symbolically reflect the pre-amalgamated municipalities. These
boundaries reflect multiple conceptions of local legal spaces in the Toronto context, each
created with their own independent objectives and claims to representation based on the
asserted boundaries, working like an accordion to reorient the scale of interest and
decision-making. They embody what Habermas observes as the ongoing negotiation
between and within groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or
“community.”706
Within this model, BIAs and neighbourhood associations have transformed since
amalgamation. From a legal perspective, there are significant differences between these
bodies. BIAs are “local boards” of municipal government, with delegated powers, city
assistance, and direct involvement of councillors. While neighbourhood associations are
informal bodies, they have transformed since amalgamation from largely focused on
planning to taking on other functions, including stepping into local government provision
of services. However, there are important similarities: both of these bodies have doubled
in number since amalgamation, are unevenly scattered across the city, and are generally
situated in the city’s most affluent areas. Their creation and involvement in local
governance is perpetuated by the city councillor.
Local legal spaces are thus comprised of geographic and participatory characteristics,
both of which assert norms of inclusion and exclusion. Boundary lines have
consequences.707 Participation in local governance is contingent on the legitimization of
the geographic boundary, either because a councillor has determined their interests in
considering a particular matter, or a BIA or neighbourhood association exists in a specific
part of the city. The boundaries of the local legal spaces are plural and overlapping.
In Toronto, local governance is dominated by the ward, with BIAs and neighbourhood
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associations asserting significant influence. This model calls into question the degree to
which Toronto’s local governance model is inclusive and participatory, as neighbourhood
associations and BIAs represent economically privileged residents,708 with
neighbourhood associations, in particular, dominated by homeowners who are white and
middle class, who do not reach out to other members of the communities.709 Like the
observations of Gerald Frug that neighbourhood-based governance can have significant
implications on inclusivity, including the creation of the “other,” the data collected in this
chapter shows that BIAs and neighbourhood associations perpetuate decision-making that
is disproportionately focused on the interests of certain residents to the exclusion of other
voices.710
Like Young and Valverde, this dissertation focuses on scale and, in particular, the
appropriate scale of local decision-making. This chapter concludes that community
councils were intended to and could be designed to play a pivotal role in local
governance, unsettling the power of the ward councillor and shifting the focus away from
BIAs and neighbourhood associations to a broader public, which other scholars have
suggested may be a positive contribution to the governance structures of amalgamated
city governments.711 Chapter 1 presented three rationales for the establishment of
delegated “local” bodies like community councils. First, as argued by Slack and Bird,
local institutions like community councils may allow pre-amalgamated communities to
maintain a sense of their earlier identities and to govern particular affairs independently.
This has also been referred to as “stewardship,” whereby a community has autonomy to
manage its own affairs and promote well-being while insulating itself from conflicting
city-wide decisions.712 Second, community councils may fulfill the democratic ideal of
representation that is closer to the community. Jane Jacobs passionately advocated the
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importance of neighbourhoods in the built form and in the decision-making of urban
areas.713 Her position was that local decision-making was more legitimately democratic
and connected to the interests and desires of those within neighbourhoods. A third
argument concerns the efficient operation of government committees through the use of
delegation. The suggestion is that community councils should have responsibility for
certain localized functions like minor planning, parking or zoning decisions in order to
give City Council the time and mandate to focus on issues that affect the city as a
whole.714
Chapters 4 and 5 offer case studies to apply the claims made here. A reimagination of
local governance within the context of the urban commons is explored in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4 – The Local Claims and Competing Forums of Toronto’s Casino
Decisions
This chapter provides an analysis of two related case studies: the 2012-13 casino
decision, which involved four potential options for casino placement in the City of
Toronto; and the 2015 casino decision, where the expansion of the Woodbine casino in
the northwest part of the city was considered.715
These case studies query how local spaces in the City of Toronto are created, imagined
and governed by law. In Chapter 3, I examined the governance of Toronto’s local legal
spaces, including how their overlap impacts inclusive participation. This dissertation now
turns to an application of the framework outlined in Chapter 1. The cases here and in the
following chapter were chosen on the basis of four criteria: first, that Toronto’s local
governance bodies, meaning wards (as represented by councillors), community councils,
BIAs and neighbourhood associations, did or could have played a role in decisionmaking. Second, the cases considered matters that were deemed under the City of
Toronto’s procedural bylaw to be city-wide issues. Third, the cases tested the geographic
boundaries of local, meaning that the spatial aspects were considered alongside
governance. Fourth, each of these cases concerned distributive justice, in that the citywide issues to the decided would have localized implications for residents.
This chapter makes two conclusions regarding the overlap of the four bodies that form
Toronto’s local governance model and how they govern the smaller-than-city areas of the
city. First, community councils were used as a forum for the consideration of “local”
issues in the city-wide debate, with “local” referring to the matters of concern to the
community where the casino would be located. In 2015, the matter proceeded through the
existing process for “city-wide” deliberations, namely through Executive Committee and
then City Council, with staff-led consultation, and the local councillor acting as the local
gatekeeper. In the 2012-13 decision, the Toronto-East York Community Council
715
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(“TEYCC”) was used as a forum for deliberation, whereby the local aspects of a citywide issue were directly considered by staff, formal procedures and greater opportunities
for civic engagement. The use of the community council in the 2012-13 casino debate
was a powerful tool to shift the debate of this city-wide issue to the local community.
Second, these case studies demonstrated that the city’s distinction between local versus
city-wide decisions, based exclusively on subject matter, does not necessarily correspond
to what communities deem to be of concern. Instead, the city-wide matters of casino
development, the job and the economy and tourism are also local matters.
I. The 2012-2013 casino decision
In 2012, the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG), a provincial corporation of
the Province of Ontario, announced that it would expand gaming sites in the province. At
the request of the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, city staff spent months
reviewing the pros and cons of having a casino in the City of Toronto, and the ideal
location for such a casino.716 This review, which ultimately comprised more than a dozen
staff reports and consideration by two committees and City Council, was articulated by
city staff as a city-wide issue, with a focus on the city’s operating budget, jobs and
tourism impacts. While city staff were conducting this official review, ward councillors
and other parties, including BIAs and neighbourhood associations, played a role.717 As
this section will show, these local entities negotiated their way into official processes including the use of city staff, resources and governance entities - forcing consideration
of the local effects of a casino.
Ultimately, City Council decided not to permit the creation of a casino in Toronto’s
downtown core. This case study examines the role that wards, community councils,
716
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neighbourhood associations and BIAs played in the process, and what this reveals about
the construction of the local and the meaningful, inclusive participation of people in local
governance in this city-wide debate.718

1. The legal context and history of gambling law in Toronto
The history of gambling legislation in Canada assists in appreciating events related to the
2012-13 casino debate. Until 1969, gambling was illegal across Canada under the
Criminal Code of Canada.719 Gambling provisions, found in Part V of the Criminal Code
(“Disorderly Houses, Gaming and Betting”), had origins in English Law, enacted in the
14th-century720 in response to monarchs fearing that their archers “could be lost to ‘idle’
games of dice.”721 This legislation found its way into Canada’s first Criminal Code in
1892 and prohibited the keeping common gaming houses, conducting lotteries, gambling
at public conveyances and cheating at play.722 These “piecemeal” provisions more or less
stayed the same until the striking of a joint committee of both houses of Parliament in
1952, which noted that existing laws suffered from a lack of clarity making enforcement
impossible, did not have the support of the public, and led to fraudulent activity that
authorities were unable or unwilling to control.723 The committee ultimately
recommended relaxing and clarifying criminal law provisions, but not without offering
the following proviso regarding its moral concerns with gambling activity:
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The Committee does not wish in any way to give countenance to or
encourage widespread organized gambling through lotteries or other means.
It recognizes that unrestrained gambling would produce grave moral, social
and economic effects in the community and it is of the opinion that the duty
of the state is to ensure that lotteries and other forms of gambling are kept
within limited bounds. This desirable result has not been achieved and, in
the Committee’s opinion, cannot be achieved within the framework of the
present law.724
In 1969 and 1985, considerable changes were made to gambling, in no small part related
to the Committee’s conclusions. While there remain federal prohibitions against gaming
and betting, section 207 of the Criminal Code carves out an important exception which
permits provinces to conduct activities broadly defined as “lottery schemes”:725
207. (1) Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this Part relating to gaming and
betting, it is lawful
(a) for the government of a province, either alone or in conjunction with the
government of another province, to conduct and manage a lottery scheme in that
province, or in that and the other province, in accordance with any law enacted by the
legislature of that province;
Since these changes to the Criminal Code were introduced, the Province of Ontario has
introduced sweeping reforms relating to gambling.726 As noted by scholars Colin
Campbell and Gary Smith: “Legal gambling in Canada now operates on a scale that was
unimagined thirty years ago.”727 From 1993 to 1997, the Province of Ontario provided
licenses to charities to run temporary casinos as fundraisers. As a result of technical
challenges associated with licensing, the Province then developed permanent charity
gaming clubs. In 1997, the Province announced that it would develop a certain number of
724
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permanent charity gaming clubs and introduce video lottery terminals, first at charity
gaming clubs and racetracks and then in bars and restaurants. However, under the
applicable legislation at the time, the host municipality was required to approve the
operation of a casino following public consultation.728 In response, the former City of
Toronto, along with each of the other former municipalities of Metro Toronto held a
referendum in tandem with the 1997 municipal election, where 67% of citizens in each of
the former municipalities voted against the establishment of permanent charity casinos.729
As such, there are currently no charity casinos or video lottery terminals in the City of
Toronto.
In Ontario, gambling activities are subject to a complex regulatory regime.730 The OLG
sits within this regulatory framework. The OLG is a Provincial Crown Corporation
reporting to the Minister of Finance. Since 2000, OLG has been responsible for the
province's lotteries, casinos, and slot facilities. OLG operates 24 gaming facilities within
the Province, which include 14 slot facilities at racetracks, five casinos offering both
table games and slot machines, one charity casino, four resort casinos, and dozens of
retail ticket games. It has authority under section 207 of the Criminal Code to conduct
and manage lottery schemes pursuant to its mandate under the Ontario Lottery and
Gaming Corporation Act, 1999 (“OLGCA”), including the establishment of a “gaming
site” in any municipality located in Ontario.731 The OLGCA regulation provides for a
number of preconditions to OLG authorization, including a municipal council resolution
supporting the establishment of a gaming site within the applicable municipal
boundaries.732 The municipality must also seek “public input into the establishment of the
728
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proposed gaming site and give the Corporation, in writing, a description of the steps it
took to do so and a summary of the public input it received.” Two factors help to
contextualize the presence of gambling sites and public consultation. First, legislation
now repealed previously required that a municipality hold a referendum to ensure public
approval of a casino within local government boundaries, as illustrated in the following
section. Second, the OLG itself is not obligated to seek public opinion or demonstrate to
any government entity the process it undertook on casino-related decisions.
Leading up to the 2012-13 casino debate, there were three kinds of venues available for
gambling in the City of Toronto: a racetrack and slot machines at the Woodbine
Racetrack,733 a temporary casino held each summer at the two-week Canadian National
Exhibition (CNE), and charity gaming venues licensed by OLG, such as bingo halls.
2. Genesis of the debate
In July 2010, the Government of Ontario directed OLG to raise its revenue in the areas of
commercial and charitable gaming. On February 1, 2012, the Province of Ontario
announced that it would be closing Ontario Place, a 96-acre public and family friendly
space located in the City of Toronto’s waterfront, a destination for mainly Greater
Toronto Area (GTA) residents since 1971. The City of Toronto’s Executive Committee
speculated at this time that Ontario Place would ultimately be used as a casino.734 Even
without formal notice from OLG or the province, the City Manager was asked to report
back on the pros and cons of hosting a commercial casino in Toronto.735
In March 2012, OLG delivered a report to the Minister of Finance following a Strategic
Business Review of its operations, which outlined a plan to “modernize” lottery and
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gaming in Ontario.736 OLG identified 29 zones across Ontario for locating gaming
facilities, of which 24 already housed an existing slot or casino gaming facility. OLG’s
intention was to issue a request for proposal for a private sector provider to develop or
operate a casino in each zone. OLG would regulate the types and number of games
offered, betting limits, and responsible gambling policies. Two gaming zones were
proposed within the City of Toronto’s boundaries.737 Illustration 4.1 shows the OLG’s
preferred zones for a new casino, called “C1.”

Illustration 4.1: Map of Preferred OLG Casino Zones738
Before the development of any new gaming sites, OLG required under provincial
legislation the explicit consent of a municipality, which in Toronto is the passing of a
resolution by City Council.739 The City of Toronto’s procedural bylaw considered this to
736

City Manager, Staff Report: New Casino & Convention Development in Toronto, City of Toronto (5
April 2013), online: <http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57336.pdf>.
737
Ibid. at 27.
738
Ibid. at 27.
739
Ibid. at 3.

177

be an issue of city-wide consequence, meaning that it affected the city as a whole, not a
single community council area.740 As such, City Council approval was necessary to
expand or construct gaming sites within the city’s boundaries.741

3. Distinction between a “city-wide” and “local” process
The 2012-13 casino debate took place over a single year and included three overlapping
events and actors: the formal process as set out by City Council; the steps taken by the
ward councillors and the Toronto and East York Community Council (TEYCC); and the
role played by BIAs, neighbourhood associations, and other groups.742 Key decisions
were also made at the provincial level, which impacted OLG’s negotiations with the City
of Toronto over the 12-month period.743
The City of Toronto’s Executive Committee is made up of the Mayor and hand-picked
members from amongst the city’s 44 councillors. The Executive Committee is required
under COTA.744 The City’s procedural bylaw sets out the terms of reference for the
Executive Committee.745 Its mandate is to “monitor and make recommendations on the
priorities, plans, international and intergovernmental relations, and the financial integrity
of the City” including “Council's strategic policy and priorities in setting the agenda.”746
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Figure 4.1: Organizational Structure of the City of Toronto747
The City’s organizational structure, shown in Figure 4.1, was introduced following the
2005 governance review was outlined in Chapter 3. The governance structure was
intended to reduce the number of days that councillors say in City Council meetings
through enhanced delegation to committees. The new governance model introduced an
Executive Committee; seven city-wide standing committees;748 six special committees,
which are sub-committees of the Executive Committee;749 and four community
councils.750 These bodies are set out and described in the Procedural Bylaw,751 which
comprehensively sets out the rules for all Council and committee meetings and the
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Council Committees.752 The provisions in the procedural bylaw are very detailed. They
prescribe exactly how the meetings should be conducted, which committees there should
be, and what may be delegated to community councils.753 City Council also delegated
limited powers to the City’s four community councils, highlighted in yellow in Figure
4.1, as outlined in Chapter 3.
The City Manager is the city’s most senior staff member, appointed by City Council.
COTA states that the City Manager (referred to as a “chief administrative officer” in the
Act) is responsible for: “exercising general control and management of the affairs of the
City for the purpose of ensuring the efficient and effective operation of the City; and
performing such other duties as are assigned by the City.”754 The City Manager provides
advice and information to the Executive Committee.755
The changes in the city’s governance structure were in part a shift to make City Council
more efficient, but another aim was to include in the model possibilities to look at the
city-wide perspective, too. Amalgamation ultimately eroded the two-tier perspective, but
integrating what was formally a metropolitan level with the municipal level. As a former
senior staff member told that, in general, “there is something to be said for just
coordinating better and putting in place mechanisms that make sure you were to cross
boundaries that were kind of arbitrary to serve the people as a whole.”756 But the thing
that is lost is that “the two-tier did give you the ability for different people to look at
things differently. Either from a sort of citywide, or region-wide perspective and a local
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perspective.”757 The Executive Committee was meant to be a “kind of proxy for two-tier
in a kind of way.”758
In the process outlined by the City of Toronto’s Executive Committee, staff was asked to
examine the “city-wide” effects of a casino, rather than the effects within the immediate
area in which a potential casino would be located.759 In a report submitted to the
Executive Committee and City Council summarizing the effects on communities and
neighbourhoods, city staff did not report on the effects on neighbourhoods adjacent to
one of the proposed casino sites: “To date, the City has not formally received a specific
proposal for the establishment of a standalone casino gaming facility and/or integrated
entertainment complex in Toronto. As such, City staff cannot provide a full analysis of
the social impacts and opportunities a new casino gaming facility may have on the
neighbourhood(s) adjacent to such a facility at this time.”760
On May 14, 2012, the Executive Committee considered two other member motions
referred by City Council related to casinos, in addition to the Ontario Place Motion that
was introduced the previous month. The Executive Committee referred both items to the
City Manager requesting that he consult with the OLG on the process for the selection of
future casino locations in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA). The City Manager was also
asked to report back to Executive Committee at its October 9, 2012 meeting on the pros
and cons of hosting a commercial casino in Toronto, “including projected job creation,
revenue to the City, tourist attraction, and social impact”761 and the effects of casinos on
neighbourhoods.762
On November 5, 2012, the City Manager reported back to the Executive Committee with
757
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a preliminary report, “Considering a New Casino in Toronto,” and was directed to
conduct a public consultation, provide further analysis, and report back with
recommendations in Spring 2013. The Committee authorized the City Manager to
conduct public consultations based on the staff report and technical report prepared by
consultants. The direction was also given to report on a temporary casino, establishing a
“social contract” (undefined in the motion) and developing recommendations on
preferred locations, size, and type of facility and potential revenues from a hosting
arrangement. No additional directions were provided on the effects of a potential casino
on neighbourhoods.
The City of Toronto identified three “study areas” as potential sites for a downtown
casino, as well as analysis of the effects of an expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack.763
As documented in its final report, the City undertook a “detailed review” of the study
areas to provide advice on possible locations that “may or may not be appropriate for a
new casino” and to give advice to City Council on the conditions it may wish to impose if
Council proceeded with a casino in the C1 zone, which were OLG’s preferred areas for a
casino development.764 The City identified the “opportunities and challenges” of a casino
in this area based on five themes: the existing planning framework, urban fabric, place
making/public realm, transportation, and infrastructure.
The three areas chosen for closer study were the Ports Lands, Exhibition Place, and the
downtown core. The proposed downtown locations were all within the boundaries of the
TEYCC, which has representatives from 12 wards. The Port Lands were ultimately
rejected as a suitable area for a casino, thus leaving Exhibition Place and the downtown
core, which lie within Wards 19 and 20.765 Councillor Mike Layton was the Ward 19
councillor and then-Councillor Adam Vaughan represented Ward 20.
From a planning perspective, planning staff noted that “casino uses have significant city
building implications which have to be understood both at a citywide level and an area
763
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specific basis” (emphasis added).766 Normally, city planners are given “a detailed
proposal for a specific site accompanied by development applications submitted under
the Planning Act with supporting documentation,” which is then assessed.767 This
information helps staff in making recommendations to City Council on “the
appropriateness of a proposal (proposed uses, scale, form, density, etc.) for a specific
site.” Here, the casino was to be located within the zones identified in Illustration 4.2,
with uncertain, unpolished details regarding the precise location and square footage,
interfering with staff’s ability to assess the local implications of the casino, on top of the
“complicated” and “significant” city-wide “economic, financial and social considerations
around casino uses.”768

Illustration 4.2: Map of Toronto’s Study of Casino Locations 769
Within the city’s decision-making process, individual ward councillors and community
councils did not have a formal role to play in the casino deliberations. The councillors
766
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were meant to fulfill their role as local representatives on City Council. The casino was
seen as a “city-wide” issue given the magnitude of the financial consideration and
because it involved more than one community council area.
The consultation process, mandated by the Executive Committee and overseen by the
City Manager’s Office, was one of the ways that the local impacts were assessed.
Throughout the month of January 2013, City of Toronto staff and consultants oversaw
five public consultations throughout the city.770 Consultants also conducted a poll and
stakeholder interviews to understand whether the public supported the introduction of a
casino.771 The format of the public consultations changed throughout the process. The
initial open house took place in the City Hall Rotunda on January 9, 2013, with a series
of information boards setting out the decision process; revenue, financial and economic
development information; social and health considerations; and planning and site area
information. City staff was available to answer questions. A feedback form and two
online terminals were available for participants to provide their input. Hundreds of people
showed up for the consultation, demanding more than information. Councillor Gord
Perks, who represented a ward in the Toronto-East York Community Council area, stood
on a chair and invited participants to an upstairs committee room to “have an actual
conversation.”772
Following the first meeting, the format for the remaining Community Open House events
held between January 12 and 19, 2013 was changed to include presentations by City staff,
more formal facilitated discussion groups and the opportunity to make statements during
an open microphone session.773 I spoke to a former city staff member about the civic
engagement process during the 2012-13 casino debate. For this former staff member, the
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casino debate was “one of the most difficult kinds of topics and situations.”774 The staff
member noted, “In the end, you know, we had a legislative requirement to do civic
engagement, and so we had to have some kind of process. We didn’t want to have it seen
to be just ticking a box, so we wanted to do it properly, as much as we could, given the
topic. And the first one went badly, but the rest went reasonably smoothly.”775
The prevailing position of members of the Toronto public who attended the Community
Open House Discussions or completed a Feedback Form was opposition to a new casino
in Toronto. Among the 17,780 completed Feedback Forms, 66.3% indicated they were
“strongly opposed” to a casino in Toronto and another 5% “somewhat opposed.” Those
“strongly in favour” or “somewhat in favour” of a casino represented 21.2% and 4.5%
respectively. Another 3.1% indicated they were neutral or had mixed feelings.776 As the
staff member interviews above noted, it was uncertain whether any of these public
participation efforts “really had an impact on where it was going to go anyway.”777
The councillors in the Toronto-East York Community Council area thought that the
consultation process was inadequate for consideration of the local impacts.778 They
advocated for a more formalized local consideration of the issue. The councillors used the
authority of Toronto Municipal Code’s Chapter 27 to argue that, “community councils
are entitled to hear from the public about local needs and neighborhood issues.”779 As
noted in Chapter 3, all four of Toronto’s community councils have the authority to strike
subcommittees under §27-131 of the Toronto Municipal Code. The TEYCC could,
therefore, convene community meetings to “inform” (rather than consult) the public of
the casino issue. Under Chapter 27, TEYCC could only make recommendations to

774

Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted.
775
Ibid.
776
DPRA, City of Toronto Casino Consultation Report (22 February 2013), online: City of Toronto
http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/ex/bgrd/backgroundfile-57343.pdf.
777
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted.
778
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 July 2016) –
author conducted.
779
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted.

185

Council on “local” official plan and zoning by-law amendments, or planning applications
that “are not of city-wide interest,” neither of which applied in this case. Nor could
TEYCC make recommendations at the committee level, as there was no planning report
and no involvement for the committee.780
On November 6, 2012, the TEYCC established the subcommittee to “undertake public
consultation with BIAs and local business representatives in the casino zones identified
by OLG in the Toronto and East York District regarding the impact of a casino on
parking and other business infrastructure in the Toronto and East York District, with a
request that the subcommittee report on the outcome of such consultation to the January
22, 2013 meeting of the Toronto and East York Community Council.”781 The TEYCC
could not use its authority under Appendix B-IV (5) to make recommendations on policy
and research about local matters. In the case of the casino, the City Manager had
identified that the decision was one of City-wide interest.782 As such, there was no
capacity for the TEYCC to assume authority under that provision. However, under §§27131(A) and (D), community councils may create subcommittees that report directly to
Council on public hearings or public presentations. The subcommittee must have terms of
reference in accordance with § 27-130B, including details as to why an existing
committee or public advisory body cannot do the work; and a Clerk's impact statement
identifying the staff and other resources the committee or public advisory body needs for
support and a statement that such resources are available.783 No information could be
located on the terms of reference of the subcommittee or the details of the Clerk’s impact
statement beyond what was in the motion, illustrating perhaps that this was a novel use of
the TEYCC.
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The use of TEYCC to deliberate on the local effects of a downtown casino impacted how
the meanings of “local” and “city-wide” were constructed by different city actors. To
some, the TEYCC legitimized the city’s decision-making process. A senior staff member
explained the striking of the subcommittee as a means to “create a legitimate … political
entity that would become a place of energy for the counter argument, the anti-casino
voice.” To others, it was used as a forum for an oppositional process. As another staff
member said, the Subcommitte became a “theatre.”784 Either way, the role of
neighborhood associations and BIAs was to ensure that “traditional voices are a part of
the process” and were part of a genuine, but strategic effort to hear from everybody, even
those who might be strongly in favour of casino. The strategic element was to loop them
in, as “they would be delegitimized if they didn’t come across as wanting to hear from
everybody.”785
I interviewed one of the City of Toronto staff members who helped to design the
community council model. The staff argued that the community council as a “segregated
out a body, a committee which is geographically ward based,” needs to have a clear
function, “otherwise what is the point?”786 In this staff member’s view, the evolution of
the community council from a body primarily focused on planning issues to one that
considered the neighbourhood effects of city decisions, like the 2012-13 casino decision,
indicates that the community council mandate “stood the test of time.”787
There was a disconnect between the view of councillors in the TEYCC area and city staff
working on the city-wide issue. To one of the main city staff members working on the
matter, “we were really honest about trying our best… [I]t’s one of the most difficult
kinds of topics.”788 However, to one of the local councillors involved in the decision to
establish the subcommittee, the impetus for the TEYCC’s involvement was the lack of
784
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staff reports available on the local effects of the casino, which needed to be requested by
elected officials:
[W]e didn’t feel like we were getting enough of an opportunity to evaluate what the
impacts were on a local level of a citywide decision. The decision was very
specific, about two neighborhoods, but, with respect to the Toronto East York
Community Council district, there was no member of the Community Council on
executive where the item was being debated. And we wanted to get … down into
what planning implications, what traffic implications, what social development
impacts would have on it, would a casino have on a neighbourhood.789
One of the local councillors involved in the issue describes the goals of the subcommittee
as “specific to the planning and transportation impact, which are squarely within the
purview of Toronto East York Community Council.” The main benefit of the
subcommittee approach was that and it “allowed us to question staff in far greater detail
and to scrutinize the assumptions that were being made by various actors and players.”
Another councillor put it this way, “What we did have is the ability to create a forum for
the casino exploration and use that forum to get the information we need, under sort of
requirement to get staff in front of us and push them on things like parking requirements
and cost of parking spaces, and vehicle studies and do all the stuff from the areas where
community council had jurisdiction to deal with is as a land use issue.”790
The TEYCC was thus able to leverage the subcommittee to engage with BIAs and
resident associations, request staff reports on the impacts of a casino, and make
recommendations directly to City Council. Numerous reports were requested from or
submitted to the Subcommittee, all with a focus on planning, local transportation, local
economic development, and health, as summarized in Table 4.1.
TEYCC
City unit
Subcommittee authoring the
Meeting date report

Issues considered
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October 10,
2012

City Planning791

•

Transportation792 •
•

November 6,
2012
February 26,
2013

Zoning regulations governing casinos, actions to
prohibit casinos under the zoning by-laws,
parking standards, parking capacity within the
Front Street and John Street precinct
Traffic operation issues arising from large
casino/resorts in downtown locations in similarsized cities
Traffic conditions, capacity constraints and
other operational issues on the highways and
arterial roads in the vicinity of the
Exhibition/Ontario Place grounds
Land uses, transportation, and the Port Lands

City Planning793

•

City Planning794

• Existing, approved and anticipated population
densities and growth within 10 km of each of
the proposed casino sites within the TEY
district
• Transportation and parking issues, character of
the local neighbourhood, economic impacts on
local businesses, local property assessment
impacts and local safety and security impacts in
the TEY district
• The use of the Exhibition Place lands for parks
and industrial purposes
• Legal or other mechanisms for securing any
conditions requested by the City

City Solicitor795
City Manager
and City
Solicitor796
Economic

• Economic and employment losses as a result of
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Development &
Culture797
Medical Officer
of Health798

the elimination of the exhibition place grounds
as a public event space
Provided two reports to the Board of Health and
then to the TEYCC, Executive Committee and City
Council on the health impacts of gambling,
focusing on social and community impacts.799

Table 4.1: Reports requested by the TEYCC Subcommittee related to the 2012-13
Casino Debate
When asked how the Subcommittee was distinct from practices aimed at gathering public
input, one of the local councillors described the forum as, “a more formal place to
provide feedback and I think that’s where it helped with collecting information, but not
giving out information.” In public consultations, by contrast, “nothing that you say is
really on the record, you submit your comments on a little form, you stuff them in a box
and there you go.” The councillor cited this as relevant in the 2012-13 case, as “the first
set of public consultations [were] disappointing. [They were] held in City Hall, so not in
the communities that would have been impacted. It was ‘here’s the pretty picture of what
can happen, here’s the economic benefit’ [yet in fact] says nothing about the economic
impact, [just] everything that the casino operators are promising.”800
This novel use of the procedural bylaw to create the TEYCC subcommittee was perhaps
anticipated. As affirmed by a senior city staff member, this provision of the Municipal
797
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<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2013/te/bgrd/backgroundfile-56371.pdf>.
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Board of Health, The Health Impacts of Gambling Expansion in Toronto (7 November 2012), online:
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of Health, Community Health Impacts of a Casino in Toronto (28 January 2013), online: City of Toronto
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2013.HL19.4>. Note that The Medical
Officer of Health does not have explicit authority to assess the health effects of planning decisions such as
casinos. The involvement of the Medical Officer of Health in matters that tangentially relate to the health of
Toronto residents is not new: previously, he has contributed to debates with arm’s length relevance to the
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Note that the Board of Health endorsed the Medical Officer of Health’s proposed Dr. McKeown’s
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Code was included in 2006, when the city’s committee system was restructured.801 As
this staff person conceded: “We put a backdoor in that might support community councils
developing more of that local council role. … We needed to have something in there that
would support that, because the rest of the description of community councils is really a
laundry list.”802
Thus, the TEYCC was able to use the creation of the Subcommittee to engage squarely in
local decision-making in the 2012-13 casino debate, using a little-known provision in the
Toronto Municipal Code setting out community council authorities. A councillor
described it as “a tool of extraordinary importance,” stating that the Subcommittee “gave
us … space to think out loud” in contrast to City Council, which had become “a decisionmaking body and not a debating and research body.”803 This was the first time the
community council had been used for this purpose. Ultimately, the subcommittee was
able to speak the language of local on a city-wide matter by considering specific matters
of relevance to the TEYCC boundaries.

4. BIAs, neighbourhood associations and other iterations of “local”
The casino opposition was described in the Globe and Mail as follows: “Apart from the
mayor, a union or two and the developers and casino operators who stood to benefit, the
casino lacked powerful champions. Its opponents, by contrast, were articulate and wellorganized.”804 The main community group involved in the 2012-13 was “No Casino
Toronto,” a grassroots group started in the spring of 2012 by three women in Etobicoke,
one of Toronto’s suburbs.805 Maureen Lynett, Peggy Calvert, and Sheila Lynett headed
No Casino Toronto. Maureen Lynett objected in particular to Ontario Finance Minister
801
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Dwight Duncan’s vision of a casino-anchored “golden mile on Toronto’s waterfront,
stating: “Dwight Duncan’s idea of a jewel, a golden mile, to me was a nightmare,” that
would ruin the waterfront, harm neighbourhoods and send a terrible international
message about what Toronto considers “iconic.”806 It is interesting to note that No Casino
Toronto was not in any way connected with BIAs or neighbourhood associations in the
TEYCC area; instead, they comprised elite and well-connected people and organizations
outside of these organizations.807 However, the involvement of No Casino Toronto was
facilitated and enabled by the local councillors involved in the issue.808 This is consistent
with the findings reached in Chapter 3, that councillors are the chief facilitators and
enablers of BIAs and neighbourhood associations in local matters.
Of key significance was the close working relationship between No Casino Toronto and
councillors in the Toronto-East York district. The trio approached downtown councillors
very early in the debate for advice, even before the OLG announced its expansion plan.809
They were described as “relentless” at contacting the local councillor and mobilizing
support against a casino anywhere along the waterfront.810 Their intention in reaching out
to councillors was to understand the process for decision-making at City Hall and to
coordinate their efforts outside of the formal institutions.811
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No Casino Toronto was effective at bringing together multiple voices, including other
activists812 and high-profile members from the arts, business and academia like Ken
Greenburg, Jack Diamond and Richard Florida who gathered weekly to discuss strategy
in an unnamed downtown office. This suggests that No Casino Toronto, rather than
acting as a “grassroots” organization as characterized in the news, was instead a highly
mobilized, elite organization.813 They collaborated with the Martin Institute, a think-tank
affiliated with the University of Toronto, who opposed the casino on business and
economic grounds.814 No Casino Toronto had a steering committee who met regularly to
discuss their strategy and included an emphasis on messaging and social media.815 They
also used a range of canvassing and media techniques, including Facebook,816 building a
website, attending meetings and debates, contacting other organizations, handing out
buttons, creating an online petition, actively using a twitter account to report the news
and to live-tweet key City of Toronto meetings), and helped distribute lawn signs.817
They used innovative approaches like setting out exactly how residents could sign up to
depute at Executive Committee and what individuals could say818 and distributing a
youtube video explicitly for sharing on social media.819 The result was over 250
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deputants at Executive Committee, and 20 out of 22 petitions at the final City Council
meeting where the casino issue was heard.820
Religious leaders also played an important role, with 268 faith leaders signing a petition
on April 5, 2013 that they could not support a casino.821 This group did not appear to
have a direct relationship with No Casino Toronto.822 According to one councillor,
getting the faith community on board was a strategic decision: “We knew that to win the
casino fight, we had to win the vote of council. We knew that we had to get to those
communities somehow, we were not going to get to them through neighborhood
associations very easily, so we went through different organizations. … one of the critical
ones is getting to the Baptist churches.”823 John Sewell, former mayor of Toronto, found
few civic leaders who would speak publicly in favour of a casino. He wrote: “[F]ew
community leaders favour a large casino in downtown Toronto. As one can see from the
ads placed in the daily papers by No Casino Toronto, virtually everyone who cares about
the city and participates in its public life is opposed. They come from every sector. When
faith leaders made their public announcement of opposition, they proved a lively crew in
their different religious outfits and said this was one of the first times they had spoken out
as a group.”824
In contrast to these other key advocates, BIAs and neighbourhood associations played a
less obvious role in the debate. As noted earlier, the TEYCC established the
subcommittee to “undertake public consultation with BIAs and local business
representatives in the casino zones identified by OLG. The motive behind the explicit
naming of BIAs over other local interests was unclear. A former staff member ruminated
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that, “I guess they were getting lots of pressure from [BIAs]… This was … about the
Metro Convention Centre site mostly, right? That whole area and the Entertainment
district… [S]o I guess that’s why … because there would have been an impact on
them.”825
One of the councillors who initiated the subcommittee thought that it might have had to
do with the impacts on local businesses in favour of “large multinationals” who were
concerned that “a lot of money would be coming out of that very local community and
what impact that would have on local businesses.”826 When asked why other parties
weren’t named specifically as bodies to consult, the councillor said, “I can’t remember
why, but it may have been that at that point in time was the most pressing, seemed the
most pressing of issues. And because of how quickly [the debate] was going, we didn’t
really sit down amongst the colleagues to say let’s draft out this long list, laundry list of
groups to consult. It was, who’s missing at the table?”827
Although BIAs and NAs didn’t lead the charge in the casino opposition, they contributed
to the debate, mainly via the city’s formal committee process. Toronto’s BIAs and NAs
were among the hundreds of submissions and deputations to the Executive Committee in
April 2013.828 Some of their concerns centred on neighbourhoods, like the impact on
traffic and local planning. For example, the York Quay Neighbourhood Association was
very active, submitting letters,829 deputing at meetings830 and appearing in media
including Metro Morning.831 They state that they are a, “RESIDENTIAL community
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organization,” representing a population “expected to top 120,000 by 2015.”832 The York
Quay Neighbourhood Association emphasized that “a mega-casino anywhere downtown
that increases congestion and threatens the city’s economic and social fabric,” and had
issues with the consultation process adopted by city staff. The Wellington Place
Neighbourhood Association stated, “WPNA represents the area bounded by King,
Spadina, Front and Bathurst Streets and is most concerned with the negative economic
and urban planning effects that this proposal presents... In the case of downtown Toronto,
the King-Spadina area is already overwhelmed by the impact of nightclubs on the
residential community.”833
However, many did not expressly reference local concerns, instead emphasizing the citywide effects of a casino. For example, the Federation of North Toronto Residents
Association (FoNTRA), an important umbrella organization of resident associations in
northern Toronto, stated: “casinos do not contribute positively to city-building and their
social impact affects the quality of place. By their nature, casinos are inward-facing,
aiming to keep the client contently in one place, depleting the life of the street, and giving
little or nothing back to the public realm.”834 FoNTRA’s rejection of the downtown
casino was considered to be a very important catalyst in mobilizing North York
councillors to the “no” side.835
While the “no” side was engaged in a fulsome campaign and bringing together BIAs,
NAs and other parties, pro casino advocates did not appear to have such a unified voice
outside of City Hall, nor did they have BIAs and NAs on side. Early in the debate,
lobbyists formed a critical part of the “yes” side campaign. Even before the decision was
made by the Executive Committee to study the issue, lobbyists began approaching city
councillors to garner their support for a casino in the city’s downtown or waterfront
areas. These practices resulted in a review by the Lobbyist Registrar, who found that
832
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MGM had breached the Lobbying By-law836 by failing to register in the Lobbyist
Registry before lobbying public office holders at the City. The “yes” side also had a
public campaign, which began on April 26, 2013, less than a month before the crucial
City Council vote.837 Other proponents included downtown restaurant owners, real estate
developers, and brokerage companies, and all focused on the development of jobs and
revenue opportunities for the city.838 They did not have BIAs or NAs on side.
5. The Final Report and Executive Committee’s Decision
The City Manager’s final report was first delivered to a special meeting of the Executive
Committee held on April 15-16, 2013, with options on how City Council could
proceed.839 The meeting included hundreds of deputations and submissions, including
from BIAs and NAs. City staff reviewed the issue of a new downtown casino and
expanded gaming at the Woodbine site by evaluating key economic, city building, social,
health, and fiscal criteria. The 84-page report (not including attachments) provided a
detailed analysis of specific study areas in the Port Lands, Exhibition Place, downtown
core, and Woodbine. In the report, the City Manager provided two options: first, not grant
approval for a casino. And, second, that City Council grant approval for the City
Manager to continue discussions with OLG, with a recommendation that City Council
select a mixed-use site in the downtown core for a casino, rather than selecting a site in
the Port Lands, Exhibition Place and Woodbine.840 Although then-Mayor Rob Ford’s
Executive Committee struggled to approve a casino without assurances that the hosting
fee, the annual amount to be paid to the City of Toronto by OLG in return for having a
casino without its boundaries, would be at least $100 million, which city staff were
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unable to secure from OLG,841 the Executive Committee voted overwhelmingly in favour
of a downtown casino, conditional on 47 requirements including a minimum annual
hosting fee of $100 million.842 The hosting fee was consistent with the Executive
Committee’s construction of the casino as a city-wide issue, one meant to address the
city’s operating revenue.
The casino issue was scheduled for a City Council deliberation on May 21, 2013.
However, in between the Executive Committee and Council meetings, a significant
change in OLG’s position took place in respect of hosting fees.843 At the initial stages of
the negotiation between the City of Toronto and OLG, it was suggested that the City
would obtain a special hosting fee of between $50-million to $100-million, as estimated
by OLCG, “in recognition of the size and scale and job opportunities promised by casino
operators fighting for the opportunity to build casino-anchored complexes worth $2
billion to $3 billion.” The City of Toronto-commissioned report forecasted annual hosting
fees of up to $168 million in addition to property taxes.844 However, following her win of
the Liberal leadership race, Premier Kathleen Wynne advised Ontario’s gambling agency
that it would not give the city any extra fees for hosting a downtown casino. The Globe
and Mail reported that Premier Wynne was “no fan of the proposal to build a downtown
Toronto casino” and that she had “raised concerns about several key OLG decisions and
ordered the Crown agency to nix plans to cut Toronto a special financial deal, if city
councillors voted for a casino.”845 OLG Chief Executive Officer Paul Godfrey was fired
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by Premier Wynne on May 16, 2013.846
Mayor Ford delayed and then cancelled the special City Council meeting scheduled for
May 21, 2013, declaring the proposals to build a casino in downtown Toronto “dead”
unless OLG could guarantee $100 million annually in hosting fees.847 Councillor Mike
Layton, one of the councillors within the TEYCC area, pursued a petition to hold the
meeting on May 21, 2013, gathering 24 signatures pursuant to Section 27-30 of the
Council Procedures, driving throughout the city over the weekend and reaching the
Clerk’s Office as the bells at Old City Hall rang in order to obtain the signatures in
time.848 At the meeting, City Council rejected the option to have a casino in the
downtown core by an overwhelming majority.849
In summary, the 2012-13 casino decision reflected what Santos observed as the tension
between rational bureaucracy and messier forms of political action. He notes that the
relationship between representative and participatory democracy often forget that these
two concepts must work together and that participatory democracy in complex political
environments always presupposes opportunities for delegation and representation.
Indeed, the model for this public engagement and involvement should be complex and
sophisticated to reflect the importance of an overlapping, multifaceted, multiplayer
decision-making at the municipal level. Here, the “rational” system of decision-making,
meaning the city-wide characterization of the casino decision and the Executive
Committee forum, misrepresented the messy local reality of the issue, which was
846
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interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation. In the end, the
councillors in the TEYCC were able to mobilize the casino opposition with a city
committee that could serve as a legitimized forum to receive information on the local
effects of the issue.
However, amidst this final decision to disallow a casino in the city’s downtown core,
another matter was being considered, too. As part of this motion, City Council also
rejected the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack to a casino. In addition to prohibiting a
new casino in the downtown core, the Port Lands or Exhibition Place in 2013, City
Council also opposed the expansion of existing gaming sites in the C2 Zone, where the
Woodbine casino was located.850 This meant that an expansion of the Woodbine
Racetrack was not permitted. However, while City Council narrowly voted against a
Woodbine expansion, all 11 councillors in the Etobicoke York Community Council area
voted against the motion disallowing a Woodbine gaming expansion to create a casino, as
noted in the chart below.851 During the 2012 debate, Councillor Crisanti noted the
importance of considering the local voice in any casino deliberations.852 As can be seen
in Table 4.2, where green marks support of a casino and red marks opposition, the
councillors within the Woodbine area were unequivocal in their desire to expand
Woodbine to create a casino, even though they opposed the creation of a new casino in
downtown Toronto. The reorientation of the 2012-13 casino debate as a local issue by the
councillors in the TEYCC area did not negate the desire of councillors in the EtobicokeYork area of the city to frame a Woodbine expansion as a local issue, too. Thus,
councillor support for a casino was contingent on the local area of the city, not a
principled decision about casinos.
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2013 Council motion to

2013 Council motion to

expand Woodbine853

create new casino854

Ward 1 (Vincent

In favour of Woodbine

Crisanti)

expansion

Ward 2 (Doug Ford)

In favour of Woodbine

In favour of downtown casino
Against downtown casino

expansion
Ward 3 (Doug Holyday)

In favour of Woodbine

Against downtown casino

expansion
Ward 4 (Gloria Lindsay

In favour of Woodbine

Luby)

expansion

Ward 5 (Peter Milczyn)

In favour of Woodbine

Against downtown casino
Against downtown casino

expansion
Ward 6 (Mark Grimes)

In favour of Woodbine

Against downtown casino

expansion
Ward 7 (Giorgio

In favour of Woodbine

Mammoliti)

expansion

Ward 11 (Frances

In favour of Woodbine

Nunziata)

expansion

Ward 12 (Frank Di

In favour of Woodbine

Giorgio)

expansion

Ward 13 (Sarah

In favour of Woodbine

Doucette)

expansion

Ward 17 (Cesar Palacio)

In favour of Woodbine

In favour of downtown casino
Against downtown casino
Against downtown casino
Against downtown casino
Against downtown casino

expansion
Table 4.2: Etobicoke councillor votes in 2012-13 casino decision
The decision to reject the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack would come to City
Council a short time later, as we will see in the next section.
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II.

The 2015 Casino decision

The 2015 casino decision concerned only one site in the City - the Woodbine Racetrack,
located in Rexdale, one of the City’s most economically vulnerable areas.855 More than
half of Rexdale residents are first-generation Canadians.856 About a quarter of families
are poor and nearly 40 percent of working adults have low-wage, part-time jobs without
benefits or security. High school dropout rates are 50%, double the Toronto average.857
At the time that the decision was made, the Woodbine Racetrack was responsible for the
employment of more than 7,500 people in Toronto, with approximately 5,000 of jobs
located in Rexdale. The Woodbine Racetrack stated that this represented 10% of the
workforce in a community that had seen a 26% decline in jobs over the last 10 years.858
During the 2015 debate, community advocates located in Rexdale suggested that the
community should have the final say on an issue that has many pros and cons.859
However, in the end, community advocates played a limited role and the decision-making
process proceeded through the Executive Committee to City Council without the
involvement of the Etobicoke York Community Council (EYCC) as a forum for
consideration of local effects. All of the adjacent councillors and the polling data
affirming support for an expanded casino. BIAs and neighbourhood associations were
absent from decision-making, as few such bodies exist in the Etobicoke-York
Community Council area and none in Rexdale. However, in contrast to the 2012-13
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casino decision where the focus of advocacy organizations, BIAs and neighbourhood
associations was on traffic, local planning and the impact of addiction on nearby
residents, the local considerations in the 2015 debate were jobs and the economy,
typically framed as city-wide considerations.
This section provides an overview of process and the roles of the ward, community
councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. It concludes that “local” in the 2015
casino debate concerned a singular issue – jobs– with a lack of tension between this issue
and the city-wide agenda. While the City’s consultation processes did not reveal
overwhelmingly different results in 2015 than during the 2012-13 casino debate, the data
was used to reinforce the ward councillor perspectives, without more nuanced
intervention of other participants in the decision-making process.
1. Resurgence of the debate
The municipal election was held on October 25, 2014, a little over one year after the
2012-13 casino decision. The election brought in a few changes. First, Mayor John Tory
replaced Mayor Rob Ford, promising a more economically stable, professional and
transparent government.860 Second, Rob Ford replaced his brother, Doug Ford, as
councillor for Ward 2. Third, three new councillors were elected: John Campbell replaced
Gloria Lindsay Luby, who had decided not to run again; and both Doug Holyday and
Peter Milcyn ran for provincial office, resulting in new councillors, Stephen Holyday and
Justin Di Ciano.
On March 18, 2015, Councillor Cristanti, whose ward is adjacent to the Woodbine area,
and who sits on the Etobicoke York Community Council, re-opened the expansion
debate.861 Councillor Crisanti had been named as deputy mayor, with the task of
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increasing economic growth in Etobicoke-York area of the city.862 Mayor John Tory
affirmed Councillor Crisanti’s proposal, saying, “I have said all the way along that I
support us taking a second look at casino gambling at Woodbine provided it is part of a
much larger vision, that we’re not doing it just for sake of allowing a casino out there
where there are already slot machines and horse racing. It’s all about jobs for me. It’s all
about jobs and economic development, not gambling.”863
Councillor Crisanti distinguished the 2015 Woodbine proposal from the earlier debate.
He suggested that the May 2013 vote against the Woodbine expansion occurred at the
same time as the controversial proposal to build a casino in the city’s downtown core and,
therefore, the Woodbine casino idea did not get the full attention it deserved.864 “In
essence, what we’re doing now is dusting off that information we had two years ago,”
Deputy Mayor Vincent Crisanti later stated at a Woodbine public consultation meeting.865
“Unfortunately that [2013] vote for Woodbine was a very, very tight vote. I think it just
got convoluted and mixed up in the major fight, which was the downtown issue. But now
we’re focused on Woodbine and Woodbine only. And I can tell you that Woodbine has
been a great community partner, they do a wonderful job, and they employ about 7,500
people – and this is also about protecting the jobs that are currently there.”866
The Woodbine proposal was re-opened in 2015 without the controversy of a suggested
downtown casino, and with a new scandal-free mayor committed to economic
development. However, many councillors objected to reopening the debate. Councillor
Josh Matlow stated, “I am surprised that we would want to reopen such a divisive and
862
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difficult debate that we just had.”867
2. The “local” in a “city-wide” decision
In early 2015, the Executive Committee requested that the City Manager study the
planning implications of a casino, the economic impact, employment issues, social costs,
incremental costs associated with expanded gaming, like police, fire and emergency
medical services costs. The local effects that had dominated the 2012-13 debate, namely
traffic – were not included in the laundry list of public input items that the Executive
Committee asked the City Manager’s Office to obtain in its public consultation
process.868 Council also asked that consultation efforts include a public meeting in
Etobicoke, an online questionnaire promoted on the City's website and via social media, a
city-wide public opinion poll, and a presentation at Executive Committee.869 Council
allocated $75,000 from the City Manager’s budget for this review.
The 2013 review had included an analysis of the economic benefits, planning
implications, social costs, and other aspects of an expanded casino. In regard to economic
gains, the Final Report suggested that a standalone casino would generate $32 million to
$95 million in hosting fees at Woodbine and up to $10 million in increased property
taxes.870 In 2015, this figure was changed to an increase of $14 million (a total of $29.5
million) in hosting fees and up to $5.5 million in property taxes, an increase from the
existing $1.7 million received at the Woodbine Racetrack.871
As with the previous casino debate, an external firm was hired for part of the consultation
process, although unlike the 2013 decision, a consulting company, Ipsos, managed all
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aspects of the consultation process.872 This meant that detailed notes were available on
the process followed and the information gathered. The results of the public consultation
showed substantially different results based on the form of engagement. In respect of the
telephone poll, Ipsos conducted 701 interviews, including 200 with residents who live in
North Etobicoke in order to boost the sample size of local residents.873 Initially, 34% of
individuals supported the expansion and 25%, opposed, with the remaining (42%) having
mixed feelings. Support was significantly higher among North Etobicoke residents (50%
support, 34% mixed feelings and 16% oppose).874 Once residents are told the estimated
possible number of additional slots and video tables and new live tables that could be
added with the expansion, support remains steady, but many of those who initially have
mixed feelings shift to opposition.875
The most compelling reasons that responders supported casino expansion were the
creation of 2,600 new jobs and the promise of a community benefits agreement with the
City of Toronto.876 Indeed, support increased to 72% when it was suggested that
expansion would bring new commercial development such as hotels, restaurants or
entertainment venues (21% support regardless, 51% support on the condition of new
commercial development).877 However, 70% of responders were dubious that expansion
would lead to full-time, permanent jobs, and worried that expansion would contribute to
an increase in problem gambling.878
The results from the telephone poll were not hugely different than in 2013, when 55% of
Torontonians supported an expansion of the Woodbine casino.879 No data was available
as to the breakdown of residents by community council area, therefore, we do not know
872
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the geographic distribution of this support. This same study found that 45% of residents
in Etobicoke strongly or somewhat supported “the possibility of a new casino in
Toronto.”880 Over one-third of respondents (38.5%) indicated that expanded gaming at
Woodbine Racetrack was strongly unsuitable, compared to 21.2% who felt it was highly
suitable.881 Those with neutral or mixed feelings indicated a preference for leaving the
facility as is (28.1) compared to expanding the gaming opportunities (18.2%). Overall,
there was more support for an expanded gaming facility at the Woodbine Racetrack than
for the introduction of a new casino in Toronto’s downtown core.882 It is difficult to
arrive at concrete numbers related to support for a Woodbine expansion, as a total of
55.4% or 9,852 respondents checked the box “I do not support a new casino under any
conditions.”883
Ipsos also conduced an online survey and hosted a public consultation meeting, both of
which suggested overwhelming support for an expanded casino. Almost five hundred
people completed the survey.884 Overall, 65% indicated support for the expansion, 24%
opposed it and the remainder had mixed feelings or didn’t know (11%).885 The strongest
levels of support came from non-Toronto residents (85%), Etobicoke/York residents
(74%), Scarborough residents (65%) and North York residents (61%).886 The reasons for
support were: an increase in the number of employment opportunities (38%), economic
activity (17%), tourism (17%) and entertainment in the area (15%). Several (18%) also
felt that it was a good location for expanded gaming.887
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Likewise, the public consultation meeting hosted by Ipsos suggested overwhelming
support.888 Approximately 80 people attended the community meeting,889 although
newspaper reports suggested 100.890 The notes of the Woodbine casino consultation
meeting state that the public meeting included an open microphone, where approximately
20 community members spoke; that Ipsos researchers spoke with attendees one-on-one to
gather reactions, whereby 19 people provided feedback; and anonymous feedback was
immediately uploaded and projected in the room via a live feed.891 In addition, 51
community members provided feedback via a distributed form.
Of the 51 community members who completed feedback forms, 48 either somewhat or
strongly supported the possible expansion. Only one had mixed feelings, and one person
was somewhat opposed. 892 No one who completed the feedback form expressed strong
opposition to the expansion. Support for the expansion was based largely on the creation
of new jobs, securing existing jobs, and generating revenue for the City. Residents
expressed concern over increased traffic congestion, revenue coming from a source some
don’t agree with, and concerns about gambling addiction, but overall, those attending
expressed that a casino would bring greater benefits than problems for the community.893
The support is the potential increase in jobs and the promise – however dubious residents
are – of economic development in an area of the city that badly needs it.894 As a former
city staff member noted, “nobody really cared, because for them out there it was about
jobs, it wasn’t about quality of life next door and all these things that come into play
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down here, or at Exhibition [Place].”895 A councillor described it differently, that
ultimately this was the decision that the local community wanted: “if the folks in Rexdale
want a casino, let them have it.”896
Ultimately, City Council voted in favour of expanded gambling with limited opposition
or fanfare. The small dissent came largely from the Toronto-East York and North York
councillors.897 As part of this decision, City Council sought mechanisms to improve the
economic circumstances in Rexdale, including a further review of whether additional
revenues from expanded gaming at Woodbine could form part of a “City of Toronto
Community Benefits Fund,” where funds would be allocated to Neighbourhood
Improvement Areas and other lower income communities for capital or operating projects
aimed at improving the quality of life for local community members.898
3. BIAs and neighbourhood associations
A key difference between the 2012-13 and 2015 casino case studies was the lack of
involvement from local BIAs or neighbourhood associations in the 2015 debate. In the
former the BIAs and the neighbourhood associations were important participants,
including such bodies from outside the TEYCC. In the latter, there was no mention at all
of these informal governance bodies, either through a newspaper search of key terms
during the six-month period of the debate, nor in listings of deputants on City of Toronto
decision documents. The reason is simple: Rexdale does not have any BIAs or
neighbourhood associations. Nor are there BIAs or neighbourhood associations in all of
North Etobicoke. Illustration 4.3 shows the locations of BIAs and NAs in comparison
with the proposed casino sites.
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Illustration 4.3: Map of proposed casino sites, with BIAs and NAs
The difference in consultation practices in the 2012-13 and 2015 casino processes was
stark, particularly in regard to the role of BIAs and community councils. In the 2012-13
debate, the purported reason for the creation of the TEYCC subcommittee was to consult
with BIAs. Thus, the subcommittee institutionalized the importance of further
consultation with key stakeholders in the governance model – the local businesses.
Without neighbourhood association or BIA involvement, it is difficult to know what
residents in the area thought about an expanded casino. In the 2012-13 debate, the
neighbourhood associations and BIAs brought added information to residents and another
opportunity to learn about the effects of a casino and were a catalyst for the creation of
the Subcommittee. This contribution was even more crucial in the 2015 debate, as far
fewer residents were aware that the issue was before City Council. The lack of
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neighbourhood association involvement may also mean that a broader range of resident
perspectives were not included in the debate. While the information is incomplete and
anecdotal, popular media accounts noted discord with the proposal to expand Woodbine
from those who lived nearby.899 As one resident noted, “If you get on building the LRT,
we can bring condo development; we can bring retail development, all sorts of
development. I don’t think we need a casino to be the catalyst for that.”900
Community advocates in Etobicoke, suggested that the community should have the final
say on the expansion of Woodbine, given the many different benefits and drawbacks that
require consideration.901 It is impossible to know whether the presence of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations would have led to a different result. As one columnist said,
“Rexdale had two options in the casino debate: Take it or leave it. It’s easy for a
councillor to say a casino will bring the wrong kinds of jobs when the neighbourhood that
councillor represents is chock full of them. In Rexdale, almost any job is better than
none.”902 Likewise, another writer stated, “Gambling is a rotten way for governments to
make money, if you ask me. But that’s the province we live in. As such it would take
some balls to look Woodbine, and its employees, both extant and potential, in the eye and
tell them they can’t partner with Queen’s Park to provide a perfectly legal product on
private land.”903
However, without any formal organizing by neighbourhood associations and BIAs, it is
harder to know what members of the residential and business community believed. As
noted in Illustration 4.4, although there are no BIAs in Rexdale, there are numerous local
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businesses. Unlike in the 2012-13 casino debate, the views of these local entities were
entirely absent, with no challenge made of Woodbine’s information on local jobs and the
economy.

Illustration 4.4: Map of BIAs and local businesses904
But what can be done if the organizations don’t exist? One councillor said, “If you don’t
build the association, if you don’t build the activity, if you don’t engage in that front, you
get what you deserve. So if you’re complacent about it, or apathetic, or disengaged, or
marginalized, there’s a price to pay for that.”905 To this councillor, it is up to the local
community and its councillors to “make its own mistakes.” There is no point in having
outside voices help them to organize or “colonize” the area: “I’m not going to have time
to go up there and orchestrate the neighbourhood for them. But I have seen people try and
904
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do that, it’s sort of like they’re missionaries going into the suburbs to try and urbanize
somebody. [They have] to make their own mistakes.” The councillor said, “They will
build a casino and realize it’s wrecked their city and there will be nothing they can do
about it.”906
There are few jobs in Rexdale, very high unemployment rates, and bleak signs of
economic development initiatives coming from either the City or the Province of Ontario.
It may well be that the ward councillors and the Etobicoke York Community Council
fully represented the views of their residents in opting to the promise of new employment
to the area. However, it may also be that the absence of these voices diminished the
nature, amount and depth of engagement opportunities, representation, and contribution
to decision-making for Rexdale residents and businesses.
III. Conclusion
These very different outcomes on a similar issue tell us that the governance of different
local legal spaces is spatially and substantively different acrossToronto, without strict
categories of participants, uniform forums of deliberation, and with meanings of “local”
that comply with the categories of “city-wide” and “local” advanced in the City of
Toronto’s bylaws. These case studies affirm the pluralistic nature of local governance,
both geographically and based on representation, with bodies articulated in provincial law
(community councils) and bylaws (BIAs) interacting with those operating through
custom (wards) and outside formal law (neighbourhood associations). The 2012-13 and
2015 casino decisions also provided crucial insight into the use of community councils as
an appropriate forum to consider the nuance of “local” versus “city-wide” and the
privileging of BIAs as consultative participants in the City of Toronto’s governance
model.
First, the case studies tell us that the landscape of local governance looks different across
the city. This is in part due to very different levels of involvement of BIAs and
906

Ibid.

213

neighbourhood associations. In the 2012-13, the creation of the TEYCC was motivated in
part by having appropriate consultation with BIAs. BIAs and neighbourhood associations
from across the city ended up playing an important role in the decision-making process,
beginning initially with those located within the area of the casino development and
concluding with FoNTRA, which strongly opposed the creation of new casino.907 Their
involvement – together with that of other advocates – augmented the controversy of the
issue. In the 2015 debate, there were no BIAs or neighbourhood associations involved in
casino decision-making in either Toronto-East York or in Etobicoke-York. In the latter,
the reason was simple: there are no such bodies located in the area, despite there being
many residents and businesses. The former is a more confusing phenomenon, given the
depth and intensity of the involvement just two years before. While there continued to be
some ward councillor opposition in the 2015 decision on the same grounds as the 201213 debate, in general the expansion passed with little fanfare or opposition, and with no
involvement of any BIAs or neighbourhood associations, nor any other advocacy groups.
Santos remarked that there is a multiplicity of laws, institutions and boundaries operating
formally and informally, and that formal law may be rejected if it differs too dramatically
from informal notions of representation and space. In the 2015 casino decision, the local
formal forum was not the community council, it was exclusively the ward, not the
broader, multi-party scale of local governance that we saw in the 2012-13 decision.
Notwithstanding the presence of some neighbourhood associations in neighbourhood
improvement areas (as Rexdale is), the absence of such bodies in the 2015 decision
reinforces the extent to which neighbourhood associations, in particular, are dominated
by privileged homeowners.908 The articulation of local legal spaces includes insiders and
outsiders, including who is eligible to participate, in what manner, and with what power,
but the context for these spaces is not geographically uniform across the city. Moreover,
if we believe, as Dahl, Stone, Leo, Cobban and Good, among others, do, that non-state
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actors are involved in municipal decision-making, the question is how non-state bodies
are reflected at the local level outside of BIAs and neighbourhood associations.909
Second, the advocates who rallied in opposition to a downtown casino did not object to
the Woodbine expansion. One of the local councillors involved in the 2012-13 decisions
did speak in opposition in the 2015 debate, but this activity did not manifest in the
mobilization of BIAs or NAs outside the area of the applicable ward or faith
communities, as had occurred in the 2012-13 debate. An explanation from NIMBY
literature is that a downtown casino would negatively colour the “playground” of the
more privileged residents of the city, who may not go to or care about Rexdale. This
explanation has merit: as the Toronto Star reported in regard to the Woodbine expansion,
“most Torontonians couldn’t care less. Unaware and indifferent, we are happy with it as
long as it won’t be in our backyard. Let Rexdale enjoy what the rest of us don’t want.910
Adding to this inequality, I argue, is the absence of any bodies speaking for the residents
of Rexdale. This further exacerbates the powerful role played by the local councillor
who, in the 2015 debate, did not object to the Woodbine expansion. In the 2012-13
debate, the downtown elite were able to take control of the formal local governance
model in a manner that Rexdale residents were not – by using community councils to
consult with BIAs, mobilizing residents beyond the usual engagement processes, and
using staff resources to examine the local effects of this city-wide decision. This affirms
the data from Chapter 3 that local governance is dominated by the ward councillor
without a local governance model to challenge the councillor’s position.
The third conclusion to be drawn concerns the potential for a greater role for community
councils in the decision-making process. Although the casino results were markedly
different from one another, despite their having taken place less than two years apart,
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both illustrate the community council as an important site for local decision-making.
While each of the Toronto-East York and Etobicoke-York community councils
approached their role and the issue differently, both made a decision to include this body
in the decision-making process. During the 2012-13 debate, the TEYCC was able to
assume jurisdiction of the matter under the procedural bylaw. For the first time since the
creation of these bodies, it struck a subcommittee to engage directly with BIAs and to
solicit eight detailed staff reports on local matters that it considered important.
Ultimately, the community council became a forum to contemplate the issues deemed
crucial from a local perspective that had been sidelined in the city-wide debate. During
the same debate, in Etobicoke-York, the community council voted to endorse a report
entitled “Support for a Casino at Woodbine Racetrack.” This action from the 2012-13
debate carried over to the 2015 decision, where each one of the ward councillors again
endorsed the expansion of the Woodbine racetrack. The councillors in the TEYCC, but
not EYCC, shifted the community council mandate towards local consideration of citywide issues.
Thus, consideration of local legal spaces means questioning the extent to which they
intersect with formal bodies. We see here that community councils as formal bodies have
broad mandates that can be exercised differently, depending on the will of the councillors
that serve on them. In the 2015 casino debate, we see the standard expression of the local
voice in city-wide issues, whereby the councillor represents the voices of those in the
area where the development will take place, the community council backs up or
reinforces this councillor position, and City Council votes on the proposal as a whole. By
contrast, in the 2012-13 debate, councillors used the TEYCC to create a local forum to
consider the local effects of a city-wide decision. The effect was a shift away from the
power of the ward councillor to a more participatory and visible forum, which included
opportunities for staff support, city reports and public meetings. Community councils
could be used more broadly to serve this function under their existing legal framework.
Fourth, the decisions demonstrate the relevance of the local lens on city-wide issues. In
both the 2012-13 and 2015 decisions, all of the ward councillors in the Toronto-East
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York and Etobicoke-York areas supported the decisions. Ward councillors, BIAs, and
NAs raised and engaged in these local issues, with differing levels of involvement among
the two different community council areas. In the case of the 2012-13 decision, the
factors were traffic, threats to local businesses, quality of life for nearby residents, and
the health effects on nearby vulnerable populations. In the 2015 decision, the major
consideration was the employment of local residents. It was these local issues that framed
the debates and the eventual decisions, with the content of local meaning the economic,
logistical and social needs of the geographically-proximate community.
These case studies also challenge the distinction made by the City of Toronto between
what are considered to be local versus city-wide issues. Those issues considered to be
“local” may be considered by community councils, but otherwise they are to be decided
by City Council and its standing committees only. This distinction brings to mind Santos’
notion of scale, where a large-scale map shows a smaller area but with far more detail (a
zooming in or “miniaturized version of reality”), whereas a small-scale map shows a
larger area, but less detail.911 Under Santos’ conception of scale, a community council
could be thought of as a zooming in on a smaller area to study the localized effects, as
occurred in the 2012-13 casino debate. This framing instead suggests that smaller-thancity bodies can examine the localized effects of city-wide issues, as city-wide issues are
relevant to local communities, too. A casino, labelled “city-wide,” cannot be set aside
from other scales, including local.912
To further evaluate the conclusions drawn regarding the nature of local governance in
Toronto, the next chapter examines another case study: the ward boundary review.
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Chapter 5 – The Spaces of Local in Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review
In 2013, the City of Toronto embarked on its first post-amalgamation ward boundary
review under the authority of yet-unused COTA provisions. The review began amidst a
body of case law that required a process meant to achieve “effective representation” for
Toronto residents.913
A ward boundary review triggers many legal questions, including administrative law
requirements, compliance with applicable legislation, and provincial-municipal division
of powers. At the same time, the review raises questions regarding the “social orders” or
rules and norms outside of state law that contribute to a plurality of ideas regarding
boundaries and notions of “community,” all of which came into play in Toronto’s ward
boundary review. 914 The review attempted to frame the local legal spaces that would
subsequently determine the prime determinant of local governance: the ward councillor.
This chapter sets out the context for the review, including the interplay of Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) and OMB requirements. Second, this chapter outlines the process used
in the City of Toronto ward boundary review (WBR), including the use of consultants
meant to emulate the arm’s length review process used by the federal government in its
decennial electoral boundary reconfiguration. The meaning of “local” alongside the
concept, “communities of interest,” a feature of the WBR, is examined in the third
section.
This case study makes three conclusions regarding local governance. First, ward
councillors were the predominant participants in the review process, interviewed
individually by the consultants on numerous occasions and were decision-makers in the
ultimate results, partly due to COTA provisions, but also because of the power retained
by councillors over the process. Second, BIAs and neighbourhood associations were
913
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given favourable consideration in the review as “communities of interest.” The results
triggered questions about other boundaries and conceptions of community, in particular
those local legal spaces not represented by BIAs or neighbourhood associations. Third,
the WBR led to the creation of wards aligned with existing notions of power. As set out
in Chapter 1, local governance comprises an overlapping set of formal and informal
bodies. Ultimately, the WBR reinforced and privileged councillor-led perceptions of
“local” in the creation of new boundaries.915

I. Context for the ward boundary review
As noted in Chapter 3, Toronto has had geographically-based electoral districts called
wards since its inception as a municipality in 1834. As detailed in Chapter 3, the wards
have endured as the City’s boundaries shifted and changed over the years owing to
annexations and amalgamations, and despite other Canadian provinces having rejected
their use. Some former municipal entities continue to have defined identities in Toronto,
as reflected in the city’s wards. The current ward structure has been in place since 2000,
shortly after amalgamation, and is based on the 22 federal ridings or electoral districts
that covered Toronto at the time. Each riding was split to create the current system of 44
wards. Wards are a crucial element of Toronto’s governance model, described in this
dissertation and elsewhere as “fiefdoms.”916

1. Disparity in ward population size across Toronto
In 2010, the City Clerk’s Office reported to City Council on the discrepancy among ward
populations, noting: “The inequities in ward population and number of households place
some Ward Councillors at a disadvantage in communicating with and representing a
larger number of residents when compared to other Councillors. This could potentially
raise the issue of whether certain constituents are fairly and adequately represented
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among all wards.”917 City Council decided to allocate an additional staff member to the
councillor in question, in which the population and typical household size were more than
50 percent higher than the average.918 The city announced that any other ward in similar
circumstances would also be entitled to an additional staff member, too.919
By 2013, when the City’s WBR process began, the populations of Toronto’s wards were
widely unequal, with some wards having twice the population of others.920 For example,
ward 18 (located in the former City of Toronto) and ward 29 (in the former Borough of
East York) each contained fewer than 45,000 residents, about half of the population of
ward 23 (in the former City of North York), which had almost 90,000 residents.
Illustration 5.1 1 shows the discrepancy in population amongst the City of Toronto’s
wards.

Illustration 5.1: Map of 2011 Population Differences Among Wards921
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Notwithstanding the SCC’s requirements that electoral districts consider “communities of
interest,” the OMB’s trigger for a review of ward boundaries is based exclusively on
voter disparity. These inequalities have legal consequences for Toronto’s decisionmaking authority. Under COTA, 500 electors could petition the OMB for new, more
equitable ward boundaries in exactly these circumstances. As described next, this
approach to a review of electoral boundaries differs significantly from the federal
approach, where the number of electoral boundaries is predetermined and reviews take
place every ten years.
2. Federal and provincial electoral reviews
The process of electoral boundary review differs among governments. At the federal
level, federal commissions are established in each of Canada’s ten provinces every ten
years to recommend changes to electoral boundaries. The commissions are independent
bodies and make all final decisions as to the federal electoral boundaries following a
robust public participation process.922 The province’s chief justice appoints a judge to
chair the commission, and the Speaker of the House of Commons appoints the other two
members from among the province’s residents.923 The commissions are “radically”
decentralized, with each of the 10 commissions operating independently.924
After engaging in a public consultation process, each commission submits a report on
what it considered in revising the boundaries and proposes an electoral map to the House
of Commons. Each commission then considers any objections and recommendations
received from Members of Parliament and prepares a final report, which outlines the final
electoral boundaries for the respective province. The process is set out in the Electoral
Boundaries Readjustment Act,925 which was introduced to address problems associated
with electoral redistribution in Canada, including “the tendency for the exercise to be
922
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overly partisan and the frequent discrepancies in the geographic size and population of
constituencies at the federal level.”926
The provincial review process differs from that of the federal government. The Province
of Ontario had previously aligned its electoral districts with those of the federal
government and required that a provincial electoral district review follow a federal
review. The Province of Ontario has not yet announced its intentions for its next review,
although 10 years have passed since the last one, so it may happen soon.927 There are
indications that the Province will adopt the new federal riding boundaries within the
Toronto area before the next provincial election.928
Just as Toronto’s WBR process was beginning, federal electoral districts across the
country were realigned. In 2013, the Federal Electoral Boundaries Commission for
Ontario held two days of public hearings in Toronto, where it received more than 100
submissions each day.929 The principal focus of the submissions was the location and
boundaries of the applicable “communities of interest.”930 The Federal Electoral
Boundaries Commission for Ontario increased the number of electoral districts within the
City of Toronto’s boundaries from 22 to 25. As a result, federal boundaries and Toronto’s
wards no longer overlap, as shown in Illustration 5.2.
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Illustration 5.2: Map of Federal Electoral Districts and Toronto Ward
Boundaries931
Toronto’s WBR was the first undertaken without the provincial government dictating any
required geographical boundaries. Even so, the WBR included legislative and judicial
constraints, as we will see next.
3. A complex legal arena
Ontario municipalities have broad discretion to determine the number of electoral
districts they wish to have within their municipal boundaries. Since COTA’s
introduction, Toronto can exercise its powers with respect to “establishing, changing or
dissolving wards.” The Act clarifies this power in section 128(1), where it states:
“Without limiting sections 7 and 8, those sections authorize the City to divide or redivide
the City into wards or to dissolve the existing wards” and are able to eliminate wards
altogether. The city – like other Ontario municipalities – is empowered to determine its
manner of representation, whether through the election of councillors based on ward,
elected at-large, or some combination of the two. Examined under the lens of
subsidiarity, Ontario municipalities have been given the ability to regulate this aspect of
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their affairs freely. However, a closer look reveals constraints and impediments amidst
this power.
a) Legislative constraints
The city’s authority over its system of representation is not absolute. As noted earlier,
COTA empowers 500 electors in the City of Toronto to petition City Council to pass a
bylaw dividing or redividing the City into wards or dissolving existing wards.932 If the
City does not pass a bylaw within 90 days after receiving the petition, any of the electors
may apply to the OMB to divide, redivide, or dissolve the wards, upon which the OMB
may hear the application and make an order. Ironically, city staff estimate that the
timeline required for the introduction of new ward boundaries is at least two years, far
more than the 90 days prescribed in the Act.933 This means that while the process for
conducting a ward boundary review is long and complex, with numerous required rounds
of public consultation, it may in turn be appealed to and annulled by the OMB.934
While COTA does not set out the process that must be followed to designate new ward
boundaries, nor does the city’s procedural bylaw, the legislation does require that the
powers of the City be exercised by City Council.935 This suggests that an independent
body like the federal commission would not be able to make the final decision on the
placement of ward boundaries, although the City has never tried nor tested this approach.

b) Judicial constraints
As Sancton notes, there are no SCC decisions that apply to the drawing of municipal
boundaries.936 In practice, however, Ontario municipalities observe the common-law
requirements related to electoral districts set out in the landmark Supreme Court of
932
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Canada case, Reference Re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), known colloquially
as the “Carter decision.”937 This case considered the meaning of the “right to vote” in
section 3 of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 3 grants every citizen the
right to “vote in an election of members of the House of Commons or a legislative
assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.” The case was brought by lawyer
and resident, Rogers Carter, who observed that the electoral boundaries (or ridings)
approved in the Province of Saskatchewan led to significant deviations in population
across the province. The result was that, “a single vote in the smaller riding carried 63.5%
more electoral weight than a single vote in the larger riding.”938
In affirming that there may be population differences across ridings, the SCC clarified
that voter parity was only measure to assess effective representation, but not the only
criterion by which boundaries should be evaluated. In considering electoral boundaries,
the first criterion is that approximately the same numbers of voters are represented in
each electoral area, a criterion known as “voter parity.” However, to achieve “effective
representation,” other criteria are also important, namely geography, community history,
community interests, minority representation, and other factors.939 These other criteria
justify a departure from strict voter parity; however, the courts have said that the
population of each electoral district should not deviate by more than 25 percent.
The SCC explicitly rejected the “one person, one vote” principle which guides electoral
district decisions in the United States. In Baker v Carr, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether electoral redistricting should be subject to judicial review and coined
the term “one person, one vote,” meaning that the sizes of wards or ridings should be
equal, and roughly equivalent to the principle of voter parity.940 The equal population
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requirement has been strictly interpreted in subsequent cases “as requiring that districts
be as close to exactly equal in population as possible.”941
The SCC characterized effective representation as “the less radical, more pragmatic
approach which had developed in England,” in contrast to the U.S. approach. The SCC’s
consideration of voter parity largely focused on the legislative intent of section 3 of the
Charter: “In the absence of any supportive evidence to the contrary … it would be wrong
to infer that in enshrining the right to vote in our written constitution the intention was to
adopt the American model. On the contrary, we should assume that the goal was to
recognize the right affirmed in this country since the time of our first Prime Minister, Sir
John A. Macdonald, to effective representation in a system which gives due weight to
voter parity but admits other considerations where necessary.”942

c) Previous Ontario Municipal Board decisions
Unlike the courts, the OMB’s decisions do not follow stare decisis, meaning that
adjudicators are not bound by previous OMB decisions. Therefore, for any municipality
undertaking a ward boundary review, it is important to understand how the OMB has
decided past cases. The OMB has applied the Carter decision to evaluate the
effectiveness of representation based on the following factors, referred to as the Carter
criteria:943
•

Does it equitably distribute the population and the electors?

•

Does it respect identifiable communities of interest?

•

Does it utilize natural, physical boundaries that are locally recognized?

•

Does it serve the larger public interest of all electors of the municipality in contrast to
the interest of a small group?
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Because OMB decisions are not binding on subsequent hearings, there is no single set of
prescribed rules that municipalities must follow to prevent the OMB from overturning a
ward boundary review. The OMB has stated that ward boundary decisions are amended
or repealed only if there is a compelling reason to do so.944 That said, certain guidelines
may help insulate a municipality from challenge.
First, the OMB has overturned ward boundary reviews in which the outcome was
predetermined. This includes ones for which a City Council had specified the final
number of wards before the review process began or had mandated that the number of
wards could not increase from the existing number.945 The OMB has also determined that
a WBR process must be approached from an unbiased perspective and must include
public consultation.946 For example, Ottawa’s 2001 ward boundary review prescribed the
number of new wards in advance. The review was overturned by the OMB in 2003 on the
basis that “Council did not give sufficient weight to communities of interest and, in
particular, rural communities of interest.”947 Ottawa was required to conduct a second
ward boundary review.
Second, the meaning of the term “communities of interest” is contested. In the City of
Toronto’s WBR, the term “communities of interest” was linked to the idea of
“neighbourhoods,” suggesting that the neighbourhood is a crucially important and
identifiable geographic point in most people’s lives and frames how people experience
their city.948 The alignment of the term “communities of interest” with that of
“neighbourhood” also underscored a belief that the role and responsibilities of a
municipality are closely linked to neighbourhoods, including how people get around; the
social, cultural, and recreational services that are available; and the provision of utilities
and public spaces.
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In the City of Kingston’s 2013 ward boundary review process, City Council’s ward
boundary decision was appealed to the OMB on the basis that it did not provide effective
representation, in part because the bylaw failed to recognize communities of interest, by
splitting up an area represented by a single neighbourhood association.949 The OMB
sided with the appellant (although the decision rested largely on the lack of inclusion of
postsecondary students and the inclusion of non-voters in population counts when
determining electoral districts), and amended the bylaw to account for the Syndenham
Neighbourhood Association.950 In Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations
were the “communities of interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.951
Third, even though public consultation is not set out as a requirement under applicable
legislation, the OMB has made it clear that it expects municipalities to include public
consultation in the review process.952 In the Town of Innisfil v Hambly, 2009, the OMB
stated: “[T]he common practice of holding public meetings on a variety of matters that
come before a municipal council creates an environment and reasonable expectation that
the municipality will hold a public meeting to hear from residents on a ward boundary
proposal.”953
In the City of Ottawa’s 2001 WBR, the OMB held that the public was not sufficiently
engaged. It also noted that the public process had been too limited and that, in particular,
there had been no opportunity for the public to discuss options for specific ward
boundary proposals.954
Fourth, the OMB has stated that population deviations in rural and urban areas may
differ.955 In rural regions, the OMB has determined that up to 33 percent of a deviation in
voter parity may be allowed, if based on the Carter criteria.956 This means that the
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populations of wards may vary by up to 33 percent if the boundaries were drawn with the
intention of keeping communities of interest together, respecting relevant geographic
boundaries, or otherwise upholding the principles set out in the Carter decision.

Other municipal approaches
Appendix E compares nine municipalities from Ontario, elsewhere in Canada, and the
United States. The data show that there are no firm rules when it comes to ward-based
representation. Cities vary widely in the number of wards, the populations represented by
councillors, and the approach to ward boundary reviews. For example, Halifax and
London (Ontario) councillors represent approximately 25,000 people each, while Calgary
and Edmonton’s numbers are about 70,000. New York, which has a City Council close in
size to that of Toronto (51 members), has more than 160,000 residents per electoral
district, although it also has five borough presidents and 59 community boards.957 James
Lightbody has noted, in reference to Winnipeg’s preference for ward sizes of
approximately 50,000 residents that, “Their purposely artificial construction transcended
any bounds of neighbourhood or community.”958
The approaches to ward boundary reviews also differ from city to city. Canada does not
have a country-wide approach to the timing of electoral boundary reviews at the
municipal level, although mandatory federal electoral district reviews take place every 10
years following the decennial census. As such, the rules differ by jurisdiction. For
example, in London (Ontario), staff are required to review ward populations each term,
while in Halifax, Nova Scotia, wards are considered every eight years. In the United
States, the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 requires that local governments remap their
wards following the decennial census to meet federal “one person one vote”
guidelines.959 Deviations may be acceptable to respect established communities of
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interest or to achieve other legally valid and permissible objectives.960
Two other differences related to accountability are noteworthy. First, independent
consultants and commissions are sometimes, but not always, retained or appointed to
carry out the review. Second, City Council is not always the final decision-maker on
boundaries. In New York, the United States Department of Justice must endorse the
Council’s decision. In Halifax, final approval rests with the Nova Scotia Utility and
Review Board.
With the threat of a resident petition and, at worst, an OMB order that would impose new
ward boundaries, the city embarked on its review. With the legal background in mind, we
examine the details of Toronto’s multi-year WBR process.
II. The City of Toronto’s ward boundary review process
The 2013 ward boundary review was Toronto’s first municipal-led ward boundary review
since amalgamation. Any WBR process is a legal minefield, with broad principles but no
clear rules, the potential for residents to appeal proposed boundaries to the OMB, and a
lack of precedent in OMB decisions. This results in considerable difficulty in setting out
a process that will withstand quasi-judicial scrutiny.

1. Design of the WBR process
In June 2013, City Council approved a WBR process.961 City staff recommended that
consultants be retained to conduct the review, independent from staff and councillors.
The objective was to keep the process at arm’s-length from the City Manager’s Office,
who would oversee the WBR, as the consultants would make the final recommendations.
21 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act of 1941, 65 ILCS 20/21-0.01, et seq., which require the City of
Chicago to be divided into 50 wards of “nearly equal” populations. 65 ILCS 20/21-36.
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Careful attention was placed on avoiding language that would limit the consultants’
options, in particular by setting out in advance the number of wards.
Staff also required two rounds of public and stakeholder consultation. The first set would
allow the public and select groups (including councillors) to give general input; the
second would allow the public to comment on the options identified by the consultants.
This requirement was rooted in applicable law.962
The timeline was set on the assumption that the results would likely be appealed to the
OMB, but the timing would allow the Clerk’s Office at least a year from the end of all
appeals to prepare for the 2018 municipal election. Staff designed the process to conclude
in fall 2017, OMB appeals included, to give the Clerk’s Office the time needed to
implement the results.963 This three-year process meant that the consultants could carry
out extensive background research and analysis, making it one of the longer processes
followed in Ontario.
On June 27, 2013, shortly after City Council approved the ward boundary review process,
a petition under COTA section 129 was filed with the City Clerk’s Office by the Toronto
Taxpayers Coalition. The petition asked City Council to pass a bylaw redividing the City
of Toronto into wards, and that such wards “be based on the new boundaries for the
federal electoral districts located in Toronto proposed by the 2012 Federal Electoral
Boundaries Commission for Ontario in its Report in either its current form or as amended
after receiving objections from the House of Commons. We further request that these
new wards be in place for the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election.”964 The appeal was
withdrawn, pending the conclusion of the WBR.965
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The WBR process was approved by City Council in June 2013.966 The process taken by
the consultants followed the requirements approved by City Council. Figure 5.1 depicts
the process.

Figure 5.1: Toronto Ward Boundary Review Steps967
The consultants conducted two rounds of consultations, first on wards generally, and the
next on five proposed options. They included “web-based activities (including social
media platforms), communication and outreach to educate the public about the purpose of
the ward boundary review, keep the public informed about the process and provide a
range of opportunities for the public to get involved, including two online surveys.”968
The consultant team also solicited input from Members of Council, school board
representatives, neighbourhood associations, other stakeholder groups and members of
the public.969
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The consultants explicitly set the target year for voter parity at 2026, so that the new ward
structure would last for the next four municipal elections.970 This meant that the proposed
wards would be based on projections for the vast growth anticipated in the downtown and
other growth centres designated in the Official Plan, and data suggesting that most of
Toronto’s other communities would remain stable. The use of projected figures meant a
continued discrepancy in ward populations, with six wards having variances of over 20
percent in 2018, and one having a variance of over 37 percent.971 Finally. the proposed
ward populations were to be based on the number of residents, not simply the number of
electors, a point that had been raised in a previous OMB decision, but perhaps drew
inspiration from the City of Toronto’s recent decision to ask the provincial to extend
voting rights in municipal elections to permanent residents.972
Based on these principles, five options were offered, ranging in size, geography, and
historical connection (see Table 5.1).973 Each option sought to balance all the components
of effective representation.974
Option

Name

1
2
3
4
5

Current
Minimal Change
44 Wards
Small Wards
Large Wards
Natural or Physical
Boundaries

Avg Ward
Population
60,000
61,000
70,000
50,000
75,000
70,000

Ward Population
Range
45,000–90,000
51,850–70,150
63,000–77,000
45,000–55,000
67,500–82,500
63,000–77,000

No. of
Wards
44
47
44
58
38
41

Table 5.1: Ward Boundary Review Options Presented in the Final Report975
970
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The consultants solicited feedback on the five options and opted for an innovative way to
assess the feedback. They asked Councillors and the public to rank the options by
selecting their first, second, third, fourth, and fifth choices. Four dimensions were then
assessed: first-place choices, ranked scores, last-place choices, and a comparison of first
and last choices. The rationale was that: “a new ward structure is not just about which
option places first but just as much about which option a consensus can be built around.
That is why it is important to know which option placed last and can be considered a “no
way” option. Also, a comparison between first and last can assist in revealing options
around which a consensus may be difficult to achieve.”976
For example, Option 3 (Small Wards), saw a high degree of first and last choices from
the public and Members of Council. Option 3 is the “love-it-or-hate-it” option. The
consultants assess that, “It would be the option that would be the most difficult to form a
consensus around, because of the strong positive and negative reactions to it.”977
Ultimately, the consultants recommended the Minimal Change – 47 Ward option with
refinements. The refinements, drawn from public and councillor input, were meant to
improve the recommended ward structure with regard to communities of interest, ward
history, and other factors. The result was an increase in the number of wards to 47 from
44 while maintaining the current average ward population size of approximately
61,000.978 Of the 44 existing wards, 38 would experience some changes in their
boundaries; only six existing wards would stay the same. Also, three new wards were
recommended for the Toronto–East York community council area and an additional ward
for North York. The Etobicoke-York Community Council area lost one ward.
2. Role of the Executive Committee and City Council in WBR Design
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Toronto’s Executive Committee considered the ward boundaries on two occasions. First,
the Final Report, together with a cover staff report, was delivered to the Executive
Committee for discussion and debate on May 24, 2016. The item was the second on a
very full agenda and was heard at 8 p.m.979 After a brief period of questions and answers,
a motion was introduced, asking the consultants to review Option 1 (47 wards) by
focusing only on wards with the highest population discrepancies and leaving the other
wards intact; and to examine the possibility of having only 46 wards, 44 wards, or wards
that aligned with federal and provincial electoral boundaries, all while achieving the
objective of effective representation.980 Mayor Tory cautioned the councillors about
“getting into the weeds” for fear of “tainting the process.”981
The Final Report, written together with a cover staff report endorsing the
recommendations, was delivered to the Executive Committee for discussion and debate
on May 24, 2016. The item was the second on the agenda, right after another contentious
matter.982 I watched the meeting online from 9:30 am, waiting for the item to be heard,
which finally occurred just after 8 pm. The Executive Committee members decided to
forego the presentation of the consultants and to limit all speaking times to three minutes.
By this point, all but one of the eight listed deputants had left the meeting, meaning that
this form of civic engagement was therefore not utilized.
At the meeting, various councillors weighed in, suggesting new boundaries on the
grounds that communities could be divided and noting the difficulty in dealing only with
boundaries, rather than other relevant governance issues. A councillor noted other
objection to any changes to his ward on the grounds that it split a “community of interest”
– a BIA. Another speaker, a councillor from the Scarborough area, wondered why the
review had only focused on boundaries and not on other aspects of representation.
“Unfortunately,” the consultants stated, “those questions were not part of our terms of
reference.” Another councillor came up to the screen with a map in hand, pointing to
979
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non-arterial roads and mapping how they could be changed to accommodate “a
community now broken in half.” At this May meeting, the Executive Committee sent the
Final Report back to the consultants to consider a recommendation with fewer wards.
Second, the Executive Committee met on October 26, 2016, to consider the consultants’
further review. In their Supplementary Report, the consultants concluded in part that a
44-ward option achieves excellent voter parity among the 44 wards, but has significant
challenges for maintaining existing geographic communities of interest and, in particular,
keeping the boundaries of Scarborough intact; and using federal riding boundaries as a
basis for ward boundaries raises significant concerns for voter parity, a prime component
of effective representation, and would require altering “natural and historical” ward
boundaries.983
The consultants recommended proceeding with the 47 wards option previously
recommended, as depicted in Illustration 5.3, but with minor changes.984
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Illustration 5.3: Map of Recommended Wards With Refinements (47 Wards)985
The proposal was debated for close to four hours. Many issues were raised, including the
appetite of Toronto residents to have more councillors; whether the WBR should be
connected to a more comprehensive governance review; and if the options satisfied the
goal of keeping “communities of interest” together.986 After a number of failed motions,
the Executive Meeting vote 7–6 to forward the “Recommended Wards with Refinements
– 47 Ward Option” to City Council for approval at its November 2016 meeting.987
Two weeks later, on November 8, 2016, the 47-ward option was approved by a 28–13
vote of City Council; the Mayor voted against the proposal.988 A proposed amendment –
to consider the impacts to governance and structure changes to the authority, duties, and
function of community councils, as well as the establishment of new committees and a
board of control to focus on citywide issues – failed.989
The next section uses the analogy of Santos’ lens of scale to focus more specifically on
the notion of local governance raised in the WBR. It concludes that the judicial
requirement of consideration of “communities of interest” reflect the conflict between
how state-based law, and the norms and rules of other actors or bodies regarding the
meaning of local governance in Toronto.
3. The meaning of “local” in the ward boundary review process
This section brings together the WBR details presented earlier to analyze the implications
for local governance. First, I examine the meaning of “communities of interest,” one of
the chief criteria of the Carter test, alongside Toronto’s WBR. Next, this section explores
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the involvement of ward councillors, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood
association. This section concludes that councillors were the principal determinants of
local boundaries, with BIAs and neighbourhood associations playing a central role. The
WBR also raised the need for a governance review to address the lack of local forum
beyond the ward.

a) Definitions and applications of the “communities of interest" criterion
This section provides background on this criterion and a description of how the concept,
“communities of interest” was engaged in the WBR.
The focus on “communities of interest” was profoundly important in the Carter decision
and in the Toronto WBR. One of the underlying tenets in the Carter decision ensuring the
representation of minorities in the electoral model.990 In applying the Carter principle to
the WBR, the consultants state, “As a rule, lines are drawn around communities, not
through them. Wards should group together communities with common interests, where
there is some identifiable similarity such as age, assessed value and configuration of
housing, the life-stage and demographics of the residents, and municipal service
provisions and amenities.”991 Put another way, this WBR should ensure that communities
of interest are not be divided into separate wards.
Providing some forum for “communities of interest” when drawing ward boundaries is a
common standard in Canada and other commonwealth cities in the UK and Australia.992
The view is that it is both fair and logical to group communities together, and can also
encourage participation in civic life. This sentiment was echoed in Toronto’s ward
boundary review where the consultants wrote:
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A great number of individuals identify with geographically defined communities of
some sort. It is natural to want to extend that sense of being part of a community to
ensuring that that community becomes a part of a larger electoral district with
which there is also some affinity. A community of interest can enhance citizen
involvement in politics. It has been demonstrated that voter turnout is positively
affected when boundaries are redrawn in such a way as to place voters in a riding
with they share a strong community of interest.993
However, “communities of interest” leaves considerable room for interpretation, largely
in terms of which communities of interest to consider. “Communities of interest” has no
rigorous definition, is vague, and is applied inconsistently.994 The practice of identifying
such communities is that it biases “the very system of representation from the outset by
providing special status to particular communities over others.”995
In practice, there are contested meanings for the term “communities of interest.” In the
City of Barrie’s Ward Boundary Review Final Report, the term “communities of interest”
was linked to the idea of “neighbourhoods,” suggesting that the neighbourhood is a
crucially important and identifiable geographic point in most people’s lives and
substantially frames how people experience their city. The alignment of the term
“communities of interest” with that of “neighbourhood” also underscored a belief that the
role and responsibilities of a municipality are closely linked to neighbourhoods, including
how people get around; the social, cultural, and recreational services that are available;
and the provision of utilities and public spaces.
Another potential issue in regard to “communities of interest” is the difficulty in locating
them geographically through a ward system. Like-communities are not neatly divided
into the wards of the City of Toronto. There can be overlaps amongst communities,
communities may be larger than a single ward, or the placement of a single community
within a ward may conflict with other ward boundary review principles.
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As noted earlier in this chapter, the connection between neighbourhood associations and
“communities of interest” has arisen in other ward boundary reviews. In the City of
Kingston’s 2013 ward boundary review process, City Council’s ward boundary decision
was appealed to the OMB on the basis that it did not provide effective representation, in
part because the by-law failed to recognize communities of interest by splitting a
neighbourhood association area.996 The OMB sided with the appellant, amending the
bylaw so that the Syndenham Neighbourhood Association was not divided.997 In
Kitchener, the city’s 34 neighbourhood associations that operate across the city were the
“communities of interest” used to inform its ward boundaries.998
The consultants in Toronto’s WBR were broad in their depiction of “communities of
interest.” The consultants stated that they are “difficult to define precisely.”999 They note
of the term: “Sometimes it refers to ethno-cultural commercial areas such as Chinatown,
Little Italy or Little India. The term is also used to define neighbourhoods such as The
Annex, Rexdale, Malvern, Mimico, Mount Dennis or St. Lawrence…”1000 They also
noted that “there is no comprehensive list or map of Toronto’s communities of interest or
neighbourhoods with precise boundaries. Some areas of the city have strong
neighbourhood groups and residents associations with well-defined boundaries, while
other areas do not”1001
The consultants offered their guidelines to capture as many “communities of interest” as
possible in the new ward boundary configuration: first, communities of interest must be
geographically contiguous, meaning that there must not be a gap in their physical
location. Second, communities of interest should not be divided, although this may be
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unavoidable, such as the Jane/Finch area or Malvern, due to the size of these
communities and the location of natural boundaries. The consultants did not identify
communities of interest in advance, nor did they solicit specific feedback from
neighbourhood associations, although they did reach out specifically to BIAs. The next
section details how local participants were engaged in the WBR and what this
involvement tells us about “communities of interest.”

b) “Local” participants in the WBR process
The ward councillor played a crucial role in the WBR, together with input from BIAs and
certain neighbourhood associations. First, councillors had multiple entryways into the
review process: one-on-one consultations with the WBR consultants, involvement in the
public consultation sessions, and decision-making at the Executive Committee and City
Council. Second, unlike neighbourhood associations, BIAs had direct involvement as
stakeholders, perhaps due to the existence of a BIA umbrella organization representing
all BIAs in the city. Third, community councils were not involved in the process, in part
because of city staff concern that their input could ultimately weaken the city’s position
in the event of an OMB appeal. Notwithstanding their formal role in the process, the
boundaries of the community council areas formed part of the ward boundary review, as
a proxy for the identities of the formal municipalities.
Table 5.2 illustrates the involvement that ward councillors, community councils, BIAs
and neighbourhood associations played in WBR design, consultation and decisionmaking, further explained below.
Design
Ward
councillors
Community
councils
Business
improvement
areas

Yes

Specifically
consulted
Yes

Part of public
consultation
No

Decisionmaking role
Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
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Neighbourhood
associations

No

No

Yes

No

Table 5.2: Involvement of local actors in the WBR process
Ward councillor
The ward was of acute importance in the WBR. Not only was the subject matter of the
review the meaning and boundaries of the ward, but the ward councillors as prime
stewards of the ward were disproportionately engaged compared to other local actors. In
the first consultation stage, the consultants individually interviewed all 44 members of
the 2010-2014 City Council and seven new 2014-2018 Members of Council to solicit
their perspective on the issues related to the current Toronto ward configuration.1002 In
stage 2, the consultants had meetings with 42 members of Council and three members of
the Mayor’s staff.
The privileging of the councillor voice revealed itself in the review of the options, as
explained in the Final Report, which specifically set out the ranked order of each of the
public, the councillors, and the results of surveys.1003 The consultants recommended the
“minimal change” option preferred by the councillors, even though this option ranked
fourth (of five options) in a public survey.1004
Councillors also had decision-making power at the Executive Committee and City
Council, which enabled them to advance their views on the proper boundaries of the
ward. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the WBR process was designed by staff and
approved by the Executive Committee and City Council based on a model that would try
to emulate the federal government’s electoral boundary review approach given legislative
constraints. Neither city staff nor councillors attempted to introduce a model like the one
used at the federal level. Instead, staff recommended an arm’s length process that
involved hiring external consultants to develop a set of recommendations, following
1002
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extensive public and stakeholder consultations, which would then go to Executive
Committee and City Council for approval.1005 Staff advised councillors many times that
an OMB review could be successful if the review were overly limited or prescribed, so
the hope was that this fear would further protect the process from undue political
influence.1006 Councillors were given many opportunities to advance their own
perceptions of the appropriate ward boundaries. Their role embodied what a City staff
member whom I interviewed told me, “in the end, [councillors] decide where the
boundaries are.”1007
Community Councils
Community councils did not assume a formal role in the ward boundary review. A senior
City of Toronto staff member told me, in regard to the Etobicoke-York Community
Council, “[A]t their last meeting, they decided they wanted to have this briefing on the
ward boundary review and my staff gave advice: this is within executive committee’s
mandate, not community council.”1008 When I asked why, my contact told me, “I think
we kind of realized that there would end up being motions attached and that had the
potential to contaminate the process, in terms of future appeals and all that kind of stuff,
so that’s why we were trying to influence in that case.”1009 As we know from Chapter 3, a
community council can proceed with an issue even where city staff disagree. I heard from
this staff member that, “there are lots of examples where we’ve given advice that we
think something is a city-wide matter, that community council has considered
anyway.”1010 However, in this case, perhaps due to the emphasis on mitigating an OMB
appeal, the community councils backed off from involvement.
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The politicking related to community council boundaries plays out on the floor of City
Council. This issue came up at the ward boundary review, where many comments were
made as to the groupings of wards and affiliations with former municipalities as relevant
to ward boundaries generally. The groupings of wards to form community councils is not
new. As my former City staff colleague told me, “[W]hen we went from six to four, you
know we had to break the boundaries of the old municipalities and so Etobicoke and
York community council is an interesting one, because it’s really got some of North
York, York and Toronto attached to it.” I learned that the Etobicoke-York community
council area was created as a result of a trade. When staff originally designed that
boundary, “we basically said we’ll take all the wards on the other side of the Humber and
join them up.” One councillor didn’t want to sit on the Etobicoke York Community
Council, so engineered a trade with another councillor, originally in the Toronto-East
York Community Council area. The trade was engineered on the floor even though, to
my contact, “that makes no sense to me, geographically.”1011 The community councils
still serve as a proxy for the pre-amalgamated municipalities. As my contact said, “I
mean this to me seems like the issue, not just for this representation, but also the identity
of the old municipalities. Which, even if we don’t want them to exist and we don’t want
it to be true, is still percolating under the surface, so it’s there if we want it or not.”1012
In my own observation, while attending the public consultation sessions, the location of
wards was not neatly separated from the location of community councils. At the public
meetings, many participants were frustrated that governance, electoral reform or the
operations of community councils were outside the scope of the review.1013 Thirteen
comments were raised as to a New York-style community board system with appointed
volunteers, specified responsibilities and separate staff and budget. Eight participants
were in favour of stronger community councils with greater delegated authority and
propose the creation of a Midtown community council. And, there was widespread
concern in regard to Option 5, whereby the old Scarborough boundary would be shifted.
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Even though the WBR did not concern itself with community councils, they were
relevant to notions of “communities of interest.”
BIAs and neighbourhood associations
BIAs and neighbourhood associations were identified as important stakeholders by the
consultants. BIAs – but not neighbourhood associations – were one of the stakeholder
groups singled out for direct consultation via the umbrella organization, Toronto
Association of Business Improvement Areas (TABIA).1014 In regard to “BIAs and
Resident Associations,” the consultants stated, “In partnership with Toronto City
Council, local commercial property owners and tenants can work together to form a
Business Improvement Area (BIA) to enhance the safety, look and feel of their
neighbourhoods to attract more visitors to shop and dine, as well as to draw new
businesses to their area.”1015 The statement did not mention why this description was
relevant to the WBR, nor why BIAs were to be consulted, but not neighbourhood
associations. No other mention was made of neighbourhood associations, or how they
would be consulted.1016
Neighbourhood associations were actively involved in other aspects of the review,
namely the public consultation sessions. The Final Report states that the involvement of
BIAs and NAs made a difference in how the ward boundaries were crafted.1017 For
example, the Finch-Bathurst BIA, located in North York, is a large, influential BIA and,
as a result of their input, the consultants tried to keep it within a single ward. Likewise,
the boundaries of the Junction and the Waterfront were influenced by the involvement of
these organizations.1018 In the Scarborough consultation meeting that I observed, a
neighbourhood association suggested revisions to proposed boundaries so that their
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community would have a single councillor, making it easier for their interests to be heard.
This recommendation ultimately found its way into the final report.1019
In addition to influencing the location of specific boundaries, the involvement of these
bodies raised important information about the meaning of “communities of interest.”
First, BIAs and neighbourhood associations include boundaries that they argue delineate
a community of interest. These boundaries may be larger or smaller than, and may
conflict with, those of wards. Thus, wards are not meant to accurately map communities
of interest – one goal of the ward boundary review is to minimize, as much as possible,
their separation. Second, these bodies help facilitate the process by providing necessary
input. The consultants did not create wards based on other notions of communities of
interest like neighbourhood improvement areas or demographic information. Instead,
they relied on the feedback of these stakeholders. Third, the involvement of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations was uneven across the City. Certain areas, particularly those
without such organizations, did not give input.
Thus, BIAs and neighbourhood associations reveal themselves as key participants in the
WBR process. Chapter 1 described the debate as to whether BIAs and neighbourhood
associations are important actors in local decision-making. Asserting that some of these
bodies were able to influence the design and location of ward boundaries, the next section
examines more deeply the way in which these bodies, as Toronto’s version of
communities of interest, were specifically engaged.

4. Engaging communities of interest
The engagement of communities of interest was built into the WBR in five ways.1020
First, the consultants specifically engaged seven Toronto “stakeholder groups,” which
included the Toronto Association for Business Improvement Areas (TABIA), the
umbrella organization for Toronto’s BIAs. Second, the consultants held face-to-face
discussions with councillors on two occasions. Third, opportunities were provided to any
1019
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interested person or organization to participant to engage in the review by attending one
of the 24 consultations, with six held in each of the four community council areas. These
consultations were held in two stages – the first to obtain feedback from residents prior to
the drafting of proposed boundaries and the second following the identification of five
options. Fourth, the consultants provided a survey for any person to complete and
forward to the consultants. Fifth, individuals were able to attend the Executive
Committee meeting and give a five-minute deputation with their thoughts on the review.
Interestingly, while TABIA (the umbrella organization for the city’s BIAs) was consulted
directly as a “key stakeholder,” neighbourhood associations were not. This may be due to
the absence of comprehensive contact information, as detailed in Chapter 3. In addition,
unlike TABIA, there is no single umbrella organization that represents the 180+
neighbourhood organizations. However, the consultation sessions provided a forum for
neighbourhood associations to comment on the review process and proposed boundaries.
Table 5.3 sets out the number of people who participated in each of these engagement
exercises.
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Public engagement exercise
Stakeholder groups

Number of Participants
59 (Round 1)1021

2.

Councillor meetings and meetings with
Mayor’s staff

51 (Round 1, includes existing and
new councillors),1022 45 (Round 2)1023

3.

Public meetings, information sessions and
webinar

192 (Round 1),1024 115 (Round 2)1025

4.

Website survey and general submissions

608 (Round 1),1026 732 (Round 2)1027

5.

Deputations at Executive Committee

11028

1.

Table 5.3: Public engagement in the ward boundary review
To better understand the degree of engagement provided in the sessions, I attended
consultation sessions at Metro Hall and in Scarborough, using the method of participatory
observation, as explained in Chapter 2.

a) Observation of downtown WBR consultations
I arrived for a ward boundary review consultation at Metro Hall on October 7, 2015. It
was a brisk fall day. I arrived about ten minutes early and found the room already filled
with about 30 mostly white men and women in their 50s. The entrance way boasted a
table with a calm, unsmiling consultant sitting behind it. On the table was a sign-in sheet,
a survey, pens, and WBR buttons.
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In the room, people were speaking to one another enthusiastically. I chose a table near the
middle, where a gentleman in his sixties was looking in detail at the six maps on the
table. One map was of the existing ward structure; the other five each presented a
different ward configuration option. We smiled at each other as I got out my computer to
type. A few minutes later he passed the maps over to me. A man in his late 20s sat down
next to me just before the meeting started. Several other people trickled in around this
time. One could hear a low hum of talking, including some animated discussion at the
table to my right.
The room was very bright, with halogen lights in the ceiling. There were posters in the
back of the ward boundary options, overlaid with the current ward boundaries. The room
felt crowded with many tables and chairs, but not too full or empty for the number of
people who ultimately came, which was 21. The meeting started about ten minutes late.
The consultants introduced themselves. They noted that this was the fifth of twelve public
meetings and that this was the second of two rounds of consultations that would take
place on the WBR. They had a dry, clear tone as they described the scope of their
mandate. The presentation was very succinct, setting out the reason for the review and the
process they had followed to date, together with a timeline for the future. Half way
through, the presenter switched with another member of the team. They laid out the five
options. They articulated that the fifth option – which was to abandon historical boundary
lines and draw new ones according to the city’s environmental geography – would be a
fresh start.
They then opened the room to questions. There were about fifteen questions from the
floor. The main focus of questions was on the scope of the review – that is, whether other
issues beyond the boundaries would be considered, like the role and function of
community councils, and with having councillors ultimately approve the option, given
the concern that there would be a conflict of interest in them doing so. The consultants
were firm about their mandate as not including anything beyond “drawing lines on a
paper.”
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Next, the consultants asked everyone at each table to discuss the options and to comment
on them. Some participants raised concerns that there were people at each table who were
not from the same sections of the city. The consultants responded that this was the task at
hand and that participants were free to give any comments that they wanted. Our table,
which was a group of three, started talking. The first comments came from the younger
person, who was wearing a suit and was a very articulate a member of a racialized
minority (which stood out given the backgrounds of those in the room), said that he lived
in East York. He expressed that he did not feel at all attached to the historical connections
some felt to their neighbourhood, although noted that he knew that many people in his
ward did. He felt that the best option was the fifth, arguing that there was no need to cling
to historical boundaries. The middle-aged man at the table disagreed, stating that “social
geography” mattered as much as physical geography. He revealed that his interest in the
ward boundaries was due to his involvement in the ranked ballot initiative. He noted that
he lived in Cabbagetown and felt that some of the options would cut through his
neighbourhood. We all looked at the maps in detail and noticed that the fifth option kept
what he understood as his community intact. He seemed to like the fifth option more after
his realization. We continued to have a lively discussion about the review process.
We were given a five-minute warning and then a two-minute warning. Then each table
announced their views. Most of the comments focused in detail on how the proposed
boundaries supported or conflicted with those of neighbourhood associations. Five
speakers focused on the Yonge/Eglinton boundaries and the explosive condo
development over the last decades. They spoke of the three councillors and three planners
involved in local decisions. The preference of the speakers was to have this area located
within a single ward. The St. Lawrence area and Merton Street were also singled out as
areas with strong neighbourhood associations and BIAs, with residents asking that the
boundaries of such organizations be considered when crafting the new wards. Residents
also noted that some areas should be located within multiple wards, for example: “The
waterfront affects everyone in the city. It belongs to Torontonians and all people in
Ontario.”
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The consultants were clear and firm, again, in what feedback they were looking for,
which was essentially comments on the suggested lines themselves, not on the process or
on anything unrelated to the project. It felt a little like it was “business as usual” for the
consultants, that there wasn’t a lot of passion for the exercise. The meeting ended 10
minutes late at 9:10. The participants trickled out slowly, saying goodbye to one another.
I had the impression that many of them would have liked to have continued talking about
the issue.

b) Observation of Scarborough WBR consultations
By contrast, the consultation held in Scarborough about a week later had a very different
feel. The meeting took place in the basement of a local church, in a space that felt
considerably smaller than Metro Hall. The same three consultants were present. I walked
down several stairs into the room. I signed in with my name, address, phone number and
email address. Several round tables were set up with the option maps placed on them and
large versions of the maps were at the back of the room. Two of the tables had other
participants and I joined three of them at the farthest table on the left front side. The
session started very shortly after I got there.
The consultants introduced themselves and gave a presentation exactly like the one that
had taken place at Metro Hall. Afterwards, the consultants opened the floor to questions,
but there were none from the crowd. The consultants asked where everyone was from.
The other two or three participants at the adjacent table noted that they were university
researchers and I acknowledged the same. At the table where I was sitting, one of the
people introduced herself as a member of the consultant team, while the other two people
said they were members of a resident association in southern Scarborough and looked to
be in their late 20s or early 30s and were members of a racialized group. Their ethnicity
stood out because everyone else in the room was white. Otherwise, there were no other
people attending the session.
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The consultants asked if there was any feedback on the boundaries. The other researchers
and I didn’t have anything to say about the Scarborough options or how the lines had
been drawn in the five different maps. However, the members of the resident association
were there to help craft new boundaries for their community, which was split into at least
two wards in each of the five options. These participants stated that their community did
not have many resources and having the voice of the ward councillor really mattered.
That is why they were there. The consultants seemed very eager to hear more and came
close to the table to get a look at precisely where the community was and where the
boundaries should be. They were patient as the two residents drew on the maps and asked
specific questions to ensure that they understood exactly which streets were important, as
the maps did not provide enough detail to show them.
Afterwards, the consultants asked again if there was any more feedback or comments. No
one had any, so the meeting ended. The consultants thanked everyone for coming and the
four other participants gathered their things. The two members of the resident group left
quickly, but the other researchers chatted with the consultants and it seemed that they
knew each other. I also lingered and asked the consultants how the sessions had been
going. The consultants said that the meeting at Metro Hall had been very well attended,
but not so much the others. However, they were happy to have received many completed
surveys. I asked how much other governance issues (like community councils) had come
up during the consultations, and the consultants acknowledged that they had many times,
but that it was not their role to consider the structure or role of these bodies.
My observations of the two open sessions revealed vastly differently kinds of community
involvement. Those at Metro Hall were seemingly middle class and white, generally
representing an association of some kind, within a vibrant meeting that extended beyond
the appointed hour. Scarborough, by contrast, suggested a scantily attended meeting, with
just two participants who were not researchers. The attendees were also representing an
organization that did not fit the typical profile of neighbourhood associations.
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The consultations highlighted ongoing negotiation between and among groups regarding
the boundaries of “community.”1029 In the consultation sessions, I witnessed how the
proposed wards came into conflict with neighbourhood and community level bodies who
had crafted their own boundary lines around particular geographies, forming associations
to reflect their interests. In both situations, neighbourhood associations wanted the
legitimacy and security of ward boundaries to reinforce their own iterations of belonging.
These sessions reinforced, as Schragger and Martin state, that communities are the
products of contested political norms dependent on borders to define them, and the
political actions of those that define where those boundaries should lie.1030
The next section further explores more broadly how neighbourhood boundaries did – and
did not – conform to the geographic framing of proposed wards and what these
contestations meant for representation.
5. Contested “Local” Boundaries
In the consultants’ Options Report and the Final Report, the consultants detailed the
feedback they had received on the contested boundaries raised during the ward boundary
review. By “contested boundaries,” I mean the way in which boundary lines were crafted
in relation to disputed locations of the applicable communities of interest. Unlike some
reviews, the City of Toronto did not independently identify the locations of communities
of interest based on any demographic data. Instead, the process assumed that residents
and others would inform the consultants using or more of the public engagement
exercises that were conducted. The reports did not identify whether the contested
boundaries were raised at the stakeholder meetings, consultation sessions, surveys or
other means.
The contested boundaries can be roughly grouped into three categories. First, there are
those communities of interest which are divided amongst two or more wards. Second,
there were disputes over how communities of interest should be grouped with others.
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Third, there were strong sentiments regarding the groupings of wards and their
corresponding boundaries.

a) Communities of interest in a single ward
The WBR reports included many comments as to communities of interest that were
purportedly small enough to be placed in a single ward, which were currently divided
amongst two or three wards. The communities mentioned in the reports included the
Yonge/Eglinton area, the High Park community (Runnymede, Annette, Bloor West
Village, Swansea, High Park and Parkdale are said to have “great affinity with each
other” but are currently divided, Liberty Village, Toronto’s Waterfront, the Junction,
Victoria Park, and the Kingston-Galloway/Orton Park). In each, the existing boundary
lines were said to divide well-established communities of interest.1031
At the consultation session that I attended, there was substantial commentary on the
Yonge-Eglinton area, which is currently split among three councillors, two community
council areas, and two sets of planning staff.1032 Participants noted that there are issues
with the Yonge and Eglinton street boundaries, which currently divide wards, because of
all the development, and that both sides of Yonge are affected.1033 That the Yonge and
Eglinton area is a growth centre exacerbates the difficulty in coordinating amongst
different planning and political actors, thus the ward placement matters. Yonge Street
also divides a strong retail strip and the local BIA. Other residents spoke about the
appropriateness of Yonge as a separation. For example, the Yonge Street boundary fits
with school boundaries, and “nobody” east of Yonge goes to school west of Yonge.
When the last ward boundary review took place in 2000, some of Toronto’s
neighbourhoods did not exist. The consultant reports note concerns from respondents
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regarding new built areas like Liberty Village, Fort York and City Place.1034 The reports
also cite ward divisions in the Waterfront and Entertainment District areas, and the desire
to shift ward divisions so that the BIA community would not be split.1035 Residents also
noted communities of interest that are too large to fit within a single ward and, therefore,
a dispute over how the boundary lines should be drawn to divide them. They include the
Jane-Finch area; the University of Toronto and York University; the Danforth and the
Beaches. Malvern in Scarborough has a small enough population to fit into a single ward,
but is divided by a natural boundary.

b) Multiple communities of interest in a single ward
Second, the consultant reports noted contested boundaries regarding the groupings of
communities of interest. For example, Ward 32 currently includes Thorncliffe and
Flemingdon Park, which are racially diverse and two of the least wealthy communities in
the city, together with the affluent neighbourhood of Leaside. The Options Report noted
resident feedback that, “Leaside, Bennington Heights and Wynford Heights [the latter
two of which are affluent like Leaside] and the severely disadvantaged, more populous
and [ethnically diverse and racialized] neighbourhoods of Thorncliffe Park and
Flemingdon Park. Demographically, they are very different – can create issues for
representation and equitable distribution of recreation and cultural facilities in the
ward.”1036
Multiple comments focused on the placement of the Leaside community alongside other
communities. For example, that Leaside could be added to Ward 29 as “historically they
were one community,” and that Leaside and Bennington Heights belong in a ward that
includes some, or all, of Davisville Village, Moore Park and North Toronto, which are
amongst Toronto’s more affluent communities. There was great objection to dividing
Leaside boundaries in any way, as “it is a community.”1037
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The grouping of Leaside, Flemington Park and Thorncliffe Park were mentioned by
multiple commentators. Some said that these three communities of interest “need to stay
together.” Others thought that Flemington Park and Thorncliffe were areas that “have
many issues that would benefit from a smaller ward and personalized treatment.” There
were also many comments that Flemington Park and Thorncliffe Park should be set
within a single ward and noting that the new federal riding had inappropriately divided
them. Another contested set of boundaries which fall into this category is a downtown
ward that combines the “very disparate socio-economic status between neighbourhoods”
like Rosedale, Yorkdale, Moss Park and St. Jamestown that “would be better served if
separated.”1038 This claim of being “better served” is unsubstantiated by those who made
the claim.1039
The desire to separate communities of interest along economic lines could be seen as its
own brand of NIMBY by trying to reframe whose “backyards” should be invited to stay
in the new ward. Cheryl Teelucksingh writes of the divided community of Parkdale,
where spatial and environmental justice are evident in micro-spaces of a single ward.1040
Teelucksingh observed the separation of the ward into North and South, whereby the
North was characterized as safe, clean and more European, while the South had greater
numbers of visible minorities and new immigrants; lower incomes, crime and poorer
housing stock.1041 These perceived differences were replicated by the City of Toronto’s
planning processes, which divided North and South Parkdale for planning purposes,
including different policies or one-way streets in the more affluent North Parkdale despite
the closer siting to highways in the south.1042 The social and spatial distinctions in
Parkdale were also noted by the location of “locally undesirable land uses” in the
south.1043 Similarly, the cases of contested claims over whether affluent and poorer,
1038
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racialized communities should remain in a single ward clarified that such distinctions and
borders existed and continued to separate ward residents. Despite almost twenty years of
co-existence in a ward, Thorncliffe Park, Flemingdon Park and Leaside remain distinct
communities, with Leaside’s long-ago “ghost” status as its own independent municipality
given dominating the dialogue on its “community of interest” boundaries.
The divisions within the ward also point to the representation of more affluent or middle
class residents. Teelucksingh states: “[T]he interests of residents who are able to exercise
power become packaged as collective interests, whereas the interests of the marginalized
residents are localized to their own homes and limited spheres of interest. Marginalized
residents, who represent the majority stakeholder in Parkdale, often do not have the
resources or opportunity to participate in advocating their interests.”1044 Maps of residents
associations show one in Leaside, but not Flemingdon Park or Thorncliffe Park. The
“many issues” of Flemingdon Park or Thorncliffe Park by neighbourhood associations
who participated in the WBR were not characterized as issues of concern across the ward,
but of only those residents in the applicable communities.
This raises a deeper question of how we characterize the participation of those who
belong to neighbourhood associations. As McClymont and P. O’Hare write, assertions of
NIMBYism mean that there are “good” and “bad”, “welcome” and “unwelcome” forms
of democratic participation. To dismiss groups as NIMBY, or to critique their rationality
as being entirely self-interested or even malevolent, may, therefore, be misplaced or
misleading.1045 These comments point not simply to some residents wishing to displace
other, more vulnerable people within their ward, but also to spatial inequalities in
representation generally. In other words, understanding the role of neighbourhood
associations in representing the interests of a narrow set of residents, how can a more
inclusive “local governance” model be crafted?
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c) Communities of interest as groupings of wards
A third focus were the groupings of wards and their corresponding boundaries. At the
consultation session that I attended at Metro Hall, a suggestion was made that downtown
councillors should represent the Downtown as designated in the Official Plan. In
addition, there were strong sentiments about Option 5, which attempted to redraw the
wards based on natural boundaries; as the consultants put it, “as though we were drawing
the wards for the first time.” Residents suggested that, instead, Scarborough should be
“kept intact,” noting its distinct pre-amalgamation identity. Participants also spoke about
the locations of wards within community council boundaries. Members from a North
York neighbourhood association noted that the community near Lawrence and Yonge
identifies more with the Toronto-East York Community Council area. The Southeast
Asian (Filipino, Vietnamese) and Black (Jamaican, West African) community at the
south-east corner of Ward 7, the southwest corner of Ward 8, the northwest corner of
Ward 12 and the northeast corner of Ward 11 were noted as having been divided in the
existing wards.1046
Two of the options split the University of Toronto’s campus in a way that residents
objected to. In particular, there was concern about separating St. Michael’s and Victoria
College, which were said to be “cohesive communities” and that it is “important for
political activity, community organizing, etc. to keep these communities together.”1047
Other suggestions included coming up with a way for the university to remain in one
ward and shifting the ward locations of university residences.1048
These categories of communities of interest reflect the conflict between how state-based
law, and the norms and rules of other actors or bodies. The creation of local legal spaces
includes insiders and outsiders, a set of norms that determines who is eligible to
participate, in what manner, and with what power. The WBR process was defined
narrowly, without considering whether the ward model should be maintained or the
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system of governance more broadly. This meant that some communities of interest were
able to able to conform their version of boundaries within those of wards, due to their
size or locations, and based on their ability to access city processes to assert their
interests.
The ward as the prime local legal space in law was not fundamentally challenged in the
WBR, although tensions were raised. A summary of the overlapping role of wards,
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations in the process, and how this
overlap informs the meaning of local governance in Toronto is described next.
III. Conclusion
The WBR case study was an opportunity to study the boundaries and governance of
Toronto’s “local legal spaces.” It illustrated the scholarship of Frug and Young, who
argue that legal boundaries are borne of political decision-making that ultimately creates
boundary lines that exclude and embrace particular communities. It also affirmed the
conception of “legal ghosts,” drawn from Valverde’s contribution of time within
governance, that remain components of the boundaries and governance of local legal
spaces regardless of formal law. The WBR highlighted the challenges of decisionmaking, affirming the primacy of the ward councillor and the privileged role of BIAs and
NAs. The review neither questioned the primacy of the ward as the dominant
representational unit of local governance, nor challenged the dilemma of fitting
communities of interest within the ward, notwithstanding their differences in size. In this
case study, the pluralistic nature of local governance is revealed through the many
representations of local both within and outside of formal law, but which may not have
recognition in the formal local governance model. In particular, the WBR highlighted the
privileged role of BIAs and NAs whose communities of interests are of the right size and
location to rest within the ward, as well as the primacy of the ward councillor as decisionmaker.
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In the WBR, the City of Toronto queried the boundaries and representation of its local
government, and was empowered under COTA to significantly alter its local spaces with
latitude to design an inclusive, participatory approach to decision-making. The study
leads to two important conclusions: In regard to decision-making, the WBR case study
demonstrates that the ward councillor played the most important role in decision-making.
The centrality of the councillor role is enabled by the terms of the City of Toronto Act,
2006, which requires that all decisions be made by City Council, meaning the 44
councillors and mayor who comprise the body. However, councillor importance was also
facilitated by the design of the WBR, crafted and approved by councillors so as to require
that the final decision come back to them. While BIAs and neighbourhood associations
both engaged in the review, those areas without BIAs and neighbourhood associations are
reliant on individual community members or existing ward councillors to advance their
interests.
Ward councillors held many roles in the review (designing the process, providing input
through direct consultations, final decision-makers) and did not engage in a broader
review of the city’s local governance model. As a representational unit, the ward
councillor was given a significant role during consultation, recommendation and
decision-making. As a geographic concept, the ward is meant to enable but not contradict
the communities of interest, which includes the BIAs and neighbourhood associations to
the extent that such boundaries fit neatly within ward boundaries.
Second, the meaning of “communities of interest” was a crucial component of the WBR.
BIAs and neighbourhood associations – but not community councils – were recognized
as proxy communities of interest in the WBR and in the final outcome of ward design.
BIAs and neighbourhood associations include boundaries that they argue delineate a
community of interest. These boundaries may be larger or smaller than, and may conflict
with, those of wards. Thus, wards are not meant to accurately map communities of
interest although a goal of the ward boundary review is to minimize, as much as possible,
their fracture and separation. These bodies help to facilitate the process by providing
necessary input. The consultants did not create wards based on other notions of
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communities of interest like neighbourhood improvement areas or demographic
information, even though such data was available. Instead, they relied on the feedback of
these stakeholders. The involvement of BIAs and neighbourhood associations is uneven
across the City, which impacts the degree to which all communities of interest are able to
give input and engage in existing and proposed ward boundaries. Other communities of
interest may not be identified because of the absence of neighbourhood associations and
BIAs in all parts of the City, and because neighbourhood associations in particular may
not have the capacity to gather all information on such communities.
The sum of these conclusions reinforces that local legal spaces are defined and defended
in relation to the ward, with BIAs and neighbourhood associations generally
accommodated where their boundaries did not contradict or challenge the existing ward
model. In addition to influencing the location of specific boundaries, the involvement of
these bodies raised important information about the meaning of “communities of interest”
and other boundaries and decision-making bodies in the city, in particular community
councils, although such examinations were deemed outside of the WBR scope. The next
chapter builds on these case studies to ask how a local governance model could be
conceived if crafted within the theoretical lens of the urban commons.
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Chapter 6 – Road-mapping the new theoretical territory of local governance
The central question that the dissertation seeks to answer is what “local governance”
means within the City of Toronto as a result of the overlap of various governance bodies,
each with their own set of geographic boundaries and assertions of representation. In
Toronto, these overlapping bodies are wards (as represented by councillors), community
councils, business improvement areas and neighbourhood associations, each of which
claim geographical boundaries as justification for the representation of locally-based
populations, play a role in local governance and claim to be open to participation to some
degree. This research asks whether the overlap of these bodies has unrecognized
consequences and how these consequences affect marginalized peoples.
In Chapter 1, I justified a conception of local governance grounded in legal pluralism,
property law and legal geography. I referenced the scholarship of Frug and Young, who
argue that local boundaries are the products of political decision-making and may
privilege certain communities over others.1049 These scholars acknowledge that room
must be made for a broader range of communities to participate in decision-making
through the use of planning charettes and other engagement practices.1050 Building on the
work of Valverde, Santos and Blomley, who have studied the overlapping nature of
boundaries and governance, I focus specifically on the vertical tensions and interlegalities
about the smaller-than-city scale itself. I argue that this scholarship has framed the central
tension of local governance as between the city and region or province, rather than
centred on the smaller-than-city bodies that are unequally embedded and privileged
within the governance model.
The early part of this dissertation outlined the legal basis for decision-making under
applicable provincial legislation and municipal bylaws. Against these formal rules, the
dissertation next examined the history, roles and interplay of wards, community councils,
BIAs and neighbourhood associations as bodies that purport to represent the local
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interests of those located within overlapping smaller-than-city geographical spaces in
Toronto. Through this study, wards constitute a historical relic dating back to the
establishment of the City of Toronto in 1834 as part of a representative model inherited
from the United Kingdom without serious reflection.
In the current model, wards emerge as the dominant actor in local governance, with
councillors asserting a representative role for residents and an oversight role for planning
and other decisions within their boundaries. Toronto’s four community councils are a
post-amalgamation phenomenon, a collective of 10-12 councillors tasked with a role as
local planning committees, rather than exercising the broader mandate outlined in the
procedural bylaw. BIAs and neighbourhood associations also claim to represent interests
within bounded communities. While BIAs are local bodies of the city, with bylaws that
clarify their boundaries and permit the collection of a levy from members, a dedicated
city staff office assisting them with their affairs, and requirements that they follow
accountability requirements, neighbourhood associations are not integrated in the city’s
operations. The city’s 184 neighbourhood associations have a variety of forms, levels of
activity, and purposes.
What emerges from these early sections is a clearer picture of local decision-making than
the “law in the books” might suggest. Toronto’s governance model focuses largely on
ward-based planning processes rather than mechanisms for inclusive participation in citywide decisions, with only a few mandated engagement processes. In some areas of the
city, councillors and staff rely on BIAs and neighbourhood associations to encourage
community acceptance for proposed developments. However, while wards and
community councils are present in all areas of the city, BIAs and neighbourhood
associations are not, leaving many areas unrepresented by such bodies. Even where they
do exist, generally in the city’s more affluent areas, they do not represent a broad range of
identities and interests. While initially conceived as deliberative spaces akin to New
York’s community boards, community councils largely serve as forums for rubberstamping local planning decisions made by ward councillors.
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Chapters 4 and 5 set out case studies examining the boundaries of overlapping local legal
spaces, the bodies and contestations of local governance, and the localized effects of
“city-wide” decisions. Chapter 4 analyzes the 2012-13 decision regarding the
introduction of a casino in four parts of the city, including the downtown core. After a
contentious, year-long debate, City Council voted against the proposal by a vote of 40-4,
together with a motion to restrict the expansion of the Woodbine Racetrack, located in an
economically struggling areas in Rexdale, located in Toronto’s northwest. In 2015, this
latter decision was revisited with little opposition and the expansion was permitted. These
cases reflect three different conceptions of local governance. First, while the downtown
casino debate encompassed a more expansive geography with several sites across
Toronto, both decisions ultimately focused on “local” concerns. In the 2012-13, these
concerns were expansive and included traffic, health, parks and planning, while in
Rexdale the decision focused exclusively on jobs and economic impacts. Second, the
councillors in the downtown casino debate were able to mobilize little-known procedural
bylaw provisions to have the matter debated at the community council level. This
permitted downtown councillors, who were not part of the Executive Committee and
therefore did not have a voice in the “city-wide” process other than via City Council, to
seize control of the debate. In contrast, the Woodbine expansion became a pro forma
agenda item with little consideration outside the walls of the Executive Committee and
City Council. In both cases the ward councillors exercised considerable control over the
process and the outcome, affirming the central role played by these “local” actors. Third,
the two casino debates suggest very different engagement roles for BIAs and
neighbourhood associations, with organizations from across the city heavily involved in
the downtown debate and not at all involved in Woodbine.
Chapter 5 detailed the city’s ward boundary review, which sought to review the number
and boundaries of electoral districts, the first review full review since amalgamation. The
case studies set out the overlapping roles of wards, community councils, BIAs and
neighbourhood associations in these debates and the ways in which these bodies
purported to represent local interests. The ward emerges as the critical feature of local
governance, both in its representational and geographic form. First, the review did not
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question whether the ward should remain the representational unit of the city. Second,
councillors were given a privileged role during all of the consultation, recommendation
and decision-making phases of the review, far more than riding representatives would
have in provincial or federal electoral redistricting. Third, as a geographic concept, the
WBR was meant to legitimize as many communities of interest (ostensibly BIAs and
neighbourhood associations) as possible within the constraints of the existing ward model
and judicial parameters, but was not designed for other notions of local governance. BIAs
and neighbourhood associations, disproportionately located across the city, were heavily
invested in the process highlighting the degree to which these organizations can play an
important role in local governance.
This last chapter now seeks to synthesize this data. I first apply the conception of local
governance developed in Chapter 1 as a framework to explore the themes raised
throughout this dissertation by situating the theoretical boundaries of local governance.
The final section of this chapter offers an ambitious agenda for conceptualizing local
governance in Toronto, together with concrete recommendations for legal and policy
changes within the normative framework of the urban commons, allowing for a more
inclusive and participatory model. I conclude with a proposed set of questions for future
research.

I.

Conceptualizing local governance: lessons learned

Chapter 1 sets out a conception of local governance grounded in legal pluralism and legal
geography. I set out a two-part conceptualization of local governance in Chapter 1 that
first, recognizes the pluralistic and interlegal nature of local legal spaces and, second, is
framed by the state in political and spatial terms without necessarily incorporating other
norms, orders, rules and practices, and may ultimately include and exclude certain people
and communities through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. In Chapter 1, I
argue that a normative reimagining of local governance based on the framework of Foster
and Iaione’s urban commons would lead to a more inclusive, participatory local
governance model in Toronto. This first section integrates the findings made earlier in
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this dissertation with both the conceptualization of local governance and the normative
reimagination.

1. Understanding local governance in the Toronto context
I locate local governance foremost as a pluralist concept. This means that local
governance cannot be understood as self-contained and autonomous. Conceptions of
local governance can be singular or multiple, and may even compete with one other.
Plural notions of local may be articulated with legal language, yet may also be created
informally, thus requiring an examination that looks outside the strict contours of law to
understand the boundaries and governance of local legal spaces.
Chapters 3 set out the tensions of how local governance is situated within the city’s
broader governance model, as comprised of community councils, wards and smallerthan-ward boundaries and representatives, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. These
entities, while each claiming governance roles, may be legally reflected in different
sections of provincial acts (initially, wards and communities) and municipal bylaws
(community councils and BIAs), or may not be recognized in law at all (neighbourhood
associations). Even where these bodies are individually set out in law, their relationships
with other local governance bodies may be unclear.
The law provides a seemingly coherent structure for municipal government generally.
The Constitution Act articulates that municipalities are within the provincial domain,
which the Province of Ontario in turn executes through COTA and other pieces of
legislation and regulations. The law thus sets out a ladder or hierarchy of power, with the
federal government on top, leading downwards towards the municipality, which in strict
constitutional terms may not even be considered a government.1051 But, the reality of
law’s relations, the “law on the street,” tells a different story. First, this hierarchical
notion of municipal authority is in tension with the shifting intergovernmental relations,
whereby cities and their mayors are increasingly important players within the country.
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This is reflected in funding decisions, whereby the federal government transferred
billions to municipalities to make final spending decisions;1052 political agency, whereby
the provincial government refused to step in to remove Toronto’s mayor;1053 and the
accountability model, whereby the City successfully argued that more expansive
provincial ombudsman powers should not apply to Toronto’s affairs.1054 The courts, too,
have stepped in to recognize the principle of subsidiarity as underpinning municipal
power, meaning that cities should be given wider latitude to make decisions in the best
interests of their residents. Scholars including Levi and Valverde have noted that this
increasing recognition by senior governments and the courts speaks to the power of local
residents, in that municipalities have the ears, perhaps better than any other government,
of the many people that reside within their boundaries.1055 Thus, local governance (in this
case, local meaning municipal) has shifted from a non-governmental, prescriptively
managed entity to a government that is not entirely explained by the legal codes that
profess to govern.
Second, while the law doesn’t accurately speak to the municipal role in the overall
governmental hierarchy and is silent on key areas of governance,1056 it is clear that
Toronto has a general capacity to decide the structure and operation of its governance
model.1057 The ward is in one sense an organizational unit, sectioning the city into neatly
divided groups. These carved sections serve to install councillors who oversee the affairs
within the ward and speak for their constituents in the larger context of City Council.
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This local role of ward councillors is largely unwritten and historical, a set of relations
left over from centuries of governance evolution. Thus, the law acts as an unwritten set of
norms. Wards ensure that each part of the city has a representative at City Council and
that residents have a point of contact. While the law does not explicitly define how local
governance functions in Toronto, the ward and its councillor emerge as profoundly
important in their organizational, representative and coercive capacities. The ward is the
basis upon which local governance is negotiated in formal and informal law, by enabling
institutional voices to be heard and acting as a gateway into the City’s governance
structure.
Wards emerge as a formal mechanism to geographically carve sections in the city, even
though COTA does not require this manner of city organization. The historical legacy of
the ward and, until recently, the provincial power to determine city boundaries, has
arguably contributed to the City’s persistent emphasis on wards as the spokespersons of
“local” since amalgamation. The ward need not embody this role. The relationship
between wards and community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are
entirely within the City’s authority. Despite the challenges that this relationship poses for
representation, the ward has remained at the centre of governance as a result of political
choices, incremental decision-making, and the absence of a holistic governance review.
Community councils have not challenged the power of the councillor. Their genesis was
a provincial commandment meant to soften the blow of a forced amalgamation. They
were initially conceived as bodies to emulate the former functions of the local
municipalities, as forums to gather community input on matters of neighbourhood
concern. While committee councils are largely used as a committee to make routine
planning decisions, the procedural bylaw also sets out a back door for them to provide a
forum for neighbourhood affairs, a largely unused and little discussed provision that
remained dormant until the 2012-13 casino debate. Efforts to use community councils in
a similar manner during the WBR process were discouraged. While no longer part of
provincial legislation, community councils ostensibly serve as an efficient means to
handle mundane city business and reduce the burden at City Council, and to keep
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meddling councillors busy, rather than fulfilling this originally-conceived governance
function until commanded by councillors aware of their existence.
Both wards and community councils embody the notion of “law on the books” versus
“law in action.” Wards are not legally required under provincial legislation, yet no
reviews during or following amalgamation have questioned their use. The ward
councillor role exists via custom, but any effort to change their function or activities
would need to be approved by organs empowered under the existing system. Similarly,
community councils may serve a deliberative role in local decisions beyond planning, but
this function rarely takes place. In this way, community councils do not marry their actual
affairs, which for the most part are local planning functions that could either be delegated
to staff or that must be sent to City Council for approval, to those laid out in legal
codes.1058
In regard to other local bodies, the ward’s relationship with community councils is the
most explicit, in that 10-12 wards are grouped together to form the community council
area, with only councillors serving as representatives. The will of the ward councillor, in
tandem with others within the same community council area, determines whether the
community council may be used as a forum to bring neighbourhood actors together, as
occurred in the 2012-13 casino decision.
Wards can also act as a focal point or enabler for BIAs and neighbourhood associations.
Some ward councillors help create these smaller-than-city bodies, consult them as
sounding boards for policy decisions, or use them to further their individual and
collective agendas. The councillor may be seen to represent their residents by responding
to BIA and neighbourhood association concerns. Without any clear entryway into the
city’s local governance model, the ward can be a door to BIAs and neighbourhood
associations, letting them in when it serves a councillor’s interest (for example the
promotion of certain ward boundaries in North York in the ward boundary review).
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From a local planning perspective, this messy, plural model has an internal coherence,
albeit with notable socio-economic exclusion. The “local” includes varying legal and
non-legal claims by many entities, with contested meanings of local governance
presented by the ward, community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations, each
with their own set of boundaries and members. Wards and community councils have
clear lines of authority and involvement in relation to the planning process. As noted in
Chapter 3, BIAs and neighbourhood associations, although they play out differently in
various parts of the city, feed into local planning by way of their involvement with ward
councillors. The procedural bylaw also sets out a series of consultation requirements,
which include the power of BIAs and neighbourhood associations (and any other member
of the public) to depute at community councils and committees of adjustment
meetings.1059 The mandates of community councils are thus understood within this model
as forums for deliberation. This geographically overlapping set of bodies, each with their
own iteration of local governance, has a messy but coherent framework in the planning
context.
However, when looking at the model from a city-wide perspective, the meaning and
facilitation of local governance is less clear. As defined, a city-wide issue concerns more
than one community council area and therefore applies to the city as a whole. This means
that the Executive Committee and then City Council will consider the issue. However, in
some city-wide decisions, like the 2012-13 casino decision, “local” may be negotiated by
one or more ward councillors. In this issue, they were able to shift the theatre of decisionmaking to the community council area using a little-known provision of the procedural
bylaw.1060 This “local” included the proposed areas of possible casinos, but more broadly
it meant the spaces where the casino would be felt. It meant the spaces of businesses and
residents throughout the downtown core and down to the waterfront, but also the areas of
addiction, which extended to vulnerable neighbourhoods nearby. A city-wide issue may
also focus on smaller geographic units, for example the ward boundary review decision,
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where BIAs and neighbourhood associations played a crucial role in defining the
“communities of interest” meant to reflect the wards.
Thus, Toronto’s governance model operates within the law (wards) and outside it
(neighbourhood associations), or as bodies that have competing conceptions depending
on how they are used by stakeholders (community councils, BIAs). The next section
explores how these notions of local include and exclude particular communities.

2. The implications of local exclusion
The following section analyzes how the construction of “local” excludes, though
geography and in representation, and the resulting implications.

a) How law excludes
The overlap of local governance in Toronto reveals two ways in which the model
excludes: geography and representation.
Based on geography
Creating local legal spaces necessarily means the creation of boundary lines.1061 These
lines may be created formally through a municipality’s establishment of electoral districts
or wards, and by the creation of other representational units, for example New York’s
community committees or Toronto’s BIAs. Such bodies may co-exist as what Moore
calls semiautonomous social fields, rather than being meant to fit into a coherent
governance structure.1062 Other organizations may also create versions of local that have
boundary lines, without such bodies being in any way related to a municipal government
and therefore subject to oversight. Boundaries also have the effect of classifying
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particular members of the community into one area or another.1063 This means that all of
these lines necessarily create an “inside” and an “outside.”1064
Some scholars believe that residents often create boundaries based on notions of
community that exclude people along racial lines and ultimately exacerbate a “who is in
and who is out” notion of belonging.1065 This is evidenced in Toronto by the signifant
differences in spatial poverty and race across the city.1066 Neighbourhood associations, in
particular, are said to exacerbate exclusionary notions of community in order to maintain
a narrow understanding of who is included. As presented in Chapter 1, Alexander and
Peñalver believe that neighbourhood associations are the new “community” and base
their commonality on factors like housing values.1067 Frug argues that local should be
formed as a “togetherness of strangers” without regard for demographics, where people
regardless of their backgrounds would be brought together through the use of charettes
and other community building exercises.1068
Three geographic exclusions are evident. First, neighbourhood associations and BIAs do
not have objective measures in how they draw the lines around their communities. It is
impossible to definitively find that a community exists “here” rather than “there.”
Boundaries may be arbitrary or imposed in law without recognition of who resides within
them. In the case of neighbourhood associations, they are largely drawn in a box or
rectangle for simplicity, not because those specific lines are the exact markers of who
belongs and who doesn’t. Some associations permit residents from outside the boundaries
to become members, as if to understand that strict geographic lines may leave relevant
people out. Neighbourhood associations may also reflect the “ghost” villages of legal
boundaries that existed in the past. In the case of BIAs, the lines that are drawn have
political ends as well, in that they need to be endorsed by local councillors, and therefore
should not exist outside of the applicable ward, and because the levy is contingent on the
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approval of the applicable property owners and businesses. Therefore, the drawing of
lines is not an objective statement of which businesses “belong,” but on political, social
or historical placement.
Second, the drawing of lines is supported by Toronto’s decision-making context. In the
WBR, councillors had their own views on where the boundary lines of wards should be
located. When councillors on the Executive Committee sent the recommendations back to
the WBR consultants for consideration, some councillors did so on the basis that the
drawing of the lines did not incorporate their own views of where “communities” should
be, whereby communities were a proxy for maintaining the boundaries as they were.
These political aims of councillors ultimately shaped notions of community that differed
in some cases from the perspectives of BIAs and neighbourhood associations.
Third, the lines setting community councils are perhaps the best reflection of how
boundary lines are politically motivated. Toronto’s community councils were created in
1998 to mirror the boundaries of the former municipalities and were a political reaction to
the forced amalgamation. As a senior staff member advised, “community councils were
kind of a last minute addition, they were thrown in as a softening blow to
amalgamation.”1069 In 2000, Toronto staff introduced an initiative to reduce the number
of community councils from six to four in order to keep the councils approximately the
same size and to align service district areas. As noted in Chapter 5, the location of the
Etobicoke-York Community Council boundary was politically driven, with councillors
making a trade on the floor of City Council.1070
Community council boundaries were a factor in the WBR. One of the options presented
by the consultants disrupted the conception of Toronto’s wards by redrawing them as if
they had never been drawn before, based on the city’s physical geography. The result of
this exercise was a disruption of the Scarborough boundary, which was represented as a
community council boundary following amalgamation. This was deemed to be a highly
1069
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contentious proposal, one that the public seemed to “love or hate.” Those that hated it did
so on the grounds that it interfered with the “ghost” of the former Scarborough. The
Executive Committee requested that “in conducting the review the consultants consider
the Committee’s preference for maintaining the Community Council boundaries given
their historical significance reflecting communities of interest.”1071 The “historical
significance” meant at least one of the boundary lines of the pre-amalgamated
municipalities.
In summary, local legal spaces, which form the foundation of my conception of local
governance, exclude based on geography. Boundary lines themselves represent particular
versions of community. Councillors, with the input of BIAs and neighbourhood
asssociations, play a dominant role in crafting how boundary lines in the formal
governance model are drawn. In addition, the “ghosts” of previous municipalities factor
into their placement. The result is local legal spaces with particular perspectives of
belonging.
Based on representation
In addition to geographic boundary lines, local legal spaces include and exclude based on
representation. The ward system is based on the idea that geographic representation is the
best way by which the interests of residents will be served. There is no consensus that an
electoral boundary-based model is the only means by which representation can be
achieved; there are examples of other municipal governments where councillors are
elected at large, not based on wards.1072 Still, in Toronto, this is the fundamental premise
of the ward system: that the ward councillor represents their residents within its
respective boundaries. And, in practice, this representation may mean that only particular
perspectives are given weight. The exclusion is thus two-fold: the exclusion of voices or
interests considered important by the ward councillor, and the exclusion of other
representations of local.
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A councillor may understand the interests of the residents and businesses within his or
her ward based on the interests articulated by smaller-than-city bodies located within the
ward. BIAs and neighbourhood associations can have a big impact on local debates, as is
well documented in major decisions in Toronto, particularly in the planning context.1073
This was also demonstrated in my case studies. The 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions
point to the differences where wards include BIAs and neighbourhood associations. In
the 2012-13 decision, councillors in wards that could have had a downtown casino had
frequent meetings with BIAs and neighbourhood associations, even creating a
subcommittee to ensure adequate consultation with BIAs. This contrasts with the 2015
casino decision, where there were no BIAs or neighbourhood associations located in the
ward where the Woodbine Racetrack would be expanded. In the 2012-13 casino decision,
BIAs and neighbourhood associations helped in shaping a new use of the Toronto-East
York Community Council in city-wide decisions. For the first time, the community
council used a subcommittee to permit greater consultation of BIAs and to allow for
deeper consideration of community impacts. In the WBR, neighbourhood associations
were the main bodies that used the consultation process and gave input on proposed
boundaries.
While there are well-founded concerns regarding the role of BIAs and neighbourhood
associations as representative of interests within urban spaces, they may also serve as a
helpful tool in understanding the power dynamics within urban governance. The WBR
demonstrated that the creation of boundaries was undertaken with a particular set of
principles based on what the court has set out as priorities for determining how boundary
lines should be drawn. Neighbourhood associations are recognized as “communities of
interest,” or the embodiment of belonging.1074 However, the consultants were not able to
maintain all communities (as defined by BIAs and neighbourhood associations) intact,
often with the argument that keeping such communities together would negate having the
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same approximate sized wards across the city.1075 For example, the Jane-Finch
neighbourhood association identified community boundaries that the consultants thought
would not fit within a single ward. The consultants recommended keeping other
communities together within a single ward, including the North York BIA or keeping
together communities that had previously been separated.1076
Unlike existing scholarship suggesting that neighbourhood associations focus solely on
utilitarian objectives such as property values, my observations of Toronto’s BIAs and
neighbourhood associations point to varying objectives and purposes. These associations
are not exclusively located within affluent neighbourhoods, nor are their members solely
comprised of homeowners. In the ward boundary review, organizations from
economically challenged areas attended public consultation meetings to argue that their
residents, currently divided amongst three wards, should be kept intact, a proposal that
was ultimately accepted by the consultants and incorporated into their recommendations.
In the 2012-13 casino debate, resident associations located across various downtown
wards framed their concerns on the basis of addiction and mental health issues
experienced by their members, rather than the financial effects of having a casino nearby.
The data on neighbourhood associations affirms this assertion: while associations are
disproportionately within affluent neighbourhoods and are formed to address local
planning proposals, the organizations exist throughout the city, often reflecting members
with a range of ethnicities, and have purposes beyond planning matters.
A second kind of representational exclusion is the prioritization of city-wide decisionmaking by the ward councillor. As one city staff member told me, “They have a tendency
to look at the issues in very isolated ways sometimes, they don’t connect it to the larger
whole.”1077 This approach disproportionately affects the most marginalized of Toronto’s
residents, whose needs are not isolated to a particular geography. This same staff member
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said, “What is it that the city needs, who are the people that are disenfranchised and
marginalized, irrespective of where they are living. Of course they happen to be
geographically located in certain areas. What is the best way of connecting them to jobs
and connecting them to opportunities? How can we build capacities of those communities
to be able to influence decision making that actually has a negative impact on them, as
opposed to those who already have influence and have greater influence?”1078 The ward
councillor may be the sole representative of local governance within the ward, where they
politicize the debates and promote the perspective of those within the area to the possible
detriment of effective and inclusive city-wide decision-making. The views of the public,
or BIAs and neighbourhood associations, can be highly influential in councillor decisionmaking where only the ward councillor is tasked with representation.
Delaney wrote that the boundaries of one territorial unit often clash with those of
another.1079 The boundaries separating territorial units are not merely about the lines
themselves, but also the distribution of power.1080 This is evident in the politics of local
and city-wide decision-making in Toronto. A study of the former Metro government
suggested that one advantage of a two-tier municipal model was the separation of the
“local” from the “regional.” This separation meant that a local councillor did not bear the
burden of a regional decision that was disfavoured by residents. In Toronto’s case, this
necessitates a clearer distinction between “local and “city-wide” issues and the creation
of a governance model that liberates the councillor from such strict allegiance to local
interests in making city-wide decisions.
In addition, representation is connected to the accountability that bodies have to the
public, as accountability validates and disciplines governance bodies. Accountability
measures operate differently amongst wards, community councils, BIAs and
neighbourhood associations. Wards emerge as the chief site of representation, tested
during elections, but with few opportunities in between to keep these bodies accountable
to residents as there are limited means by which a political representative in Toronto may
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be removed.1081 Even then, the stark rates of incumbency re-election challenge the degree
to which elections serve as an accountability check on councillors. As local boards, BIAs
are bound by the strictest accountability requirements, but there are no documented cases
of BIAs having been removed by City Council. In the case of BIAs, the lack of
accountability is attributed to their focus on business interests rather than other aspects of
the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood associations fulfill a participatory and representative
role, but are not formally accountable to the city or its residents. The accountability of
neighbourhood associations is questioned on the basis that they favour the interests of
homeowners and privileged members of the community.
The overlay of these exclusions in representation was evident in the casino debates,
particular as observed by the votes of councillors across the city. Many of the councillors
who voted “no” to a downtown casino approved the Woodbine expansion eighteen
months later, even without a localized forum to study its implications. No BIAs,
neighbourhood associations or other bodies within or outside the area of the applicable
ward mobilized, as had occurred in the 2012-13 debate, even where issues of concern like
health and addiction remained the same. While NIMBYism offers part of the explanation,
the exclusion of residents was exacerbated by a lack of access to a deliberative local
governance body. Local governance is dominated by the ward councillor without a local
governance model to challenge the councillor’s position.

b) The implications of exclusion
Local legal spaces may be constituted by legal rules. Even so, this legal reality is only
one iteration of the “local,” in what Boaventura de Sousa Santos calls the distinction
between formal and organic law.1082 Under this view, formal local governance reflects
top-down, government-imposed boundaries which create the rules and standards by
which the public is meant to comply. Organic law, by contrast, is the bottom-up,
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community-created legal understandings which can operate alongside or may end of
coming into conflict formal rules.
Like other laws, organic or informal notions of local governance may or may not have
community legitimacy. This research has demonstrated that formal law sets the ward as
the primary site of local governance, both in the creation of boundaries and the
designation of councillors as representatives. The degree to which councillors engage
with residents is up to them. The legal rules in regard to planning consultations are
limited. Planning staff, developers and councillors have consultations to the extent
needed to advance the matter through the political process. Other bodies disrupt the ward
as local in three main ways: first, by articulating a different geographic notion of local
that may extend beyond the “usual suspects” in neighbourhood representation; second,
through rejecting existing practices and proposing new landscapes of local; and third, by
proposing a new forum or “theatre” where local matters can be heard.
First, neighbourhood associations and BIAs have different, smaller geographic
boundaries than those of a ward. In some cases, neighbourhood associations exist
exclusively to contest planning proposals. Others are created to articulate a different
version of local, focusing on neighbourhood cohesion. While existing research imagines
neighbourhood associations in particular to reflect a particular constituency of residents –
homeowners, white, male, middle aged – the research shows more nuanced
representation in the city. For example, as presented in Chapter 3, post-amalgamation
neighbourhood associations focus less on planning disputes, have broadened their
memberships, and in a limited number of cases have partnered with local social service
agencies.
Second, neighbourhood associations and BIAs may serve a reactionary role to proposed
policies (whether planning related or otherwise) and may propose new landscapes of
local. They may serve as a check on councillor authority and power by forcing
themselves into planning processes as one of the main participants within consultations.
This model of contestation and rejection of city decision-making processes gained
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traction following amalgamation, when the number of BIAs and neighbourhood
associations increased substantially. On the other hand, these bodies may participate as
the go-to parties when planning staff want input on proposals, on stakeholder groups, and
in targeted sessions where they are consulted on planning initiatives. They may show up
at community council meetings, City Council, and may launch appeals to the OMB. As
such, they are both within and outside of decision-making, as parties included in
consultation exercises, but as rejecters and testers according to their own versions of
local. In the WBR, neighbourhood associations and BIAs revealed themselves as crucial
actors in the consultation process, essentially defining the “communities of interest”
within wards.
Third, community councils serve as a contestation to the existing decision-making model,
one that rejects the existing distinctions between “local” and “city-wide,” and asserts a
local role that encompasses the breadth of the procedural bylaw. While community
councils are legally embedded within the formal framework of city governance, their
mandate has been limited to final approval of a limited number of delegated matters
deemed “local” and a first round of decision making on some planning and heritage
issues. Until they were seized as forums in the 2012-13 casino issue, community councils
had little interaction with residents other than through deputations. While councillors
worked with the Clerk’s Office to have community councils used in this capacity, they
ultimately proved themselves as a meeting place within the official city process as
another forum for local governance. This chapter later considers principles for such a
model.
Taken together, we see that the governance of Toronto’s local legal spaces are broader
than, but eclipsed by the ward. BIAs and neighbourhood associations create alternative
imageries of local through different versions of boundaries and memberships, some taken
from a legal past, as seen during the WBR. More importantly, they reveal the gaps of
inclusion of other iterations of local governance – those that fall outside the tidy confines
of the ward. The next section asks how a local governance model premised on the urban
commons could reimagine smaller-than-city governance.
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II. Core principles in designing local governance
This next section articulates how Toronto could craft a local governance model that
adopts the normative framework of the urban commons, as asserted by Foster and Iaione.
These principles affirm the plurality of local boundaries and bodies, while at the same
time minimizing the effects of exclusion and tensions. I propose that the four principles
depicted in Figure 6.1 form the basis of a more inclusive, participatory local governance
model in the City of Toronto. These principles are, first, that the geographic boundaries
of local legal spaces are both spaces of belonging and places of representation. Second,
the bodies that represent local governance must be open, accountable and fair. Third, that
the terms “local” and “city-wide” are inadequate in framing which issues should be
brought to localized populations for consideration. Fourth, Toronto’s local governance
model must offer opportunities for community members to influence decision-making.

Geographic boundaries:
Spaces of belonging and
places of representation

Participation and
decision-making: Being
heard in deliberations
and outcomes

Accountable
representation: Open,
transparent and fair

Localizing “City-Wide”:
Rethinking the “Local”
and “City-wide” Binary

Figure 6.1: Principles of Local Governance Rooted in the “Urban Commons”
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1.

Geographic boundaries: distinguishing spaces of belonging and places of
representation

In this study, geographic boundaries are relevant because they demarcate the legal spaces
to be governed. This dissertation has demonstrated that ward boundaries are the basis of
Toronto’s formal local legal spaces. As seen in Chapter 5, a central tension in the WBR
was between the need for wards to be roughly the same size as one another and the
recognition that communities come in all shapes and sizes.
This section considers how the urban commons framework can help rethink these spaces.
The first principle of local governance advances that new spaces of local governance are
needed, that such spaces must be collaborative, and the reimagined community councils
may hold promise as new, collaborative spaces.

a) New spaces of local governance
Local legal spaces differ in size and scale. Meaningful boundaries are not created from
cookie-cutters; they do not fit neatly and with identical sizes alongside one another.
Boundaries may not be contiguous but instead, exist as pockets here and there. As such, a
conflicting boundaries of local do not negate the possibility of representation, but require
a more multidimensional governance model.
This means that wards, with their intended equal-sized boundaries across the city, should
not serve as the sole vehicle for representation in local decision-making; more, not fewer,
spaces of dialogue are needed. The 2012-13 casino debate emerged as an important
lesson for this perspective. While councillors pushed to have the TEYCC as the venue for
debate within the city’s formal governance structure, the community council took on a
life of its own from an institutional perspective. It served as the main forum for debate
and deliberation, in particular for those against the proposed development. It also led to
the writing of numerous staff reports exposing deeper local effects, like pedestrian and
vehicle traffic.
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Just as community councils emerged as a potential for larger boundaries of local
governance, the WBR demonstrated that local legal spaces may exist at a smaller scale.
For example, the Kingston-Galloway/Orton Park neighbourhood association in
Scarborough appealed to the WBR consultants about keeping their boundaries intact. In
addition, the Jane-Finch area has straddled three wards over the last two decades and, in
the proposed configuration, must still exist within two.1083 There are no other state-based
iterations of local governance open to this community. Thus, the key point regarding
boundaries of local is that a sense of belonging does not always match up with the
institutional structures that are established to represent smaller-than-city spaces of
representation.
In Toronto, wards are used as boundaries of functional representation. Ward councillors
coordinate for those within their boundaries, but communities may find themselves
outside of or in conflict with the ward structure. As a senior staff member told me, “I
think our problem is we have structures … And, structures by their definition have a
tendency to develop a life of their own.”1084 Wards may be rigidly maintained for those
who are reluctant to see innovation or change. In the WBR, ward councillors fiercely
defended the existing ward model and boundaries, in part to maintain the life of their own
of such institutions. In each of the case studies, the critical tension of the relative size and
boundaries of local governance was whether that iteration connected to the decisionmaking process.
Particular geographies can also serve as spaces of time and memory. Temporality
attaches meaning to particular spaces as sites of belonging. The meaning is not simply
historical in nature; these spaces of memory are maintained as crucial in contemporary
debates, too. These nostalgic connections to geographic lines differ from the technocratic
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nature of BIA and ward boundaries, and the functional, staff-driven lines of
Neighbourhood Improvement Areas.
The WBR revealed many examples of meaningful boundaries, areas of the city that
created attachments due to past identities as towns or villages. In reviewing the WBR
consultant reports, the names of decades-old entities appear again and again as
boundaries worth maintaining within wards, with pleas to “keep them together” as though
an electoral line dividing them would erase their presence altogether. Likewise, there was
considerable negative public sentiment to erasing the former boundary of Scarborough
through the placement of wards. To those who spoke out in opposition, Scarborough still
has meaning as a place, and the maintenance of formal boundaries keeps relevance to that
space even though the City of Scarborough no longer exists in any formal, legal sense.
These former villages, towns, and cities are a form of ghostly presence that continues to
frame local governance in Toronto. These ghost cities are contemporaneously embodied
in many of the city’s older neighbourhood associations, for example, Swansea, the
Annex, Rosedale and York Mills, four of the oldest organizations, were each once
distinct municipal corporations. In addition to their current-day advocacy efforts, each of
these organizations maintains historical records of the community.1085 The Scarborough
Community Council, too, is a remnant of its pre-amalgamation history. This clinging to
historical spaces is not exclusive to Toronto. As observed in Chapter 3, New York
borough councils and community boards reflect pre-amalgamated spaces. Their presence
is maintained by contemporary legal codes that set out the city’s local governance model.
Some neighbourhood associations look backwards nostalgically at history, but also
towards the future. They aim to have a continued presence in the governance of the city.
Boundaries for belonging are not necessarily, and need not be, the same as the lines of
institutional representation. There may be a plurality of local bodies that may overlap and
1085
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conflict, and they may not all neatly integrate with electoral boundaries. They key is to
understand and respect the difference between boundaries of community belonging and
those of institutional representation and, ideally, to provide opportunities for input for
those who do not fall within the dominant framework. As such, reflection must be given
to the interrelationships of these multiple boundaries of local, and the degree to which
they have access to formal channels of local governance.

b) A collaborative local legal space as the basis for local governance
As detailed in Chapter 1, Foster and Iaione’s urban commons framework set out that,
regardless of whether spaces are privately or publicly owned, the city is a territorial space
in which citizens claim to have a role or stake, a norm which is reinforced in law.1086 In
this account, Foster and Iaione apply Ostrom’s thesis, which challenged the assumption
that common property cannot be governed collectively without substantial waste and
inefficiency to the urban form. The common pool resources in the city context are
particular urban spaces, which then becomes the sites of governance. Public-private
organizations can work together to effectively play a role in governing specific city areas,
but to do so they must incorporate “bottom-up” governance. The city as commons is thus
a system of governance over particular city spaces, which incorporates subsidiarity, or
delegated authority, and polycentrism, meaning multiple parties are working together.
Foster and Iaione highlight that urban governance arrangements are voluntary and bind
only those involved in the governance scheme. They note that such arrangements can
have effects on many beyond the actors that are specifically involved: “[I]n the case of
urban commons governance institutions the governance arrangement may affect the
everyday life of all city inhabitants that fall within the boundaries of the governance
scheme (think of the [BIAs], the decisions of which can have an impact also on those
who are not part of the [BIA] governance).”1087 They do not attempt to solve this issue
but encourage questions of accountability and legitimacy to be “raised and constantly
1086
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invoked” when querying collaborative governance in the urban commons.1088
I suggest that local legal spaces may also be conceived as a common pool resource, with
polycentric governance and boundaries that differ from those of the ward. Conceived of
in this way, decision-making includes a broader range of voices. In such a model, no
single party can be understood as the privileged local governance body within a specific
geography, but one of many actors with a stake. Foster and Iaione use the term
subsidiarity to “re-orient public authorities away from the central state to an active
citizenry willing to cooperatively govern common resources.”1089 As detailed in Chapter
3, the SCC ruled that the principle of subsidiarity enables broad deference to municipal
governments based on their closeness to the residents that they represent.1090 While
subsidiarity was invoked in this context in favour of enhanced authority for city
governments, it applies equally to a more localized level.1091
In Toronto, the ward is the main locus of local governance. Ward councillors are also the
arbitrators of the use of community councils for measures beyond local planning and
heritage matters. Ward councillors may help to drive the formation of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations, and enable access to decision-making within the ward.
Neither community councils nor the ward level provides for active decision-making by
BIAs or neighbourhood associations; these bodies are instead discretionary stakeholders
in local decisions. From an urban commons perspective, this approach mirrors the chief
dilemma of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, where actors may take action without
regard for the effects on others.1092 Wards may have many bodies advocating on behalf of
residents, businesses and other stakeholders, especially BIAs and neighbourhood
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors
have discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local
development, and bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and
initiate projects. Put another way, while some councillors open the ward to involvement
1088
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by a broader set of stakeholders, there is no institutional requirement that such practices
take place. Local governance within the framework of an urban commons implies a
polycentric and more participatory approach to local governance, challenging the
councillor as the main arbitrator of decision-making.
As detailed earlier in this dissertation, NIMBY concerns prompted academics Valverde
and Young to point to the regional scale as a political level that can safeguard the
interests of the most vulnerable.1093 However, since amalgamation, the emphasis on “citywide” level decision-making at the formerly regional scale has not led to a better quality
of life for the city’s marginalized populations. Indeed, income disparities have widened
across the city.1094 Clearly, another approach is needed.
The question, then, is how to ensure inclusivity when micro-scales may focus on narrow
interests to the detriment of a broader population? American scholars Richard Ford
Thompson and Richard Schragger challenged the sacredness of the “local” as the ideal
scale for the face-to-face interactions necessary for democratic dialogue and suggested
that local decision-making has negative implications for historically disenfranchised
groups, particularly those outside of the area in question. Critics of localized governance
look mainly at the regional level to address inequality. American scholar Young
concluded that, to promote the normative ideal of city life, cities themselves “should
cease to have sovereign authority.”1095 Instead, “the lowest level of governmental power
should be regional.”1096 She believed that local governments will act selfishly without
regard for the needs of their neighbours, and that only through the adoption of regional
policy will a more fair distribution of urban resources result.1097 Interestingly, Young’s
critiques of the municipal level mirror those of Frug, Thompson, and Schragger regarding
neighbourhood-based decision-making, suggesting that there is no ideal location or site of
decision-making that can remedy issues of exclusion.
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How can a local governance framework incorporate multiple voices, broader than BIAs
and neighbourhood associations, in what Foster and Iaione call “a visible, equal,
contestable, and legitimate manner”?1098 I argue that the “city-wide” scale should not
imply that the local community has no say over or involvement in decision-making.
Scholars have proposed variations on how such involvement could look, including
charrettes,1099 opportunities for deliberative participation,1100 and community-level
institutions grounded in group-based “differentiated solidarity.”1101 In Toronto, this
means opening space to local actors beyond the ward councillor, BIAs and
neighbourhood associations in a more collaborative framework that includes decisionmaking power. As Foster and Iaione put it, “thinking of the city as an institution that
promotes collaboration all the way across and down as a way to ‘share’ the resources it
controls can spur a host of innovative and progressive policies that address the social and
economic inequality that is becoming a feature of 21st century urbanization.”1102

c) Reimagined community councils as spaces for “local governance”?
A Toronto councillor put the central issue of this dissertation this way, “Well, there you
go, right, that’s the question all of this begs. The question all of this begs is, what are the
conditions that lead to a large majority of the population both having good reason, like
rational reason to be engaged in government, and the means and opportunity to do so.
And until you solve that one, the rest is deck chairs.”1103 Reimagined community councils
may hold promise as a better space for local governance.
There is great potential for actualizing a more inclusive, participatory local governance
framework within the existing legislative structure of Toronto’s community councils. As
outlined in Chapter 3, until COTA’s introduction, provincial legislation was prescriptive
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in relation to municipal authority, meaning that the city could only take action that was
set out in the applicable legislation. COTA offers far broader powers. However, the
legacy of municipal power in Toronto is such that councillors and staff may be reluctant
to push the boundaries and introduce laws which are not clearly spelled out. As a staff
member involved in the design of COTA told me, “[When you ask] ‘Are we allowed to
do that? Can we do it?’ It’s pushing off responsibility, as opposed to ‘How can we?’
[O]ne thing to this day that I always say to my staff: if you ever go to legal to get advice,
never ever, ever ask the question ‘Can we?’1104 When I asked what questions should be
asked instead, this staff member told me, “What outcomes do we as a government want
to achieve and then how do we get to those things, so what legislative measure do we
need to put in place, what resources do we need to allocate, what programs do we need to
put in place.”1105
Under COTA, the City of Toronto can create a plurality of community councils with
greater authority, non-councillor members, and a mandate to consider the localized
effects of “city-wide” decisions. Such bodies would shift the balance of power from the
ward to the community. One councillor, in discussing the immense amount of power held
by a ward councillor, told me: “I’d like to think I used it for benevolent good. But I also
think that you’ve got to get out. Anybody that’s there for more than two terms I get very
nervous about. Because they play to the same crowd and you get elected by talking to the
same people and you know, you’re protected by the things you did well and you’re
inoculated from the things you did badly.” The answer, this councillor believes lies in
further decentralization to the community, “The solution is to give the citizens more
power. … If you want to limit the power of a local councillor, find a way to invest even
stronger powers into the local community.”1106
The case studies take a new form when seen through the lens of an urban commons.
Applying the lens of an urban commons to the WBR, the following dynamic emerges.
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First, the relations at stake were the communities of interest versus the ward. BIAs and
neighbourhood associations serve as the main determinants of communities of interest in
consultation meetings. Other approaches to solicit input were used, such as surveys, but
in general, the consultants referenced the commentary from those who attended meetings.
The determination of local was linked to the meaning of “community of interest.” While
the input extends beyond the “usual suspects” to areas of the city that are more politically
and economically marginalized, the overall effect was limited to commentary on
communities of interest. It was also curious that the consultants singled out direct
consultation with BIAs, but not neighbourhood associations. On the one hand, this
approach confirms the importance given to BIAs and neighbourhood associations as
other parties with a claim to local representation. However, the use of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations as the basis to craft boundaries also points to the dependence
on these organizations to the exclusion of other notions of local and a more holistic
process to determine local governance. By excluding consideration of other aspects of
local governance, the review emerges as a “business as usual” exercise, one that affirms
the existing model of local governance.
At the time that the 2012-13 casino debate emerged, it struck councillors as a “done
deal.”1107 The mayor was in agreement and there was sufficient City Council support for
the matter to sail through approval. The opposition from outside City Hall actively
pursued support from the local councillors.1108 Already, the plurality of local voices
emerged, all focused on the downtown casinos as the main point of objection. Thus, the
spaces of local were the proposed casino sites and the areas that would be affected by a
casino. They were the local boundaries in question.
These sites as local thus reoriented local issues like traffic and effects on neighbours as
equally important questions to the city-wide factors like tourism, the hosting fee, and
jobs, as the Executive Committee had set out. In response, the TEYCC, as a governance
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body, became the voice of the local boundaries, replacing the usual centrality of the
councillor with the “theatre” of the subcommittee, a forum with more councillors, staff
support, and formalized mechanisms for public participation. The reorientation of the site
of the debate also shifted the lens of public participation. The 2012-13 review initially
approached civic engagement through a city-wide lens, but the TEYCC took over as the
chief vehicle to consult with BIAs and other stakeholders, suggesting that these parties
had not been adequately included in the process. This shift also signaled that decisionmaking was not merely a matter for politicians, but the necessary inclusion of a more
institutionalized, polycentric governance model.
By contrast, in 2015, the casino decision remained a city-wide issue, with no use of the
community council as a forum for deliberation. In 2015, the ward councillor and the
councillor adjacent were the major proponents of the casino, in their capacities as
representative of the ward and as the deputy mayor responsible for economic
development in this economically marginalized area of the city. No local BIAs or
neighbourhood associations participated in the city-wide forums. There was no change in
the geography of local, nor in the foci of debate, nor in the forums used to assess and
mediate the issue.
The 2012-13 casino decision showed the capacity for incrementally modifying local
governance based on the existing model – to nudging rather than revolutionizing
governance – through reorienting the forum of local governance. The 2012-13 casino
debate offered an example of community councils as a new local legal space, querying
how a more formalized role for the plurality of other actors, beyond the usual forums for
public participation.
Imagine, then, a community council model that draws from Foster and Iaione’s urban
commons framework, yet is available to a broader range of residents, both as participants
and deliberators. Community councils could expand their memberships to include an
“active citizenry” willing to “cooperatively govern” localized spaces of the city.1109
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Rather than having an uneven local governance model that privileges “a patchwork,
instead of a network” of BIAs and neighbourhood associations as the local voice, these
reimagined community councils could provide a more inclusive space for voices
currently unheard in the model.1110
2. Accountable representation: accessibility and fair process for local residents
and businesses, and to the broader vulnerable public
A second principle that emerges from this research is the necessity of accountability in
representation. In adapting an urban commons framework to a reimagined local
governance model, governance forums and the model more broadly must be transparent,
accessible and fair. As stated in Chapter 3, the Bellamy Inquiry in 2005 exposed
weaknesses in the governance structure of the City of Toronto.1111 At that time, the Chief
Administrative Officer (now called the City Manager) detailed the measures that would
be taken to address the governance issues and strengthen accountability.1112 The measures
included “citizen-focused” principles and assessment criteria, including a governance
model that “reflects the services that are important to the citizens of Toronto” and is
“easily understood by the public.”1113 The report also noted the need for structures to be
“adaptable, flexible, and innovative,” to promote effective inter-program and crossdiscipline collaboration, to adapt to changing public needs and service priorities, and to
reduce barriers to innovation.1114
One councillor explained their support of more community involvement in decisionmaking as follows: “When local communities know they have responsibility, they take
responsibility and they make rational decisions. When they don’t think they have a say,
they take extreme positions in order to force the extreme position, or opposing, into sort
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of beaten into submission.”1115 The councillor believes that, ultimately, more participants
are ultimately better: “when you bring a hundred and fifty people around a table to try
and make a decision about what’s best for the community, you end up with a decision,
ultimately, which is best for the city. When you try to bring fifteen people from across the
city to decide what works in a local community, the chances are you’re going to make a
mistake.”1116
In Toronto, accountability issues are three-fold: the dominance of the ward councillor, the
confusion relating to BIAs, and the role of neighbourhood associations. While these
measures focus on the administrative functions of city government (meaning the internal
organizational structures and conduct of city staff), they apply to reflections on local
governance.
Ward-level representation as the formal arena of local governance creates a lack of
accessibility and clarity. A foundational requirement of governance is that the public
easily understand how forums may be accessed. As it stands, the ward-based governance
model is unclear. It is not evident how a member of the public would engage in a local
matter beyond contacting the ward councillor. Where a councillor is not approachable or
responsive, a member of the public may be left with uncertainty as to how they may
initiate change. The ward level does not provide a forum for clear access by residents or
members of the public. The councillor has discretion to decide the extent to which
engagement and community forums will take place. A model that doesn’t enable the
public to engage in a democratic forum at the local level challenges the principle of
fairness. As Grainger and Greene write:
The cornerstones of government ethics rules – the rule of law, honesty, the
prohibition of conflicts of interest, the prohibition against using public office for
personal gain, the rules preventing undue influence, the promotion of fair
procedures and objectivity, the promotion of accountability and openness – all stem
from the principle of mutual respect. As human beings, we get used to carrying out
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our work the way we have learned to do it, and most of us think of ourselves as
ethical without stopping to examine whether the way things are usually done might
contradict the principle of mutual respect and the sub-principles that derive from it.
Leaders who want to introduce real and lasting reforms to ethics in government
need the ability to be able to examine carefully whether business as usual is really
meets the ethical standards they claim to espouse.1117
The problem with the dominance of the ward councillor extends more deeply than simply
access; the larger issue is the extent to which councillors control innovation in local
governance. As noted in an interview with a senior staff member who was involved in the
two major governance reviews involving the possible inclusion of localized governance:
“I think inertia kind of sets in. I think, I don’t know that the neighbourhood council idea
ever got very far, because there was just so much political resistance.”1118 This dynamic
was observed as well in the WBR process, where the Executive Committee’s reluctance
to approve the external consultant’s recommendations reflected an inertia and
contrariness to change.
BIAs emerge as an uncertain arena of local governance. On the one hand, they are woven
into city administration through the existence of a dedicated office, an approved budget,
and accessible information on how they may be contacted. This suggests that they are
like any other local board of the City, with the responsibility to deliver a set of services
and accountability for how they use their funds. On the other hand, in local planning and
other debates, they act as an interest group to be consulted, like neighbourhood
associations. This dual role creates confusion as to what role they serve (local board or
interest group) and to whom they are accountable (the public or their members). This
confusion played out in both the casino debate and the ward boundary review, where a
privileging of the BIA voice happened. In the 2012-13 debate, the BIAs were named as
the parties requiring particular consultation. In the ward boundary review, the BIAs were
also singled out as a key stakeholder group to be consulted directly.
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Neighbourhood associations serve as an impromptu force in local decision-making,
which is often contingent on the councillor or staff engaged, but also dependent on the
degree of influence of the association itself. There is understandable reluctance on the
part of the City as to how they may be folded within its formal structure. The research in
Chapter 3 showed that neighbourhood associations vary widely across Toronto. There are
no clear standards for their organization or representation, which means uncertainty as to
the legitimacy of the representational voice.
The following quote, from an interview with a City of Toronto official, sums up the two
possible iterations of neighbourhood associations: “[R]epresentation should be an
outcome of communities self-organizing and creating that space for themselves. Or
demanding that space for themselves where they need to be, no matter who speaks, that
their voices need to be heard. As opposed to organized, rather dodgy groups, dodgy
agendas, claiming representation on behalf of people. Be it individuals, or organizations
from the NGO sector or social justice sector.”1119 Are neighbourhood associations selforganized bodies demanding voice, even where they represent a very narrow set of
interests, like BIAs?
Neighbourhood associations would need modification to become more robust, reliable
organizations across the city to meet the standard of accountable representation. At
minimum, the city could provide information and training to neighbourhood associations,
as it does with BIAs, to provide capacity on organizational structures, decision-making,
and fairness. The city could also require that neighbourhood associations register as an
interest group, as some staff have recommended, in a manner that does not result in an
unfair degree of work for these small, sparsely funded organizations.
A third option is to weave neighbourhood associations into the City’s governance
structure in a more formalized way, as New York or Los Angeles does, with staff
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support, operational funding, and space to weigh in on City policy.1120 Under this
approach, the city could have a relationship with the neighbourhood associations that
better mirrors what it has with BIAs. It could also monitor the composition of
neighbourhood associations to understand whose voices are heard and to develop
capacities for new voices to join the conversation.
It is important to note that in all three of these options, there would be greater oversight
of the organizations. As one councillor told me, in contrasting the funding received by
BIAs and the corresponding accountability rules: “So, yes [BIAs] do have access to
resources, but they’re legislatively restrained in very, very significant ways, about how
they can deploy those resources. And I think providing resident associations with some
kind of institutional money, or staff support would require putting rules in place.”1121
What might be the results of such action? “There’s always a trade off, right? Use of
public money requires constraint, that I think would effectively demobilize them, or
constrain them to the point where you’d have other organizations pop up anyway.”1122
The goal instead is to provide more accountability between these organizations and the
public so that those who profess to “represent” are indeed doing so. Given the privileged
role of neighbourhood associations in the overall governance model, and in particular in
planning issues, fairness and accountability should not be disregarded.

3. Localizing “City-Wide”: Rethinking the “Local” and “City-wide” Binary
The City of Toronto distinguishes between “local” and “city-wide” in determining what
matters may be delegated to community councils. The city views some issues, such as
parking pads and speed limits, as “local” issues, while any matter that has implications
beyond a single community council is a “city-wide” matter. In its categorization, the City
of Toronto only delegates decision-making and deliberation on “local” issues to
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community councils. Any matter deemed “city-wide” must be considered by City
Council.
This dissertation argues that the current distinction between local and city-wide is
artificial as it does not consider the interests of local residents in its categorization. The
current model does not provide deliberative forums that allow residents to remain
connected to city government, as community councils were created to do. Instead, I
advance the third component of local governance that “city-wide” decisions have local
implications and, therefore, Toronto’s local governance model must make room for
consideration of city-wide issues. Put another way, rather than conceptualizing a
municipal issue as residing at a singular scale, a better approach is to acknowledge the
localized effects of “city wide” issues.
The mythology of the “local” issue suggests that certain matters are inherently smaller or
larger scale and that governance forums should be divided on that basis. The reality is
that transit systems, affordable housing, and casinos are as “local” in scope as they are
“city-wide.” Cowen and Parlette write about the pitfalls of directing resources – and
therefore responsibility – at the neighbourhood scale, particularly in economically
disadvantaged communities, without recognizing that the remedies to neighbourhood
matters are only really solvable at the municipal, provincial or even federal levels.1123
This idea was echoed during an interview that I had with a senior city staff member, who
said: “You can have a neighborhood lens, but it cannot be isolated to the neighborhood,
because a neighborhood is part of a global supply chain.”1124 In this study, we see that
“local’ and “city-wide” are not simply about the subject-matter, which is the basis upon
which the distinction is made now. Instead, “local’ and “city-wide” may relate to the
consequences of an issue. For example, in both the 2012-13 and 2015 casino decisions,
the circumstances that made the matter “local” were the localized effects of a casino, not
whether the subject matter itself was a local one.
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As raised by Cowen and Parlette, geographies of subject-matter problematize phenomena
in particular communities rather than highlighting systemic or higher order causes and
contributions.1125 The same dynamic can be said to take place in calling an issue citywide. This kind of articulation leads to a concentration on particular aspects of issues
over others as evidenced in both of the casino debates, where the city-wide focus
highlighted the economic implications above all others. In using the community council
forum, city staff reports focused on local implications became part of the decisionmaking discourse.
The City of Toronto may consider multiple options in operationalizing this notion. First,
City Council can set the broad, strategic policy frameworks of city-wide issues, while
decision-making can be delegated to a smaller-than-city level. As one senior staff
member from the City of Toronto told me, “[I]f you look at a city council agenda and you
have on the same agenda the casino debate, which is a strategic city-wide … issue of
huge policy significance [that] the council should be paying attention to. The same
agenda is whether or not to cut down a tree in Mrs. Jones’s backyard.”1126 Likewise, local
governance conceived as an urban commons would have some delegated powers. Areas
of “huge policy significance,” including matters like housing and infrastructure, must
have room for localized debate, even where ultimate decisions are maintained at the citywide level.
As one councillor told me, the decision over a governance model comes down to the
degree to which you want local government run by the public versus councillors: “If you
want citizens to run the place, get rid of the party politics, let citizens choose their own
representatives, and let citizens organize their decision making mechanism. You’ve gotta
give away the power in order for the power to become effective.”1127 To this councillor,
the casino debate showed the power of public involvement: “part of what the casino fight
showed us, is that you can push back into the community to figure out political strength
1125
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and you will win those fights. And I don’t think there’s a fight that was more city-wide,
broad base, more effective, in actually flipping local voters and local communities’ minds
than this one was.”1128
Other jurisdictions provide institutional support for local governance bodies, with noncouncillor representatives, spaces for such bodies to deliberate and debate, and staff
support. For example, New York’s community committees have the authority to vote on
matters that will ultimately be decided by City Council, but these votes are nonbinding.1129 Borough Presidents have also played a crucial role in city-wide decisions,
both historically and at present.1130 Although a constitutional challenge in 1989 led to
sweeping changes in New York City’s governance model by removing the Board of
Control – where Borough Presidents had been key members – these local actors continue
to exert substantial influence on city-wide decisions.1131
Matters that on their face appear to be city-wide may have disparate, specific and
localized effects for local communities. Artificially distinguishing issues as “local” and
“city-wide” produces a single and limited lens, dismissing scalar consequences.
4. Decision-making: participation as deliberation or outcome?
To Tina Nabatchi and Matt Leighninger, “public participation” is an umbrella term that
describes the activities by which people’s concerns, needs, interests, and values are
incorporated into decisions and actions on public matters and issues.1132 They write that
cities, in particular, are crucial and optimistic spaces of participation: “Cities, due to their
compact size and contiguity, offer the greatest potential for the development of inclusive
institutions for managing political conflict, create critical spaces for institutionalized
forms of political debate and participation and facilitate new forms of political
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representation through civil society actors, operating within participatory governance
mechanisms.”1133 Nabatchi and Leighninger endorse Sherry Arnstein’s conception of
participation as a “ladder” with information dissemination on one end of the spectrum
and direct decision-making on the other.1134
As demonstrated in this dissertation, BIAs and neighbourhood associations have played a
central role in local governance in Toronto and elsewhere. As noted in Chapter 1,
Schragger Ford, Frug and Briffault have noted the concerns with this model of
participation, in particular, the issues of fairness and exclusion. As a response, Young and
Valverde advocate for the shift in decision-making to a regional level body.1135
In Toronto, the ward is the main locus of local governance. Ward councillors are also the
arbiters of the use of community councils for measures beyond local planning and
heritage matters. Ward councillors may help to drive the formation of BIAs and
neighbourhood associations, and enable access to decision-making within the ward.
Neither community councils nor the ward level provides for active decision-making by
BIAs or neighbourhood associations; these bodies are instead discretionary stakeholders
in local decisions. From an urban commons perspective, this approach mirrors the chief
dilemma of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, where actors may take action without
regard for the effects on others.1136 Wards may have many bodies advocating on behalf of
residents, businesses and other stakeholders, especially BIAs and neighbourhood
associations, with varying degrees of formal connection to the city. Ward councillors
have discretion over many issues, including local planning, spending on local
development, and bringing together the various representatives to resolve conflicts and
initiate projects. Put another way, while some councillors open the ward to involvement
by a broader set of stakeholders, there is no institutional requirement that such practices
take place. Local governance within the framework of an urban commons implies a
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polycentric and more participatory approach to local governance, challenging the
councillor as the main arbitrator of decision-making.
Neighbourhood associations have not always been seen as oppositional towards
progressive city planning. Indeed, they were at the forefront of pushing for a more
inclusive planning model, one which considered the interests of the community. Up until
the 1960s, experts made planning decisions without any public input.1137 This changed
when neighbourhood associations began opposing planners, often because they disagreed
with the vision that planners had for their neighbourhoods.1138 However, the views
brought to bear on local planning were very much tilted towards those representing the
associations, meaning those with political, social and economic capital.1139 In practice,
the voices of renters, the less affluent, and underserved are unheard in local decisionmaking forums.
Scholars have written about the impact of BIAs and neighbourhood associations that
represent affluent, white residents and businesses. What is less considered are the
outcomes of participation efforts of neighbourhood associations in underserved areas.
The focus on neighbourhood-based consultation also masks that many local matters that
disproportionately affected poorer residents are rarely solvable by the municipal
government alone. Unlike zoning or minor planning issues, matters of social justice,
including homelessness and lack of affordable housing, cannot be meaningfully
addressed and resolved by municipalities alone; it requires the cooperation and active
involvement of all levels of government.
If a model predicated on neighbourhood associations is fraught with issues, then what
else? As one of the senior city staff members opined on the ideal model of consultation,
“[Y]ou need to create a pipeline, you need to create mechanism for people to be able to
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express themselves and have influence on public policy and programming in a
meaningful way and the voices be diverse and the voice be organized and all of that.”1140
But how? In Toronto’s case, the traditional vehicles of engagement – online surveys,
public meetings held in communities, and deputations at committee and community
council meetings – bring in a small minority of residents.1141 Since 2013, the City
Planning department introduced new measures to solicit input from a wider range of
residents, recognizing that the existing engagement mechanisms are not reaching those
who are impacted by local planning decisions. For example, City Planning now has “pop
up planners” (POPs) who appear in areas across the city to get input from the public on
particular policy proposals; has an advisory panel comprised of randomly selected
Toronto residents; and relies increasingly on Twitter and other social media for
feedback.1142 The initiative is noted in particular for generating far more feedback than
typical engagement exercises.1143
However, it remains uncertain the extent to which these new consultation efforts resulted
in vastly different voices being heard, especially in the case of social media commentary.
In the case of POPs and the advisory panel, there appear to be underserved constituents
targeted for feedback. However, it is unclear whether this form of consultation has an
impact on the ultimate decisions made. As noted in Chapter 1, scholars Cowen & Parlette
undertook an expensive study of consultation efforts in one of Toronto’s poorest
communities, concluding that such exercises can lead to “consultation fatigue.”1144 They
observed significant fatigue when the same people are consulted again and again but are
not given any decision-making power. The time consuming and ineffectual results of
constant consultation are frustrating and difficult, and tax the time of already
overstretched people working largely in precarious and low-paying jobs. Cowen and
Parlette suggest that the weakness with current consultation methods is that they are
distinct and disconnected from decision-making power. Besides, participation efforts do
1140
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not include skills building and leadership opportunities or other intangible benefits,
making the process one-sided in favour of city departments, who engage to meet statutory
or City Council requirements, but do not necessarily weave broader perspectives into
their final reports.
Part of the reason for this fatigue is that those conducting consultations expect such
conversations to take place in the forums of their choosing, in a manner that conforms to
their notions of consultation. What is missing from the research and analysis is the
existing conversations on local issues that are already taking place. One of the people I
spoke with, who is familiar in particular with the organizing of Punjabi and Sikh
populations in Toronto, told me that those looking to engage these particular
communities might not see the engagement already taking place. When reflecting on a
question received from a colleague on how to consult communities and get people
engaged, my contact said:
Well, communities are actually pretty engaged, it’s just that you’re not in those
engagement mechanisms... [T]hey are having conversations in communities where
you don’t listen, or go, or understand what they’re talking about. Either you have a
language difficulty of your own, or you just don’t understand what drives their
thinking. So, it’s not that the communities are not politicized and particularly
engaged, it’s just they’re engaged in ways that you don’t understand and you are
not plugged into. [Rather than saying] “communities are not engaged,” … say,
“communities are engaged in ways that I’m not familiar with, so how can I find out
where those communities’ conversations are taking place, whether they are in
mosques or community centers, or, you know, people’s living rooms, wherever.”
Because I know they’re happening, I live it on a daily basis, I can’t go anywhere
without people having a political conversation. It’s just that none of the decision
makers ever, ever, sit there and listen to us.1145
This notion of existing conversations speaks to the tension between rational bureaucracy
and messier forms of political action. Santos notes that the theoretical debates on the
relationship between representative and participatory democracy often forget that these
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two concepts must work together.1146 He writes that participatory democracy in complex
political environments always presupposes opportunities for delegation and
representation.1147 Indeed, the model for this public engagement and involvement should
be complex and sophisticated to reflect the importance of an overlapping, multifaceted,
multiplayer decision-making at the municipal level. He favours this decisional
complexity in contrast to the approach of Weber, who argues instead for rational
bureaucracy.1148 Santos proposed the following hypothesis: “in internally differentiated
societies, the stronger the bond between democracy and distributive justice, the more
complex the methodology that guarantees such bond tends to be. The decrease of
complexity that bureaucracy allows for cannot but bring about the loosening of the bond
between democracy and distributive justice.”1149 Thus, a rational system of decisionmaking misrepresents the messy reality of participatory democracy, which is
interconnected with tugs and pulls of representation and delegation.
The messiness that Santos speaks of requires the city to move back, to listen and to let
other voices in. As one interviewee suggested, the local governance system “has to be
more flexible and less rigid and the only way to make it less rigid would be the less the
government plays a role, the government plays the role of a facilitator in the sense of
setting up the mechanism, but not on running the mechanism.”1150 There would need to
be less control of the forums of decision-making and of the conversations that will
ultimately take place. In New York, this is at least partly achieved through the
community board model, where anyone may attend a meeting and have a voice, where
the members are not part of the government, and where city staff attends to document and
report on what is said. Community boards raise opinions that are contrary to those of
elected officials, which can lead to changes in proposed policies.1151 Los Angeles goes
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even farther by letting the public set the boundaries for the local bodies, by providing
some funding for organizational needs, and by encouraging greater representation from
the applicable communities. While some scholars laud this purported delegation to the
local level as supporting communities to build capacity and encourage a broader range of
participants, others suggest that these bodies attract people with the same demographics
as neighbourhood associations, meaning unrepresentative of the populations they
serve.1152
In sum, these four principles – flexible boundaries, greater accountability, consideration
of the “local” effects of “city-wide” decisions, and enhanced participation – point to the
need for reimagined local governance in Toronto based on the urban commons
framework. The City of Toronto has the legal authority to reimagine community councils
within the inclusive, participatory framework of the urban commons.
III. Conclusion
The reimagination of local governance in the context of the urban commons is at the core
of the dissertation. I asserted that local as an urban commons marries property,
governance, and inclusivity. Local legal spaces must have room for the plurality of voices
that have an interest in policies and decisions made at this level. At present, Toronto’s
local governance model privileges the geography of the ward as the representative unit,
with councillors serving a dominant role. BIAs and neighbourhood associations
participate unevenly and with considerable dependence on councillor interests. Looking
at local through the lens of the urban commons allows us to see the vast array of voices
that are not typically seen and heard when decisions are made.
The urban commons, ultimately, recognizes the messy nature of property. Progressive
property theorists have struggled to identify the definitive qualities of this form of
interest. What is clear is that the urban commons reflects an overlapping, polycentric set
285; Peter Marcuse, “Neighborhood Policy and the Distribution of Power: New York City’s Community
Boards” (1997) 16(2) Policy Studies Journal 277.
1152
Chemerinsky & Kleiner, supra note 156 at 571.

305

of interests that legitimize a shared authority to govern, regardless of the property rights
held by those engaged in the debate.1153 The urban commons, rooted in property law,
speaks to the relationships at the core of a governance model.
What, then, does this mean for local governance? First, local decision-making needs to be
acknowledged as a legitimate site of governance. Neighbourhoods can trigger a sense of
belonging and agency that lead to the creation of organizations. As a senior staff member
that I interviewed told me, “[I]f a community, if there’s a neighborhood where people
have been living there for thirty years, it doesn’t matter if they’re Italians, Ukrainians,
and Polish. They’ve been living in the same community for thirty years, they’re likely to
find something in common.”1154 Local governance should be acknowledged as an arena
for public participation, not just for some local planning decisions, as exists now, but
where “city-wide” matters are heard, too. The current approach of ward dominance over
the local conversation gives far too much authority to the councillor and includes too few
voices. In Toronto, this means re-imagining local governance. A new vision means
incorporating a wider range of community members, an acknowledgment of the “messy”
nature of local governance, and a way of hearing hard questions and sticky answers.
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Conclusion - Re-imagining Local Governance
This dissertation was born from enthusiastic conversations with fellow municipal law
nerds over the meaning of “local governance” in Toronto. What are the institutions that
the public can access to create change in their communities? Is “local governance”
geographically or subject based? My gut feeling was that, unlike in many other large
metropolises, there was no clear answer to these questions. As such, I started this
dissertation asking how the four main bodies that form Toronto’s local governance model
– wards, community councils, neighbourhood associations and business improvement
areas – overlap, and the effect of this overlap on inclusive participation.
Informed by a mixed methodology that included case studies, document analysis, semistructured interviews, GIS mapping, basic descriptive statistics and participatory
observation, this dissertation sought to test a conceptualization that, first, local
governance is pluralistic and recognizes the interlegality of multiple normative orders
known as “local legal spaces,” which cannot be considered self-enclosed, autonomous
units; and second, that state iterations of local governance bodies create political, social,
and spatial realities, through multiple overlapping institutions; incorporate other norms,
orders, rules and practices; and include and exclude certain people and communities
through the setting of boundaries and participation rules. This project advances the legal
geography project by conceptualizing localized areas of the city as multiscalar and
interlegal in themselves, with a local governance model that is inclusive of a plurality of
formal and informal bodies and geographies. The dissertation also asserts a normative
argument, that a local governance model that is based on the urban commons framework
of Sheila Foster and Christian Iaione would provide a road map for more inclusive,
participatory local governance.
The conclusions that emerge from this dissertation are set out below, together with
suggestions for future research.
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I. Summing up: Toronto’s local legal spaces
This dissertation is organized around three broad propositions. First, Chapter 3
demonstrated that wards are a necessary, but not a complete account of local legal spaces
in Toronto. Under COTA, certain decisions must be made by City Council, meaning (at
present) the 44 councillors and mayor. Under this model, ward councillors exercise a
considerable degree of power. However, wards are not the only means of conceptualizing
local governance. As Santos asserts, there is a multiplicity of laws, institutions, and
boundaries operating formally and informally. In Toronto, while wards serve a privileged
role in the formal model, local legal spaces include the overlap and competing claims of
community councils, BIAs and neighbourhood associations. Some wards and
neighbourhood associations act have the same names and boundaries of towns and
villages going back to 1834, the genesis of Toronto as a city. Community councils largely
and symbolically reflect the pre-amalgamated municipalities. These boundaries reflect
multiple conceptions of local legal spaces in the Toronto context, each enacted or
governed with independent objectives and claims to representation based on the asserted
boundaries, working like an accordion to reorient the scale of interest and decisionmaking. They embody what Habermas observes as the ongoing negotiation between and
within groups regarding the boundaries of “neighbourhood” or “community.”1155
Thus, local legal spaces are both geographic and participatory, both of which assert
norms of inclusion and exclusion. Boundary lines have consequences. Participation is
contingent on the legitimization of the geographic boundary, either because a councillor
has determined their interest in considering a particular matter, or a BIA or
neighbourhood association exists in a specific part of the city. The boundaries of the local
legal spaces include multifarious and overlapping bodies, marking who is and is not
included within literal lines, but also regarding participation, as residents are less able to
access or influence decision-making based on the state or non-state body in question.
Second, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, BIAs and neighbourhood associations are more
numerous and broader in their scope since the 1997 amalgamation. There appear to be
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significant differences between these bodies, especially from a legal perspective. BIAs
are local boards of municipal government, with delegated powers, city assistance, and
direct involvement of councillors. While neighbourhood associations have no formal
connection to the City of Toronto, they have transformed since amalgamation from
largely focused on planning to take on other functions, including stepping into local
government provision of services. However, there are important similarities between
these bodies: both have doubled in number since amalgamation, are unevenly scattered
across the city, and are disproportionately situated in the city’s most affluent areas. Their
creation and involvement in local governance are perpetuated by the city councillor. Like
the observations of Gerald Frug that neighbourhood-based governance can have
significant implications on inclusivity, including the creation of the “other,” the data
collected in this chapter shows that BIAs and neighbourhood associations perpetuate
decision-making that is disproportionately focused on the interests of certain residents to
the exclusion of other voices.1156
BIAs and neighbourhood associations may conceal other “local” iterations or
participants.1157 In Chapter 4, the 2012-13 casino debate, BIAs, and neighbourhood
associations were engaged and involved, but the crucial advocates were instead No
Casino Toronto, which triggered a major local opposition to a downtown casino. In the
ward boundary review case study outlined in Chapter 5, the consultants did not create
wards based on other notions of “communities of interest” like neighbourhood
improvement areas or demographic information, instead relying on stakeholders to come
forward with that information. Other communities of interest may not be identified based
on the absence of neighbourhood associations and BIAs in all parts of the City. Thus, the
focus on BIAs and neighbourhood associations may leave wanting other local groups
who have less access to ward councillors or the mechanics of city decision-making.
While an expansive review of the other local bodies was beyond the scope of this
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dissertation, a further study could focus specifically on such bodies, including the nature
of their access to city decision-making.
Third, as explored in Chapter 6, this dissertation argues that principles drawn from Foster
and Iaione’s version of the urban commons have the potential for creating a more
inclusive local governance. Minor changes to the city’s governance structure could
unsettle the power of the ward councillor and shifting the focus on participation from
BIAs and neighbourhood associations to a broader public. Igor Vojnovic has concluded
that community councils can be successfully used in the governance structures of
amalgamated city governments.1158 This reimagined view of local governance is
contingent on broad participation and inclusivity, empowered to consider the “local”
effects of “city-wide” issues, rather than distinguishing them. The power of the ward,
coupled with the narrow scope of BIAs and neighbourhood associations, undermines the
flourishment that Foster and Iaione assert. Redesigned local governance offers an
opportunity to realize an accessible entry to decision-making that avoids both the singular
discretion of councillors and the narrow interests of BIAs and neighbourhood
associations. Fundamentally, this reimagination means experimenting with a governance
model that includes a wider range of voices and disrupting existing practices of a
councillor-focused model.
The principles underpinning this reimagined local governance model were sketched in
Chapter 6. The City of Toronto has created a distinction between “local” and “city-wide”
decision-making, with one route for each kind of decision. This dissertation queried this
distinction in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, asking instead whether local issues may be city-wide,
and vice versa. In the 2012-13 decision, the local issues were traffic, threats to local
business, quality of life for nearby residents, and the effects on nearby vulnerable
populations. In the 2015 decision, the local issue was the employment opportunities of
residents.
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This challenges the “local” versus “city-wide” distinction present in the city’s procedural
bylaw, the basis of which determines what may be delegated to community councils for
deliberation or decision-making. In Santos’ conception of scale, a large-scale map shows
less land but far more detail (“a miniaturized version of reality”) and small-scale more
land, showing relative positions, but ultimately less detail.1159 The scales are a lens by
which information is presented, whether the degree of detail or relative positions, a
“zooming in.” Under Santos’ conception of scale, a ward or community council could be
thought of in the context of large-scale law, where there is a zooming in on the localized
area to study the effects on the community. “Local” issues may thus be “city-wide”
issues, too. Transforming Jacobs’ notion that localized bodies fulfill the democratic ideal
of representation that is closer to the community, suggesting separate, delegated powers,
this framing instead suggests that smaller-than-city bodies can examine the localized
effects of city-wide issues. A casino labelled “city-wide,” cannot be set aside from the
local governance scale.
A next step would be to put these principles into practice, sketching out the legal model
that would result in these reimagined community councils. This dissertation began with
an example of a live issue in Toronto: the local impacts of the city-wide Scarborough
subway project. The reimagined community councils, premised on the urban commons,
would provide an opportunity to give residents a voice.1160
II. The limits of “local” literature
In addition to practical implications of municipal governance, this dissertation illustrated
some of the theoretical challenges of a review of the governance of local legal spaces.
First, this dissertation revealed the need for more theoretical work, both diagnostic and
normative, on the legal foundations of city governance tailored to the Canadian
experience. An assertion raised in this project was the extent to which history matters, as
illustrated in Chapter 3, whereby the city’s wards, community councils, and
1159
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neighbourhood associations continue to reflect the towns and villages that used to lie
within its borders. Likewise, the dissertation demonstrated that provincial action – and
especially the spelling out of community councils at the time of amalgamation – mattered
in the development of the city’s local governance model.
However, much of the theory that seeks to explain local governance is drawn from
American scholars. As argued in Chapter 1, the analysis from legal scholars Frug,
Alexander, Schragger, and others focus on city governance from the perspective of
American cities which have their legal histories of annexations and amalgamations,
spatial inequality, and municipal responses unique to their jurisdictions. Moreover,
relationships between cities and state governments differ than those of Canadian urban
areas. These distinctions are relevant as applied to the structure of local governance in
Canadian cities, whose legal models are constitutionally structured to allow for provincial
determination and oversight over their affairs. In the American literature, regional
governance is advanced as a model by which municipal power can be tempered, whereas
in the Canadian case, regional governance is equally at the discretion of provincial
governments. As such, the arguments of Young, Frug, and Ford that regional
governments are the model by which “local” control can be dovetailed are less relevant in
Canadian cities. It would be helpful to have further applications from the Canadian legal
context to nudge and mold these theoretical frameworks.
Second, and related, the notion of subsidiarity as a tool for understanding local
governance should be further explored. This dissertation only touched on the relevance of
subsidiarity as a further model for understanding delegation. Just before COTA’s
introduction, Levi and Valverde wrote on the impact of subsidiarity in advancing
municipal authority in the Canadian context. As noted in Chapter 3, after a decade of case
law affirming this principle favourably for municipal governments, recent lower court
decisions have begun to decide differently, narrowing the scope of what might rightly be
within their authority. Two possibility future applications include the extension of
subsidiarity to smaller-than-city areas of the city, applying Frug’s notion of
“neighbourhood constitutionalism” in the Canadian context and examining how
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subsidiarity should be applied to particular municipal governance decisions, especially
where councillors benefit from the existing model.1161
Third, this dissertation suggests further contributions to the emerging field of the urban
commons, including how this theoretical framework may be used as a lens through which
participatory governance can be normatively evaluated. Chapter 1 set out three rationales
for the establishment of local governance bodies like community councils, including the
retention of pre-amalgamation boundaries; the creation of government decision-making
that is closer to the community; and a greater degree of efficiency in local governance, by
allowing more delegation to local bodies. While each of these rationales are valid, I argue
that recrafted community councils allow for local legal spaces that are molded by all
residents, leading to a more inclusive, participatory governance framework.1162 The urban
commons is a notion with many definitions, although in the context of legal theory is
very much in the early stages of theoretical analysis. One possible inquiry could be the
development of a typology for the application of the urban commons to types of property
ownership, for example the private ownership claims of BIAs. A further study could
involve the establishment of principles that would underpin localized areas operating
within the context of an urban commons, including how such areas differ in their
governance models and how these models may be evaluated.
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Appendix A – List of Interviews
Interview with members of No Casino Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (11 May 2015)
– author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #1, City Clerk’s Office,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18 December 2015) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #2, Shelter, Support and
Housing Administration Division Toronto, Ontario, Canada (2 February 2016) – author
conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #3, City Manager’s Office,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (17 February 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #4, City Manager’s Office,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7 May 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto staff member #5, City Planning, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada (18 May 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5
July 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #2, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (7
July 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #3, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (18
July 2016) – author conducted.
Anonymous interview with City of Toronto councillor #4, Toronto, Ontario, Canada (5
August 2016) – author conducted.
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Appendix B - Toronto’s Business Improvement Areas
#%of%
MemName%of%BIA
bers #%of%Cllrs Ward
CC%area
Albion'IslingtonSquare
12
1
1 Etobicoke
Baby'Point'Gates
9
1
13 Etobicoke
Bayview'Leaside
9
2
22,'26 Mixed
Bloor'By'The'Park
7
2
13,'14 Mixed
Bloor'Street
5
1
27 TEY
Bloor'West'Village
9
1
13 Etobicoke
Bloor'Yorkville
15
1
27 TEY
BloorTAnnex
8
1
20 TEY
Bloorcourt'Village
14
2
18,'19 TEY
Bloordale'Village
8
1
18 TEY
Cabbagetown
12
1
28 TEY
Chinatown
20
1
20 TEY
ChurchTWellesley'Village
17
1
27 TEY
College'Promenade
10
2
18,'19 TEY
College'West
7
1
18 TEY
Corso'Italia
10
1
17 Etobicoke
Crossroads'of'the'Danforth
8
1
35 Scarborough
Danforth'Mosaic
21
29,'30,'31,'32
4
TEY
Danforth'Village
9
2
31,'32 TEY
Dovercourt'Village
8
2
18,'19 TEY
Downtown'Yonge
13
2
27,'28 TEY
DufferinTWingold
11
1
15 North'York
DuKe'Heights
14
1
8 North'York
Dundas'West
9
1
18 TEY
Dupont'by'the'Castle
7
3 20,'21,'22 TEY
Eglinton'Hill
7
1
12 Etobicoke
Emery'Village
13
1
7 Etobicoke
Fairbank'Village
9
2
15,'17 Mixed
Financial'District
12
2
20,'28 TEY
Forest'Hill'Village
7
2
21,'22 TEY
Gerrard'India'Bazaar
13
2
30,'32 TEY
Greektown'on'the'Danforth
15
2
29,'30 TEY
Harbord'Street
6
1
20 TEY
Hillcrest'Village
12
1
21 TEY
Historic'Queen'East
16
1
28 TEY
Junction'Gardens
11
2
13,'14 Mixed
Kennedy'Road
13
2
37,'40 Scarborough
Kensington'Market
11
1
20 TEY
Korea'Town
14
2
19,'20 TEY
Lakeshore'Village
11
1
6 Etobicoke
Leslieville
12
2
30,'32 TEY

Yr%Created
2006
2010
2015
1987
2006
1970
1985
1995
1979
1976
1982
2007
2002
2005
2013
1984
2008
2008
2006
1984
2001
2015
2014
2006
2009
1997
2003
2007
2013
1979
1981
1972
1985
1984
2006
1973
1980
2009
2004
1973
2013

Before%
Amalgamation
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE

Blocks
4
8
3
4
7
12
125
7
12
7
11
13
6
7
8
7
14
25
16
8
42
70
10
20
5
70
10
46
9
12
13
8
7
20
9
10
20
9
11
19

Businesses
167
83
170
118
89
400
2,500
109
302
122
200
411
125
100
93
174
112
500
200
25
750
120
1,321
166
60
81
2,500
115
1200
68
100
400
49
100
159
220
300
240
148
150
36

2015%
Budget
197,261
50,000
190,033
83,354
1,650,000
387,898
3,019,696
239,892
185,000
92,278
195,626
437,830
242,008
151,153
20,476
221,164
169,766
332,681
426,787
7,055
2,583,899
100,000
1,159,368
207,624
84,108
26,123
2,500,034
240,682
1,543,714
195,859
133,386
424,297
34,739
96,088
0
275,434
255,816
135,667
93,283
98,446
110,000

Budget%/%
Business
Admin
Marketing Maintenance
1,181
$64,435
$63,000
$50,000
602
$8,838
$5,000
$17,900
1,118
$64,497
$47,250
$33,000
706
$8,200
$1,900
$35,400
18,539
$7,000
$10,000
$30,000
970
$35,728
$79,000
$113,000
1,208
$539,950
$125,400
$1,044,500
2,201
$37,283
$21,882
$49,846
613
$48,900
$100,100
756
$9,580
$5,500
$8,000
978
$92,355
$6,500
$49,300
1,065
$162,627
$36,200
$78,300
1,936
$85,424
$30,000
$65,293
1,512
5,694
$7,000
220
$3,423
$7,500
$750
1,271
$60,267
$67,100
$79,100
1,516
$40,825
4,700
$26,500
665
$76,057
$61,000
$125,000
2,134
$67,868
$39,500
$203,500
282
2,239
$5,250
$4,000
3,445 $1,063,869
$266,080
$500,000
833
$51,769
$24,700
$2,800
878
$290,535
$107,000
$260,000
1,251
$63,672
$10,800
$99,300
1,402
$25,294
$2,160
$6,236
323
$9,877
$3,650
$5,250
1,000
$586,442 $1,052,000
$303,094
2,093
$62,439
$3,505
$31,393
1,286
$386,116
$562,803
$105,250
2,880
$55,678
$38,500
$36,500
1,334
$48,317
$7,500
$20,500
1,061
$121,839
$62,000
$172,500
709
$2,872
$6,530
$12,300
961
$24,805
$10,500
$13,400
0
1,252
$121,217
$49,400
$47,200
853
$27,627
$37,500
$129,500
565
$50,267
$9,750
$15,200
630
$26,389
$8,732
$33,482
656
$14,457
$7,700
$45,600
3,056
$52,067
$13,423
$2,500

$31,500
$143,000
$888,000
$4,800
$46,500

Total%vs.%
Budget
113%
102%
95%
75%
7%
83%
74%
54%
81%
66%
103%
95%
120%
8%
67%
120%
85%
91%
81%
163%
91%
89%
57%
105%
44%
97%
83%
84%
68%
83%
164%
293%
76%
99%

Admin%%
33%
18%
34%
10%
0%
9%
18%
16%
26%
10%
47%
37%
35%
4%
17%
27%
24%
23%
16%
32%
41%
52%
25%
31%
30%
38%
23%
26%
25%
28%
36%
29%
8%
26%

$82,500
$0
$45,000
$40,000
$26,700
$30,000

109%
76%
89%
116%
96%
89%

44%
11%
37%
28%
15%
47%

Festivals
$45,000
$19,078
$35,000
$17,000
$62,700
$96,000
$538,500
$20,800
$38,000
$53,000
$139,000
$109,000
$2,000
$60,000
$72,000
$40,000
$35,000
$0
$508,500
$10,000
$0
44,500
$3,700
$6,500
$131,000
105,250

Marketing% Maintenance%
%
%
Festivals%% Advocacy
32%
25%
23%
10%
36%
38%
25%
17%
18%
2%
42%
20%
1%
2%
4%
20%
29%
25%
4%
35%
18%
9%
21%
9%
0%
54%
0%
6%
9%
41%
3%
25%
27%
8%
18%
32%
12%
27%
45% Pships
0%
5%
0%
37%
4%
10%
30%
36%
27%
3%
16%
42%
18%
38%
12%
9%
48%
8%
74%
57%
0%
10%
19%
20%
25%
3%
10%
9%
22%
0% Y'(mx)
5%
48%
21%
3%
7%
4%
14%
20%
25%
42%
12%
5%
1%
13%
44%
36%
7%
0% Y
20%
19%
16%
6%
15%
107%
15%
41%
209%
19%
35%
14% Pships
11%
14%
48%
18%
15%
7%
9%
8%
12%

17%
51%
11%
36%
46%
2%

30%
0%
33%
43%
27%
27%
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#%of%
MemName%of%BIA
bers #%of%Cllrs
Liberty(Village
15
2
Little((Portugal
8
2
Little(Italy
12
1
Long(Branch
15
1
MidtownNYonge
12
1
Mimico(by(the(Lake
8
1
Mimico(Village
7
1
Mirvish(Village
9
2
Mount(Dennis
7
1
Mount(Pleasant
10
1
Oakwood(Village
8
2
Ossington(Avenue
11
1
Pape(Village
6
1
Parkdale(Village
12
1
Queen(Street(West
10
1
Regal(Heights(Village
10
1
Riverside(District
11
1
Roncesvalles(Village
10
1
Rosedale(Main(Street
13
2
Sheppard(East(Village
10
2
shopthequeensway.com
10
1
St.(Clair(Gardens
9
1
St.(Lawrence(Market(Neighbourhood
11
1
The(Beach
9
1
The(Danforth
11
2
The(Eglinton(Way
11
2
The(Kingsway
12
1
The(Waterfront
15
2
Toronto(Entertainment(District
22
2
Trinity(Bellwoods
9
1
Upper(Village
6
1
Uptown(Yonge
19
2
Village(of(Islington
7
1
West(Queen(West
17
2
Weston(Village
6
1
Wexford(Heights
11
1
Wilson(Village
16
1
Wychwood(Heights
9
1
YongeNLawrence(Village
7
2
YorkNEglinton
8
1

Ward
14,(19
18,(19
19
6
22
6
6
19,(20
11
22
15,(17
19
29
14
20
17
30
14
22,(27
41,(42
5
17
28
32
29,(30
16,(22
5
20,(28
20,(28
19
21
16,(25
5
18,(19
11
37
9
21
16,(25
15

CC%area
TEY
TEY
TEY
Etobicoke
TEY
Etobicoke
Etobicoke
TEY
Etobicoke
TEY
Mixed
TEY
TEY
TEY
TEY
Etobicoke
TEY
TEY
TEY
Scarborough
Etobicoke
Etobicoke
TEY
TEY
TEY
Mixed
Etobicoke
TEY
TEY
TEY
TEY
North(York
Etobicoke
TEY
Etobicoke
Scarborough
North(York
TEY
North(York
North(York

Yr%Created
2001
2007
1985
1987
2015
1985
1997
2005
1974
2008
2008
2014
1986
1978
2008
2000
1980
1985
2000
2007
2012
1985
1994
2004
1986
1987
1973
2004
2008
2007
1983
2005
1986
2005
1979
2004
2013
2002
2000
1981

Before%
Amalgamation
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
FALSE
TRUE

Blocks Businesses
28
500
6
132
14
178
6
113
9
140
10
51
6
39
6
97
7
61
7
200
9
106
4
126
4
80
11
340
11
300
8
120
10
120
16
270
8
193
10
500
27
300
7
125
20
1200
26
390
8
350
9
121
6
250
9
255
156
1,800
9
108
9
139
9
400
8
198
20
400
8
160
12
245
12
200
8
124
12
314
7
200

2015%
Budget
291,658
54,500
379,928
63,793
149,443
53,842
32,420
0
15,948
157,512
54,012
88,700
237,159
277,180
72,352
186,120
235,529
262,796
177,230
125,000
67,776
1,014,120
235,328
297,539
310,271
346,190
704,100
2,079,199
51,603
99,388
212,130
100,249
308,303
105,529
199,506
275,169
75,377
201,927
257,492

Budget%/%
Business
583
413
2,134
565
1,067
1,056
831
0
261
788
0
429
1,109
698
924
603
1,551
872
1,362
354
417
542
845
603
850
2,564
1,385
2,761
1,155
478
715
530
506
771
660
814
1,376
608
643
1,287

Admin
Marketing
$169,145
$50,000
$22,822
$2,000
$55,000
$42,000
$22,081
$3,000
$34,677
$20,000
$18,711
$8,462
$2,528
$7,900
$8,977
$2,000
$7,440
$300
$58,507
$25,100
$4,627
$18,757
$111,353
$80,082
$20,083
$94,119
$55,582
$66,781
$32,427
$28,477
$9,463
$246,067
$79,127
$109,477
$141,580
$79,622
$330,827
$429,211
$10,515
$11,137
$68,359
$26,967
$87,095
$74,874
$69,797
$73,288
$21,675
$72,327
$129,427

$13,475
$500
$10,500
$15,500
$8,000
$8,500
$7,500
$7,000
$92,900
$1,000
$1,500
$103,000
$20,500
$37,500
$78,500
$21,200
$102,000
$537,300
$20,250
$2,800
$43,855
$40,700
$19,800
$3,800
$12,000
$26,500
$34,200
$42,950
$20,000

Maintenanc
e
$53,500
$11,500
$52,000
$51,300
$3,000
$14,000
$3,035
$10,500
$11,750
$44,500

$22,300
$91,906
$21,900
$26,500
$35,450
$64,950
$87,800
$37,850
$12,000
$42,300
$231,000
$47,500
$85,828
$81,900
$80,500
$20,500
$360,331
$74,600
$34,770
$42,400
$135,000
$32,600
$55,950
$102,200
$27,030
$53,000
$31,000

Festivals
$60,000
$41,950
$234,000
$24,000
$20,000
$8,000
$15,000
$6,500
$950
$35,000
$30,000
$40,750
$48,330
$54,500
$17,000
$21,732
$276,100
90,000
$0
$25,000
$14,085
$150,000
$67,050
$104,500
$60,000
$305,900
$255,000
$46,700
$18,489
$3,000
$47,500
$4,600
$19,100
$38,600
$228,200
$11,000
$6,500
$30,700
$109,500

Total%vs.%
Budget
114%
144%
101%
157%
52%
91%
88%

Admin%%
58%
42%
14%
35%
23%
35%
8%

Marketing% Maintenanc
%
e%%
Festivals%% Advocacy
17%
18%
21%
4%
21%
77%
11%
14%
62%
5%
80%
38%
13%
2%
13%
16%
26%
15%
24%
9%
46%

128%
104%

47%
37%

2%
16%

74%
28%

6%
22%

89%
93%
111%
62%
99%
86%
172%
96%
92%
53%
99%
72%
91%
113%
117%
141%
101%
66%
95%
92%
92%
114%
85%
142%
183%
77%
119%
99%
113%

9%
21%
47%
29%
28%
51%
24%
25%
18%
23%
14%
24%
34%
37%
46%
23%
47%
21%
20%
11%
32%
27%
28%
71%
35%
27%
29%
36%
50%

25%
1%
4%
6%
11%
5%
3%
3%
52%
1%
2%
10%
9%
13%
25%
6%
14%
26%
39%
3%
21%
41%
6%
4%
6%
10%
45%
21%
8%

0%
25%
39%
8%
37%
19%
28%
33%
21%
10%
62%
23%
20%
29%
26%
23%
3%
17%
0%
75%
16%
42%
44%
31%
28%
37%
36%
26%
12%

56%
46%
20%
20%
23%
12%
117%
34%
0%
20%
21%
15%
28%
35%
19%
88%
36%
2%
36%
3%
22%
5%
6%
37%
114%
4%
9%
15%
43%

Pships

Y((Mx)

Y
Y
Y((Mx)

Key: # - number; Cllrs – councillors; CC - community council; Yr – year; % - percentage
Sources: City of Toronto. Business Improvement Areas (2017); Original research (Alexandra Flynn).
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Appendix C - Toronto’s Neighbourhood Associations
ABC Residents Association (ABC)
5 Greencrest Circuit/70 Stevenvale Road
Aberdeen Avenue Residents Group
Active18
Annex Residents’ Association
Ashdale Village Residents Association
Atkinson Housing Co-op/Alexandra Park Residents' Association
Avenue Road - Eglinton Community Association (ARECA)
Avondale Community Condominium Association
Balmy Beach Residents Association
Bathurst Finch Network
Bathurst Quay Neighbourhood Association
Bay Cloverhill Community Association
Bayview Cummer Neighbourhood Association
Bayview Village Association (BVA)
Beach Hill Neighbourhood Association
Beach Lakefront Neighbourhood Association
Beaconsfield Village Residents' Association
Bedford Park Residents Association
Bedford-Wanless Ratepayers Association
Bloor Street East Neighbourhood
Bloor West Village Residents Association
Bloordale CIA
Brockton Triangle Neighbours
Cabbagetown South Resident's Association
Carleton-Davenport Village Residents Association
Casa Loma Residents Association
Castle Hill Neighbourhood Association
Centennial Community and Recreation Association
Christie Pits Residents' Association
Church Wellesley Neighbourhood Association
CityPlace Residents' Association
College–Ossington–Dufferin–Argyle
Collier Asquith Neighbourhood Association
Concerned Citizens of Quarry Lands Development
Connaught/Lonsmount Area Ratepayers Association (CLARA)
Corktown Residents [and Business?] Association
Coronation Community of West Hill
Cottingham Square Community Association
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Curran Hall Community Association
Danforth East Community Association (DECA)
Davenport Neighbourhood Association (DNA)
Deer Park Residents Group Inc.
DIGIN
Don Mills Residents Inc.
Don Vale Cabbagetown Residents Association
Don Valley East Residents Association
Dovercourt College Residents' Association
Dovercourt Park Community Association
Downsview Lands Community
Dufferin Grove Residents' Association
East Beach Community Association
East Rouge Old Lansing Community Association
Edithvale-Yonge Community Association
Edwards Gardens Neighbourhood Association
Eglinton Park Residents Association
Fifeshire Road Area Community Association
Forest Hill Homeowners Association
Fort York Neighbourhood Association
Friends of Kensington Market
Garden District Residents Association
Garment District Neighbourhood Association
Gerrard East Community Organization
Glen Agar Residents Association
Glen Andrew Community Association
Glenorchy Residents Association
Gooderham & Worts Neighbourhood Association
Governors Bridge Ratepayers Association
Grange Community Association
Greater Yorkville Residents' Association
Greenwood Community Association
Guildwood Village Community Association (GVCA)
Harbord Village Residents' Association
Heathwood Ratepayers Association
Henry Farm Community Interest Association
Highland Creek Community Association
High Park Residents Association
Hillcrest Ratepayers Association
Homewood Avenue Neighbourhood Association
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Humber Bay Shores Condominium Association
Humber Valley Village Residents' Association
Huron-Sussex Residents Organization
Islington Ratepayers and Residents Association
Junction Residents Association
Kensington Market Action Committee
Kensington Residents Association
King Spadina Residents Association (possibly succeeded by TEDRA)
King West Residents Association
Kingsway Park Ratepayers Inc.
Lansing Community Association
Lawrence Park Ratepayers Association
Leaside Property Owners' Association (LPOA)
Liberty Village Residents Association
Long Branch Residents Association
Lytton Park Residents' Organization (LPRO)
Malvern Community Coalition
Markland Wood - Markland Homes Association (MHA)
Maryvale Community Association
McGill-Granby Village Residents' Association
Midland Park Community Association
Mimico Residents Association
Moore Park Residents Association
Morningside Heights Residents Association
Mount Dennis Community Association
Mulock Avenue Residents' Association
New Toronto Good Neighbours
Niagara Neighbourhood Now
North Bendale Community Association
North Rosedale Ratepayer's Association (NRRA)
Northcliffe Village Residents' Association
Norwood Park Neighbourhood Association
Oakwood Village Community Asociation (5 Points Community Action)
Old Mill Community Association
Old Millside Residents' Association
Old Orchard Grove Ratepayers Association
Oriole Park Association
Ossington Community Association
Palmerston Area Residents Association
Parkdale Residents Association
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Parkview Hills Community Association
Parkway Forest Community Association
Playter Area Residents’ Association
Queen-Beaconsfield Residents' Association
Queen Street West Residents Association
Queensway Residents' Association
Rathnelly Area Residents Association
Regal Heights Residents' Association
Regent Park Network
Residents Rising Community Association
Richmond Gardens Ratepayers and Residents Association
Ritchie–Herman–Golden–Silver
Rockcliffe Smythe Community Association
Roncesvalles-Macdonell Residents' Association (RMRA)
Scarborough Village Neighbourhood Association
Seaton Village Residents' Association
Sheppard-Leslie Homeowners Association (SLHA)
Sherwood Park Residents Association
Silverview Community Association (SCA)
South Armour Heights Residents Association
South Corso Italia Neighbourhood Association
South Eglinton Ratepayers' and Residents' Association (SERRA)
South Perth and Sterling Road Residents Association
South Rosedale Ratepayers' Association (SRRA)
St Clair West Village Residents' Association
St. Andrews Ratepayers Association
St. Jamestown Network
St. Lawrence Neighbourhood Association
Summerhill Residents Association
Sunnyside Community Association
Swansea Area Ratepayer's Association (SARA)
Teddington Park Residents Association
The Beach Triangle Residents Association
The Crescent Town Tenants Association
The Goldhawk Community Association
The Kew Beach Neighbourhood Association
The Pocket
The West Kingsway Ratepayers' Association
Thorncrest Homes Association Inc.
Toronto Beach East Residents' Association

353

Toronto Entertainment District Residents’ Association (TEDRA)
Toronto Harbourfront Community Association
Toronto Islands Community Association
Trefann Court Residents Association
Trinity Bellwoods Community Organization
Upper Jarvis Neighboroughood Association
Upper Middle Gainsborough Residents' Association
Uptown Yonge Neighbourhood Alliance
Victoria Village Ratepayers Association
Village at York Residents Association
Wellington Place Neighbourhood Association
West Bend Community Association
West Lansing Homeowners Associations
West Rouge Community Association WRCA
Weston Village Residents' Association
Willowdale N.E. Neighbourhood Association
Winchester Park Resident Association
Woodbine Park Residents' Association
Yonge Corridor Condominium Association
Yonge Ridge Homeowners Association
York Mills Gardens Community Association
York Mills Heights Residents Association
York Mills Valley Association
York Quay Neighbourhood Association
Sources: Topping, David. “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015);
Federation of North Toronto Residents Associations, "Member Associations" (2016) FONTRA;
Confederation of Resident & Ratepayer Associations in Toronto, "MM7.1 Request to Protect 250 year old
Red Oak Tree at 76 Coral Gable Drive City Council Meeting No. 7: June 10, 2015" (2015) CORRA;
Federation of Urban Neighbourhoods (Ontario), "Members and Their Affiliates By Municipality" (2016).
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Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

+
Y
Y
Y

+
Y

+
Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Coop/Condo

Priority-Area

Economic

Safety

Advocacy

Information

Environment

Traffic

Social-programs

Community

Name
Huron&Sussex+Residents+Organization
1968 Y
Y
Y
Y
Junction+Residents+Association
1999
Y
Kensington+Market+Action+Committee
1997 Y
+
Y
+
Lawrence+Park+Ratepayers+Association+ 1956 Y
Y
Y
Leaside+Property+Owners'+Association+LPOA
1950 Y
Y
Y
Long+Branch+Residents+Association
2015
+
Y
Lytton+Park+Residents'+Organization+LPRO 1970 Y
Y
Y
Y
Markland+Wood+&+Markland+Homes+Association+MHA
1962 Y
Y
Y
McGill&Granby+Village+Residents'+Association
1978 Y
Y
Y
Y
Mimico+Residents+Association
2005
Y
+
Y
Mount+Dennis+Community+Association
1975 Y
Y
North+Bendale+Community+Association 1961 Y
Y
Y
+
North+Rosedale+Ratepayer's+Association+NRRA
1949 Y
Y
Y
Y
Northcliffe+Village+Residents'+Association 2008
+
Y
Y
Norwood+Park+Neighbourhood+Association2007
+
+
+
Oakwood+Village+Community+Asociation+(5+Points+Community+Action)
2005
+
Y
+
Old+Orchard+Grove+Ratepayers+Association1985 Y
Y
Y
Oriole+Park+Association+
1954 Y
Y
Y
Y
Ossington+Community+Association
2012
Y
+
+
Palmerston+Area+Residents+Association 1985 Y
Y
Parkdale+Residents+Association
2005
Y
Playter+Area+Residents’+Association.
1972 Y
Queen&Beaconsfield+Residents'+Association2005
Rathnelly+Area+Residents+Association+
1963 Y
Y
Y
Y
Roncesvalles&Macdonell+Residents'+Association+RMRA
1973 Y
Y
+
Sheppard&Leslie+Homeowners+Association+SLHA
2004
Silverview+Community+Association+SCA 1974 Y
Y
Y
Y
South+Armour+Heights+Residents+Association
1988 Y
Y
+
South+Corso+Italia+Neighbourhood+Association+
2009
+
+
South+Eglinton+Ratepayers'+and+Residents'+Association+SERRA
1065 Y
Y
Y
Y
South+Rosedale+Ratepayers'+Association+SRRA
1931 Y
Y
Y
Y
St.+Andrews+Ratepayers+Association+
1988 Y
Y
Y
Y
Swansea+Area+Ratepayer's+Association+&+SARA
1929 Y
+
Y
Y
The+Beach+Triangle+Residents+Association 1985 Y
+
Y
+
The+Pocket
2012
The+West+Kingsway+Ratepayers'+Association
1950 Y
Y
Y
+
Thorncrest+Homes+Association+Inc.
1975 Y
Toronto+Beach+East+Residents'+Association+(no+website)
2008
Y
Y
+
Toronto+Islands+Community+Association 2005
+
Y
Trefann+Court+Residents+Association
2008
+
Uptown+Yonge+Neighbourhood+Alliance 2013
Y
Victoria+Village+Ratepayers+Association 1960 Y
+
Y
+
West+Bend+Community+Association
1990 Y
Y
Y
West+Rouge+Community+Association+WRCA1983 Y
Y
Willowdale+N.E.+Neighbourhood+Association
2008
Y
Y
Y
Winchester+Park+Resident+Association+(see+brochure)
1975 Y
Y
+
Yonge+Corridor+Condominium+Association 2000
Y
Y
Y
York+Mills+Gardens+Community+Association1975 Y
Y
Y
York+Quay+Neighbourhood+Association
2003
Y
Y
+

Planning-and-land-use

Fee

Residents

Incorporated

Before--Amalgamation

Origin

Appendix D - Data on Neighbourhood Associations
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Coop/Condo

Priority-Area

Economic

$
$
Y
Y

Safety

Information

$
$
$

Advocacy

Environment

Traffic

Social-programs

Community

Planning-and-land-use

Fee

Residents

Incorporated

Before--Amalgamation

Origin

Name
ABC$Residents$Association$ABC
1957 Y
Y
Y
$
Y
$
$
Y
Balmy$Beach$Residents$Association
2004
$
Y$
Y
$
$
Y
Bathurst$Finch$Network
2009
$
Y
Y
$
Y
Y
$
Bathurst$Quay$Neighbourhood$Association2000
Y
Y
Y
Y
Bay$Cloverhill$Community$Association
1995 Y
Y
Y
Y
Bayview$Cummer$Neighbourhood$Association
1978 Y
Y
$
Y
Y
Bayview$Village$Association$BVA
1956 Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Beach$Hill$Neighbourhood$Association$I$http://www.beachhill.org/p/aboutIbhna.html
2012
Y
Y
Beach$Lakefront$Neighbourhood$Association
2007
Y
$
Y
BedfordIWanless$Ratepayers$Association 2011
Y
Y
Y
Y
Bloor$Street$East$Neighbourhood$
2002
Y
Y
Y
Y
Bloor$West$Village$Residents$Association 2005
Y
Y
Y
Y
Bloordale$CIA
2013
$
$
Y
Brockton$Triangle$Residents$Associationhttp://groups.yahoo.com/group/brocktonneighbours
2006
$
Cabbagetown$South$Resident's$Association2002
Y
Casa$Loma$Residents$Association
2009
Y
Y
Y
Castle$Hill$Neighbourhood$Association
1990 Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Centennial$Community$and$Recreation$Association
1949 Y
y
Y
Y
Y
Christie$Pits$Residents'$Association
2012
Y
Y
Church$Wellesley$Neighbourhood$Association
2011
Y
$
Y
Y
Y
College–Ossington–Dufferin–Argyle
2011
$
$
Concerned$Citizens$of$Quarry$Lands$Development
2003
Y
Y
Y
Connaught$/$Lonsmount$Area$Ratepayers$Association$CLARA
1998
Y
Y
Y
Corktown$Residents$[and$Business?]$Association
1975 Y
Y
Y
$
Y
Coronation$Community$of$West$Hill
2005
Y
Y
Y
Danforth$East$Community$Association$I$DECA
2007
Y
Y
Y
Y
Davenport$Neighbourhood$Association$DNA
2007
$
$
Y
Y
Deer$Park$Residents$Group$Inc.
2008
Y
Y
Y
Y
DIGIN
2002
$
$
Y
Y
Don$Vale$Cabbagetown$Residents$Association$
1975 Y
Y
$
Y
Dovercourt$College$Residents'$Association 2015
Y
Y
Y
Dovercourt$Park$Community$Association 2013
Y
Downsview$Lands$Community
1995 Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Edwards$Gardens$Neighbourhood$Association$
2005
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Eglinton$Park$Residents$Association
2007
Y
Y
Y
Forest$Hill$Homeowners$Association$
1947 Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Fort$York$Neighbourhood$Association
2012
$
Y
$
Y
Friends$of$Kensington$Market
2013
Y
$
Y
Garden$District$Residents$Association
1989 Y
Y
Garment$District$Neighbourhood$Association
2015
$
$
Y
Y
Glen$Agar$Residents$Association
2014
Y
Y
Y
Glen$Andrew$Community$Association
1960s
$
Y
Y
Y
Gooderham$&$Worts$Neighbourhood$Association
2001
Y
$
Y
Y
Governors$Bridge$Ratepayers$Association$ 1980 Y
Y
Y
Y
Grange$Community$Association
2008
$
Y
Y
Y
Greater$Yorkville$Residents'$Association 1990 Y
$
Y
Y
Guildwood$Village$Community$Association$GVCA
1958 Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Harbord$Village$Residents'$Association
1999
Y
Y
Heathwood$Ratepayers$Association
1985 Y
Y
Y
Y
Henry$Farm$Community$Interest$Association
1978 Y
$
Y
Y
Y
Y
Humber$Bay$Shores$Condominium$Association
1997 Y
Y
Y
Y

$
$
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
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Sources: Topping, David. “Toronto Residents' Associations & Neighbourhood Groups Map” (2015);
Federation of North Toronto Residents Associations, "Member Associations" (2016) FONTRA;
Confederation of Resident & Ratepayer Associations in Toronto, "MM7.1 Request to Protect 250 year old
Red Oak Tree at 76 Coral Gable Drive City Council Meeting No. 7: June 10, 2015" (2015) CORRA;
Federation of Urban Neighbourhoods (Ontario), "Members and Their Affiliates By Municipality" (2016);
Original research (Alexandra Flynn).
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Appendix E - Comparison of ward/electoral boundary approaches of other municipalities
Municipality

Population

Councillors

Ottawa, ON
London, ON

883,391
366,150

23
14

Average ward
pop.
38,408
26,154

Mississauga, ON
Halifax, NS

713,443
390,095

11
16

64,858
24,395

Winnipeg, MB

663,617

15

44,421

Regina, SK

193,100

10

19,310

Edmonton, AB
Calgary, AB

812,201
1,096,833

12
14

67,683
78,345

Vancouver, BC

603,500

10

New York, USA

8,406,000

Chicago, USA

2,719,000

5 borough
presidents; 51
councillors
50 aldermen

Councillors
elected at large
164,824
54,380

Last review
2005
2005 (as of 2011,
required every term
of council)
2005
2014 (required every
8 years)
2009 (required every
10 years)
2014 (required at
least every 3 election
cycles)
2016
2016

Consultant
/commission?
Yes
No

Final ward
decision-maker
City Council*
City Council*

No
No

City Council*
Nova Scotia Utility
and Review Board
City Council*

Information
unavailable
Independent
commission

Independent
commission
City Council
City Council

N/A

No
Ward Boundary
Commission
N/A

2013 (required every
10 years)

Independent
commission

United States
Department of
Justice
City Council

2012 (required every
10 years)
Los Angeles,
3,884,000
15 councillors
252,847
2011 (required every
USA
10 years)
* Ward decisions made by City Council may be appealed to a quasi-judicial municipal board.

No
Independent
commission

N/A

City Council

Source: Alexandra Flynn, “(Re)creating Boundary Lines: Assessing Toronto’s Ward Boundary Review Process” (2017) 32 IMFG Papers on Municipal Finance
and Governance 1 at 12.
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